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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
This report evaluates the innovative activities and strategies of the European telecom 
equipment sector, which includes line telephony, radio communication, and TV and 
radio broadcasting equipment. Part One examines publicly available data on 
production, trade, patents and technological trends, while Part Two presents the 
results of analyses of the 1993 Community Innovation Survey (CIS). The CIS provides 
·. data on the innovative strategies in 1992 of up to 210 European telecom equipment 
manufacturers in Norway and in six EU countries, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, 
the Netherlands, and Belgium, that were responsible for 80% of total telecom 
equipment production in the EU in 1992. The timing of the CIS survey provides a 
snapshot of conditions in the European telecom equipment sector before the 
liberalisation and privatisation of telecom services in most European countries. 
The purpose of this Executive Summary and Conclusion 'is to integrate and highlight 
the main results of Part One and Two that are of particular interest to European 
innovation policy. 
European firms have a substantial position of strength in global telecom equipment. 
In 1994 four EU firms, Alcatel, Siemens, Ericsson, and Nokia ranked among the 
world's top ten telecom equipment manufacturers, while European firms, as a whole, 
had approximately 42% of the world market in 1990. 
Other than a recession year of 1993, total European production of telecom equipment 
has been growing steadily between 1989 and 1995, though employment has been 
falling because of increasing productivity. However, rising production is largely due 
to a rapid increase in radio and broadcast equipment, including mobile telephone 
systems, while production in the traditional areas of line telephony and public 
networks has declined slightly since the peak year of 1991. These production figures 
are also reflected in sales data for Europe. The percentage of all European telecom 
equipment sales from radio and broadcasting equipment, over half of which are from 
mobile telephone systems, increased from 36.0% in 1989 to 41.0% in 1994, while the 
share of switching equipment fell from 31.5% to 25.0%. High market growth in 
mobile systems, a main area of European strength, is expected to continue. 
Imports of telecom equipment world-wide increased from 55.4 billion US in 1990 to 
71.2 billion in 1993, giving an indication of growth rate and size of the world market. 
The EU-12 consistently ran an extra-EU trade surplus in line telephony equipment 
between 1984 and 1993, though there was a trade deficit for all telecom equipment 
in 1989, which moved into surplus by 1991. The advent of Finland and Sweden to the 
EU after 1995 should increase the extra-EU trade surplus because of mobile 
·· • communication sales by both Ericsson and Nokia to American and Asian markets. 
Patent application rates at the EPO for telecom equipment increased 319% between 
1980 and 1991, partly because of a rapid increase in patenting by American and 
Japanese firms seeking to protect ~eir innovations in the European market and an. 
increase in patenting by Finnish firms. The increase in application rates for Germany 
i 
and France were below average, at 97.8% and 99.3% respectively. These rates 
compare favourably, however, with an increase in patent applications of 78% by 
American firms in their home market of the US and do not, by themselves, suggest 
that French and German firms are technically lagging behind their competitors. 
The success of the European telecom equipment sector is built upon technologically 
competitive products in a high R&D intensity industry. The high cost of product 
development in telecom equipment requires large markets and high sales to be able 
to recover R&D investments. The European single market, the successful GSM 
standard for mobile communications, and the procurement policies of national 
telecom service operators to favour national equipment manufacturers, have helped 
to ensure that these investments were economically feasible. National operators also 
invested heavily in upgrading public networks, thereby guiding the innovation 
agenda towards large public, switched systems. 
Some of these past conditions for the success of the European telecom sector are 
changing, creating new hazards and market turbulence. The dominance of public 
network providers as the major purchasers of telecom equipment, and consequently 
as the driving force behind the innovation agenda, is declining, as the technology 
lead shifts to consumer premise equipment and private networks. A greater 
proportion of output is being sold to either business users, for example for Private 
J3ranch Exchange (PBX) and Computer Telephony Integration (CTI) systems, or to 
individuals, as with mobile phones and fax machines. The dominance of networks 
is also declining because of a global move towards the privatisation of telecom 
services and greater competition. This has often broken close relationships between 
telecom equipment manufacturers and the telecom service sector, opening up 
previously closed procurement markets to new competitors. This could have serious 
repercussions for less competitive European firms. The liberalization of telecom 
services in the US in 1982 and in the UK in 1984 is believed to be partly responsible 
for both countries moving from a trade surplus between 1978 and 1982 to a trade 
deficit in telecommunications equipment between 1983 and 1987 (OECD, 1991). 
There are five key emerging technologies in telecom systems: 1) switching, 
transmission and network management, 2) the Intelligent Network, 3) mobile 
communications, 4) customer premise equipment and private networks, and 5) 
integrating fixed and mobile networks. 
The success of some of these emerging technologies depends on their ability to 
overcome substantial public network and user commitment to existing legacy systems 
for switching, line and other equipment. The problem is often one of migration paths, 
or how to move from existing telecom systems to the "Information Society", based on 
high bandwidth systems capable of transmitting voice, data, and video. Other 
emerging technologies provide intermediate methods to upgrade existing systems, 
thereby extending their useful life, but delaying the introduction of more advanced 
technologies. 
Many of the most advanced new systems take advantage of the computer power 
available at user terminals. One example is Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM), a 
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technology for public networks. A TM can replace the use of central nodes for many 
switching and routing functions with the 'intelligence' of user terminals. A similar-
example is the Intelligent Network, which decentralises some network control tasks 
from centralised switching facilities to computer-operated nodes. 
The diffusion of A TM is inhibited by five problem areas, some of which also affect 
the diffusion of other telecom technologies. These problem areas are: how to migrate 
to the new technology from existing systems, unsolved technical difficulties, delays 
in developing standards, conflicts between standards, for example for consumer 
premise equipment versus public networks or between countries, and price 
discrepancies between European networks. 
Two major problems confront European telecom firms in the face of changing market 
structures and technological trends. 
First, the technical capabilities of European telecom equipment firms are dangerously 
concentrated in the telecommunication side of network-based markets with major 
weaknesses in integrating telecom with computers and software. This is a serious 
problem because a common feature of many of the new technologies is the 
importance of increasing and decentralising system intelligence, which require greater 
processing capabilities and software. Furthermore, the European lead in 
telecommunication technology, though supported by EU programmes such as RACE 
and ESPRIT, is narrowing, while the European lag with its American and Asian 
competitors in the complementary computing and software technologies is not 
narrowing. European firms appear to strongly depend on joint ventures with non-
European, mostly American firms, for these complementary technologies. Reliance 
upon non-European firms for the provision of the •intelligence' to shape new 
network capabilities and service concepts will likely remain a structural feature of the 
European telecom industry for some time to come. 
Second, the ability of Eo/opean telecom equipment firms to control the content and 
pace of development of standards has historically been a major support mechanism 
for their product development strategies. This is breaking down because of the 
growing importance of computer and software firms to the development of standards 
· and the concomitant decentralisation of standards development. 
At the same time as these changing conditions are creating new hazards for the 
telecom equipment sector, new opportunities are opening up. Upgrading of the 
European telecommunication network to permit higher bandwidths, the blossoming 
of new markets in Eastern Europe, Latin America and Asia, and growing world-wide 
demand for mobile systems, all point toward market expansion and the potential for 
strengthening the competitive position of European firms. Maintaining this 
competitive position requires an aggressive innovation strategy to develop the 
equipment necessary to succeed in high-growth markets. Exploiting the opportunities 
'1 • in emerging markets could also require a different blend of capabilities, in which 
reducing manufacturing costs could equal the importance of product innovation. 
The analyses of the CIS data focus on six areas that are of interest to innovation 
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policy and the responSe by telecom firms to the challenges raised by technological 
trends. The six areas include the factors that determine whether or not a firm 
innovates and innovative success, the types of innovation that a firm undertakes, the 
importance of external sources of knowledge, particularly publicly funded research 
and technology acquisition from outside of Europe, the importance of an aggressive 
innovation strategy, the effect of regulation and other barriers to innovation, and the 
factors that influence the export rate. The analyses use the firm as the unit of analysis. 
Component firms and a group of other high technology firms, drawn from electronic 
equipment, office equipment and instruments, are used as comparison groups. 
Firm size, measured by the number of employees, has a major influence on 
innovation by telecom firms. There is a strong, positive relationship between firm size 
and the probability of innovating, measures of innovative success, and between firm 
size and the proportion of innovative products in total firm sales. However, there is 
no relationship between firm size and export performance, or the percentage of 
exports in total sales. The lack of a relationship between firm size and exports could 
reflect dynamic, innovative activity among small and medium sized (SME) telecom 
firms, but a more plausible explanation is probably due to relatively low export rates 
by some large firms which sell a substantial proportion of their output to domestic 
telecom service firms or PITs. 
A higher proportion of the total innovation expenses of telecom firms is spent on 
R&D than for component and other hitech firms, but relatively more of this R&D 
component is focused on process instead of product innovation. This could have a 
beneficial effect on lowering costs. Both the R&D share and the focus of product 
innovation increase with the absolute level of R&D expenditures in the telecom 
sector, indicating that new product development is more common among larger 
telecom firms. The more successful innovative telecom firms spend a lower 
proportion of their R&D budget outside of the firm, indicating that success depends 
on the ability of firms to develop their own, internal innovative strengths. 
European subsidies for public research appear to have had few positive impacts on 
the telecom sector. Public research is not rated as an important source of information 
by telecom firms, both in comparison with component and other hitech firms and in 
comparison with other information sources. This low rating overall disguises 
important differences by the type of public research. The most valuable public 
research source for telecom firms is government laboratories, while the type of 
research conducted at universities and technical institutes is considerably less 
important to telecom firms than, for example, for component firms. 
Telecom firms that find public research to be an important source of information are 
more likely to be successful innovators, which is encouraging, given public subsidies 
for public research. However, the positive benefits of public research do not appear 
to be due to programmes to encourage cooperative R&D. Large, export-oriented 
telecom firms are most likely to participate in cooperative R&D programmes, but 
telecom firms with a high percentage of innovative products in their total sales are 
less likely to participate. Therefore, the positive value of public research on innovative 
success is probably due to informal or other means of acquiring knowledge from 
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public research institutions rather than through cooperative R&D. A further, 
worrisome result is that firms that find public research of importance are less likely 
to pursue aggressive innovation strategies to create new markets outside of Europe 
and to develop new products. It is possible that public research is more oriented to 
the needs of firms that are pursuing defensive strategies than the needs of firms that 
are more likely to maintain European competitiveness in telecom equipment. 
Telecom firms obtain new technologies from sources outside of Europe more 
frequently than component firms. This could reflect the acquisition of components 
and software technology from outside Europe, but unfortunately there is no 
information on the types of technologies that are acquired. Equipment purchases and 
communication with foreign firms are the m~st important means by which telecom 
firms acquire new technologies from outside of Europe. Both are linked to success, 
with a positive relationship between exports and communication with non-European 
firms and between innovative product share and equipment purchases from outside 
of Europe. The fact that telecom firms are acquiring needed technologies from outside 
of Europe suggests that the single market is not forming a barrier to sourcing 
material from other countries. 
The ability to ob~ain new technologies from foreign sources, and the importance of 
these sources, are both strongly linked to the size of the firm. SMEs may benefit from 
programmes to assist them in acquiring expertise held by foreign, particularly 
American firms. 
Telecom firms are less likely than component and other high tech firms to find 
aggressive innovative strategies to be important. However, the probability that firms 
will find several goals that are related to future export success - lowering costs, 
developing new products in the main product field, and creating foreign markets, 
increases with the share of the firm's sales from exports. These results, though 
admittedly sparse and exploratory, further suggest that the European telecom sector 
is relying too much on defensive innovation strategies, while export success is related 
to an aggressive strategy. 
The relative failure of telecom firms to adopt aggressive innovative strategies, 
compared to component firms, could have been caused by protected national markets 
for telecom firms, rather than a displacement effect of the single market, whereby 
firms expend most of their effort on expanding their European market while 
neglecting foreign ones. 
A more aggressive approach is particularly important for telecom firms with their 
main strengths in line telephony equipment. The loss of protected markets due to the 
liberalisation of telecom services, and stagnant markets in Europe, North America and 
Japan mean, that these firms must both move into new technologies that integrate 
telecom, computing and software, and aggressively pursue new markets in Asia. 
The question on legislation and standards is not formulated in a way that is 
particularly useful for this sector. It is not possible to determine if the low importance 
attached to this factor by telecom compared to component and other hitech firms is 
v 
due to the respondents perceiving legislation as basically advantageous, or if they are 
simply less likely to view legislation as a negative factor. 
The importance of barriers to innovation is usually unrelated to the size of telecom 
firms. Of interest, firms with a high export share and a goal to create new foreign 
markets are more concerned about their internal capabilities to innovate and market 
uncertainty. This could reflect intense technological competition in export markets. 
This suggests that telecom firms that are export oriented and seeking to move into 
foreign markets, perhaps the most important firms for European competitiveness, 
could be confronting barriers in their ability to acquire skilled personnel and technical 
and market information. There are probably few short-term policy options to solve 
a lack of skilled personnel. Making it easier to hire staff from outside the EC does not 
appear to be a potential solution, since firms that hire staff from abroad are less 
innovative than firms that do not. We assume that these firms are using this strategy 
to catch-up technically, but that this is not a widespread solution. Conversely, close 
attention to the role of standards in reducing uncertainty could be of benefit. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This report provides an overview of the innovative activities and strategies of the 
European telecom equipment sector in the early 1990s, using both publicly available 
data, for example on patents and technologica~ trends, and analyses of the data 
gathered by the Community Innovation (CIS) survey. Though the focus of this study 
is innovation, additional results on production, trade, markets and employment are 
given in order to provide a full description of conditions in this sector. In addition, 
production and trade data can serve as proxy indictors of the technological 
competitiveness of an industry. 
The European telecom equipment sector faces profound change, partly as a result of 
the privatisation of telecom services in many countries, and partly because of the 
development of a range of technological options for providing existing and future 
services. Privatisation occurred in the UK in 1984, and is either underway or planned 
in other EU member states in the late 1990s. These changes in the status of telecom 
services directly affects the European telecom equipment manufacturing sector 
because of the traditionally close commercial links between national service providers 
and major equipment vendors. Examples include the long-standing ties between 
Telecom France and Alcatel and between Deutsche Telekom and Siemens. 
Privatisation and open tendering for new equipment, as part of the EU competition 
policy, are likely to reduce these close commercial links between telecom equipment 
manufacturers and service providers and to expose the European telecom equipment 
sector to greater competition. 
The CIS survey, mailed in 1993, provides a wealth of data on the innovative strategies 
of European telecom equipment manufacturers in Norway and in six EU countries: 
France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, and Belgium1• The survey obtained 
subjective data on innovative strategies over the three year period between 1990 and 
1992 and quantitative information on employment, sales, and R&D expenditures for 
1992. This time period predates planned privatisation in these seven countries. 
Therefore, the results largely reflect innovative strategies in the telecom equipment 
sector before the major push to privatise services, though respondents would have 
been aware of the impact of future changes from following the effects of privatisation 
in the UK or the liberalisation of telecom markets in the US in 1982, and presumably 
would have begun preparing for privatisation. The timing of the CIS survey is also 
1 Though the CIS was also implemented in the remaining six EU countries of the UK, Denmark, 
Luxembourg, Spain, Greece, and Portugal, data limitations preclude using respondents from these 
countries, as explained in full in Part Two. 
1 
significant for one other reason- it was mailed during the worst economic conditions 
in the telecom sector for over a decade. After years of steadily growing production, 
the output of the EU telecom sector fell by 11.6% between the peak production year 
of 1992 and 1993. 
The timing of the CIS questionnaire creates both a liability and an opportunity for 
research on the telecom sector. The liability is that the results for this sector may soon 
be outdated by the changes initiated by privatisation. Furthermore, some of the 
subjective questions, for example on barriers to innovation, could have been 
influenced by the 1993 recession in this sector, leading respondents to give relatively 
pessimistic responses. The opportunity is that the results provide a snapshot of 
conditions before the privatisation of telecom services that can be used as a baseline 
for future surveys of the telecom equipment sector after privatisation is completed. 
The report that follows is divided into two main parts. Part One provides a general 
overview of current conditions in the sector, based on publicly available data. This 
review examines the current structure of the sector, including the main players, 
markets, export and import trends; patenting actiyity, and major technological trends, 
including the main factors such as standards and legacy technologies that influence 
the potential market success of new technologies. Part Two presents the results of the 
analyses of the CIS survey on the innovative activities of European firms. Many of 
these analyses focus on some of the main issues raised in Part One. The Conclusion 
is given as the Executive Summary and integrates the results of Part One and Part 
Two and discusses their policy significance. Additional information is provided in 
several appendices. Appendix A discusses several methodological problems that are 
raised by the CIS survey, including a comparison between estimates for production 
and exports based on CIS results and actual figures, and makes recommendations for 
the design of future innovation surveys of this sector. Appendix B provides 
additional background information for the general review of Part One and the CIS 
analyses of Part Two. 
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PART ONE 
REVIEW OF THE TELECOM EQUIPMENT SECTOR 
1 CURRENT STRUCTURE OF THE TELECOM EQUIPMENT SECTOR 
There is no single definition of the telecom equipment sector that is used for all basic 
statistics on production, trade, and market size - the definition varies between 
different organisations and publications. A narrow definition is limited to a core 
group of line telephony equipment, consisting of switching and transmission 
equipment, telephones, and other terminal equipment such as fax machines and 
teletype units. A wider definition that forms the basis of major industrial classification 
systems such as NACE, ISIC, and SITC includes all line telephony equipment plus 
radio communications, mobile systems, and TV and radio broadcasting equipment, 
though they can also include some other products. An extended definition, used by 
some industry publications, recognizes the increasing importance of related software. 
The least satisfactory definition includes products that are only distantly related to 
communications equipment. This definition is often used in research where data is 
only available at the 2-digit level for NACE or ISIC classification systems (see 
Appendix B, Table B-1 for a summary of each definition). 
Not surprisingly, how the telecom equipment sector is defined has a considerable 
impact on basic statistics for production, sales and exports. For example, the 1995 
Panorama Report, using the narrow definition of the telecom sector, estimates that 
total production of telecom equipment in the four major European countries of 
France, Germany, Italy, and the UK was 14,566 million ECUs in 1993. An estimate 
based on the wide definition of telecom equipment is 53.8% higher, at 22,400 million 
ECUs (YWED, 1996). Wherever possible, this report uses the wide definition of the 
telecom equipment sector because it is also used to define 'telecom firms in the 
analyses of the CIS survey re~ults. Furthermore, this definition includes radio 
communications equipment, which is one of the fastest growing telecom markets. 
1.1 Major Telecom Equipment Firms 
Table 1.1lists the world's ten largest telecom equipment manufacturers, by 1994 sales 
using the extended definition of the telecom equipment sector, and their main 
products. Four firms are- from EU countries: Alcatel, Siemens, Ericsson, and Nokia. 
Table 1.2lists the 14largest European telecom equipment firms, using 1992 sales data 
in order to provide direct comparison to CIS results, and the percentage of each 
firm's total sales from telecom equipment. Nine firms are from countries covered by 
the CIS survey. As shown in Table 1.2, there is a wide variation in the percentage of 
3 
Table 1.1 World's Ten Largest Telecom Equipment Manufacturers in 1994, based 
on sales (million US) of Telecom Equipmentl 
Firm Country 1994 Sales Main Telecom Products 
1 AT&T us 14279 Public & private network systems 
2·, Alcatel France 14245 ., Public & private network systems , 
3 Motorola us 14236 Mobile, data communication 
.4 Siemens Germany 12156 Public & ppvate network systems 
5 '•, Eri(:SS()I\ sweden 10485 . Public, mobile network systems 
6 NEC Japan 10049 Public & private network systems 
7 Nortel Canada 8253 Public & private network syst~ms 
8 IBM us 6200 Com_E_uter network systems & hardware 
9 Fujitsu Japan 4894 Public & private network systems 
10 Nokia Finland 3697 Mobile, .public network products & systems 
':Source: Communications Week International, 7 November, 1995; 14 November 1994. Shaded lines identify European firms. 
Table 1.2 Largest European Telecom Equipment Firms by Sales Revenues for 
1992 - 1994 (Million US dollars) and the Percent of Total 1992 Sales 
from Telecom Equipmentl 
% Total 1992 sales 
Firm Country 1992 1993 1994 from Telecom 
Equipment 
Als:atel · France 14856 14544 14245 52.7 
Siemens Germany 11223 11986 12156 24.3 
Ericsson Sweden 5749 7703 10485 84.8 
Bosch Germany 2543 2655 3071 13.5 
GEC UK 2255 1917 2221 11.6 
Philips Netherlands 2081 1831 1588 5.8 
Sa gem France 1999 2049 1315 89.0 
I tal tel Italy 1751 '1558 1525 93.3 
Matra Hachette France '1508 1508 1679 15.8 
Nokia Finland 1431 2161 3697 48.9 
BICC UK 826 826 885 14.0 
DeTeWe Germany 761 721 83.4 
Pirelli Italy 746 768 749 13.1 
Racal UK 673 667 749 50.1 
1:Source: Communications Week International, 7 November, 1995; 14 November 1994. Shaded lines identify countries included 
in the CIS analyses. 
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total sales from telecom equipment, which ranges from a high of 93.3% for Italtel to 
5.8% for Philips. Between 1992 and 1994 the sales of the two largest firms, both 
producers of public and private network products, changed very little, while the sales 
of firms in mobile communications, such as Ericsson and Nokia, increased very 
rapidly. As a result, Nokia moved from lOth place in 1992 to fourth place in 1994. 
1.2.Telecom Equipment Markets 
Growth rates in the telecom equipment market during the 1980s ranged from 3% to 
6% in the US, Japan and Europe (YWED, 1991). Between 1989 and 1992 the telecom 
equipment market in the EU-15 countries increased approximately 8% per year from 
31.6 billion US to 39.5 billion US, before falling to 32.2 billion in the 1993 recession 
in this sector. Between 1993 and 1994 the market recovered, growing by 5.9% to 34.1 
billion US (See Appendix Table B-2 for full results by EU country). 
The generally consistent growth in European telecom markets, with the exception of 
the recession year of 1993, obscures notable differences in growth rates by the type 
of equipment, as shown by the market share results given in Figure 1 for seven 
Figure 1 
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centage of all telecom equipment sales2 in Europe due to radio and broadcasting I 
equipment, over half of which are from mobile telephone systems, increased from ' j 
36.0% in 1989 to 41.0% in 1994, while the share of switching equipment fell from ! 
31.5% to 25.0%. In absolute terms, the market for all line telephony equipment 
declined from a peak of 26.2 billion US in 1991 to 21.2 billion US in 1995. Continuing 
high growth rates are expected in radio and broadcasting, as shown in Table 1.3, but 1· 
the market in the four largest EU economies for all other types of telecom equipment I~ : 
is expected to continue to decline. Similar patterns are expected in the two other 
mature telecom markets of the US and Japan. 
Table 1.4 Forecasted annual market growth (1993 - 1999) in Germany, France, the 
UK and Italy by type of telecom equipment 
Radio & broadcasting Switching Transmission Other (telephones, 
(incl mobile systems) equipment equipment fax, etc) 
Germany 7.0% -2.0% -1.0% -1.0% 
France 4.0% -2.0% -1.0% -3.0% 
UK 5.0% -6.0% -8.0% -2.0% 
Italy 8.0% -4.0% 0.0% -2.0% 
Source: YWED, 1996 
These differences in market growth are also reflected in the sales growth rates of the 
worlds largest telecom 'equipment firms. The sales-weighted growth, between 1993 
and 1994, was 6% for the 18largest firms, including Alcatel and Siemens, whose main 
telecom products were public and private network equipment, 25.6% for the 8largest 
firms in data networking and software (with no European firms), and 33.7% for the 
8 largest firms in mobile communication equipment, including Ericsson, Nokia, and 
Philips (derived from CWI, 1995b). 
The stable or declining growth rate for network systems presents a worrisome 
challenge for European telecom firms such as Alcatel or Siemens that derive a 
substantial proportion of their sales from these products. However, two trends could 
permit network equipment markets to increase in the future. First, new markets for 
large-scale networks are opening up in Asia and Eastern Europe, though there is 
some evidence that the historical domination of the international telecom equipment 
market by European firms may have begun to weaken. During the 1980s the US and 
Japan picked up substantial new shares of developing markets at the expense of 
European firms (Neu and Schnoring, 1989). Second, new technical developments such 
2 Source: YWED (1992, 1994, 1996). Excludes sales of accessories and parts, since an unknowh 
proportion are inputs into the four equipment classes presented in Figure 1 and Table 4. 
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as broadband networks require high-capacity systems produced by network 
equipment firms (EC, 1994). This would also increase the market for network systems 
in the currently saturated markets of Europe, North America and Japan. 
Though the future market for some major European firms is turbulent, substantial 
strength remains among European producers. For example, in 1992 Alcatel claimed 
that it held 25% of the world market share in telecom equipment and that it was the 
number one supplier of digital switching equipment, public line transmission 
systems, and microwave systems (CCA, 1994). Similarly, Ericsson claimed that its 
AXE family of digital switching technologies had captured about 40% of the world 
market for mobile network switching by 1993. Although these estimates by the firms 
themselves are difficult to substantiate, they indicate that some of the leading 
European telecom equipment firms retain a strong position in international markets. 
1.3 Telecom Equipment Production and Employment 
Worldwide production of 
telecom equipment in 1990 by 
the major producing countries 
is given in Table 1.4. The best 
estimate for the wide defini-
tion, including line telephony 
and radio and broadcast equip-
ment, is 116.5 billion US. The 
EU 15 produced 48.7 billion of 
this total, for a global share of 
approximately 41.8%. The esti-
mate of world-wide production 
limited to line telephony equip-
ment is 65.2 billion US. The 
share of the ,EU 15 is 27.4 bil-
lion or 42.2%. 
Figure 2 summarizes the pro-
Table 1.4 Total 1990 Production by the 
World's Largest Telecom 
Equipment Producing Countries 
(US million dollars) 
Line telephony Line telephony & 
equipment radio/broadcast 
Japan ' 14652 
us 15670 
Europe2 28123 
Othet 6757 
Total 65202 
Source: Panorama, 1995; YWED, 1992. 
1
: Excludes 16 billion for military /space applications. 
2
: EU 15 plus Norway and Switzerland. 
3
: Canada, South Korea, Taiwan and Brazil. 
4
: Estimated. 
22393 
315101 
50359 
120544 
116316 
duction of telecom equipment in the 15 EU member states between 1989 and 19953 
(See Appendix B, Table B-3 for total pr9duction by country). Results are given for 
radio and broadcast equipment, all line telephony equipment, and the total of both 
radio and broadcast and line telephony equipment. The peak production year for line 
3 Source: YWED, 1992, 1994, 1996. Production figures exclude imports and re-exports of finished 
goods. The data for radio and broadcast equipment includes related accessories and parts. 
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telephony equipment was 1992 at 27.4 billion US, compared to 25.5 billion in 1994. 
Figure 2 
EU Telecom Equipment Production 
(All EU-15 member states except for Portugal and Greece) 
- Radio & Broadcast lrttJ Line Telephony - Total Telecom Equip 
In contrast, production of radio and broadcast equipment has increased considerably, 
from 12.2 billion US in 1990 to 16.2 billion US in 1994, or from 31.1 °/o 9f total 
production in 1990 to 39.0°/o in 1994. The four main EU economies accounted for 
74.6°/o of total production within the EU 15 in 1992 and 71.8°/o of production in 1995. 
The percentage of total production in the high-growth sector of radio and broad-
casting equipment varies by country. The percentage is below the European average 
for Germany, where radio and broadcast equipment accounted for 28.2°/o of total 
production in 1994, compared to 41.2°/o for France, and 50.7°/o for the three 
Scandinavian countries of Denmark, Sweden and Finland combined. The high 
percentage of radio and broadcast equipment in Scandinavia is largely due to the 
production of mobile phone equipment by Ericsson and Nokia. 
1.3.1 Employment 
The expansion of innovation-intensive industries such as aerospace, pharmaceuticals, 
and electronics sectors such as telecom equipment, were at one time believed to be 
essential to increasing European manufacturing employment. This view has been 
tempered with the realisation that employment gains can be minimal, as a result of 
high rates of productivity growth combined with intense international competition 
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on price that can force firms to move some production to low-wage regions4• 
Employment data for the telecom equipment sector is incomplete because of dif-
ferences in the methods used by countries to report employment in the electronics 
sectors. Incomplete time series data for at least two years is available for 10 EU 
countries plus Norway for either all electronic goods or a subcategory that includes 
telecom equipment (see Appendix B, Table B-4). 
With the exception of Norway and particularly Ireland, employment in all electronics 
production, or for sub-categories limited to communication equipment, declined 
between 1986 and 1994. Employment in Ireland increased because of continuing new 
investment in assembly and related production by American, Japanese and other 
foreign firms that own 97% of the Irish electronics industry.The decline in 
employment in all other countries is not due to the recession of 1993, since 
employment also declined before 1992 when production was steadily increasing. The 
decline in employment in the telecom equipment sector is due to both rapid increases 
in labour productivity (EC, 1994) and to an increase in production outside of the 
home country (YWED, 1992, 1994, 1996). 
1.4 R&D Expenditures and Public Funding of Telecom R&D 
Reliable data on R&D expenditures in the telecom sector is sparse. The main problem 
is that many firms do not report their R&D expenditures by area of activity, but only 
give total R&D expenditures over all business units. Total expenditures on R&D is 
therefore an unreliable estimator of R&D expenditures on telecom for many firms 
such as Siemens, Bosch, GEC and Nokia ,with a substantial proportion of their sales 
in non-telecom products, as shown above in Table 1.2. 
The available evidence, based on estimates of the proportion of R&D spent on 
telecom equipment or from surveys, indicates that the telecom equipment sector has 
one of the highest average R&D intensities (R&D expenditures/sales) of the main 
industrial sectors. An estimate for 1987, based on the world's nine largest telecom 
equipment firms5, is for a sales-weighted R&D intensity of 9.52%. Sales-weighted 
estimates of average R&D intensities are available for 1992 from both the PACE study 
of Europe's largest industrial firms and from the CIS survey for both R&D performing 
4 The European Commission's recent Green Paper on Innovation (EC, 1995) takes a more realistic 
view of the effects of innovation on employment. The benefits are that a high rate of innovation can 
help to slow the rate of decline in manufacturing employment and shift the spectrum of work towards 
high-productivity and high-wage activities. 
5 OECD, 1991. Excludes AT&T, for which telecom sales included both equipment and services. 
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firms only and for all firms (see Appendix B, Table B-5). The sales-weighted R&D 
intensity for telecom equipment based on PACE is 7.35%, compared to approximately 
11% in the CIS survey. Regardless of these differences, in both surveys telecom 
equipment is an R&D intensive sector compared to other industries, with notably 
higher intensities found only in aerospace and pharmaceuticals. 
Several major European programmes that receive partial public funding, including 
EUREKA and the Framework Programme of the European Commission, have 
supported R&D in telecommunications, including both services and equipment, since 
the 1980s. Public support under the latter was 550 MECU for the second Framework 
Programme between 1987 and 1991, 548 MECU for the third programme between 
1990 and 1994, and 630 million ECUs for the current, fourth programme which will 
run until1998. However, funding for telecommunications, as a percentage of the total 
Framework budgets, has declined from 10.2% for the second programme to 5.1% for 
the fourth programme. 
1.4 Import and Export Trends . 
For the world as a whole, imports of telecom equipment increased from 55.4 billion 
US in 1990 to 71.2 billion in 1993. Imports by the 15 EU countries have remained 
relatively stable at approximately 20 billion per year, while US imports increased 
from 11.8 billion in 1990 to 14.3 billion in 1993, and Japanese imports increased from 
2 billion in 1990 to 2.8 billion in 1993. The fastest growth rate for imports, from 21.3 
billion to 34.7 billion over the same time period, occurred outside of the three main 
blocks of Europe, the United States, and Japan (ITU, 1995). With a few exceptions, 
such as Canada, many of these countries have very small telecom equipment 
manufacturing industries and therefore offer large export markets to Japanese, 
American and European firms. 
Exports and trade balances can serve as a proxy measure of competitiveness, since 
they are an indirect measure of how well firms from a specific country are able to 
compete in a world market. 
Export and trade data is often dominated by a few firms exporting a limited line of 
products. This can create rapid changes in exports and therefore in trade balances. 
For example, a one billion US trade surplus m 1987 for Germany became a 0.4 billion 
trade deficit in 1991, while the Netherland's 1992 deficit of 0.4 billion in 1992 turned 
into a slight surplus one year later. These rapid swings suggest caution in using trade 
data as a measure of the competitiveness of the· telecom equipment sector. Of the EU 
countries, Belgium, France, Denmark, Finland and Sweden ran trade surpluses in all 
of the years from 1987 to 1993 inclusive, while Italy, Norway, Greece, Portugal, Spain 
10 
: j 
! 
' 
I , 
.· 
i ... , 
' ' 
' . 
,, . 
I 
'• 
' 
and Austria had consistent trade deficits (see Appendix B, Table B-6). 
Figure 3 
= 
Extra-EU Telecom Equipment Exports, Imports and Trade Balance 
1984-1993 Narrow and Wide Definition of Trade Balance (TB) 
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Figure 3 gives extra-EU trade data, based on total imports and exports into all12 EU 
countries, between 1984 and 19936• The export and import data are based on the 
narrow definition of telecom equipment, limited to line telephony equipment, while 
trade balance data appears to be available for both the narrow and wide definitions 
between 1989 and 1992. The results show that the EU has consistently run a trade 
surplus, using the narrow definition of telecom equipment, but the surplus was 
negative in 1989 using the wide definition and is,much smaller for 1990 than the 
narrow definition. The trade surplus using the wide definition is slightly larger for 
1991 and 1992 than that of the narrow definition. In 1993, most of the trade surplus 
for line telephony was due to a positive balance for switching and transmission 
equipment. The advent of Finland and Sweden to the EU after 1995 should increase 
the extra-EU trade surplus, using either definition, because of mobile telephone sales 
by both Ericsson and Nokia to American and Asian markets. On the other hand, 
6 Exports, ID\ports, and the narrow trade balance are from the Panorama of European Industry (1995), 
Table 5. The trade balance data for the wide definition of the telecom sector is from Communications 
Outlook, Table 8.3 (OECD, 1995). However, this data is not fully described and may not fully cover 
radio and communication equipment. 
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using an extended definition that includes telecom software could reduce the trade 
surplus, though at this time there are no available trade statistics using this definition. 
2 PATENTING BY EUROPEAN TELECOM FIRMS 
The patenting activity of specific firms or by firms of a specific nationality has 
frequently been used as a measure of the technological competitiveness of firms or 
countries, on the assumption that the number of patents is positively correlated with 
competitiveness. Success in technical invention can then translate into increased sales, 
particularly in rapidly changing product groups such as telecom equipment. 
However, the accuracy with which patents can measure this type of competitiveness 
depends on a range of factors, including the propensity of a firm to patent its 
innovations (the percentage of innovations patented) and the technical value of each 
patent. The latter is particularly important, since patents vary enormously in both 
technical and economic value, but unfortunately no data on the value of telecom 
equipment patents is currently available7• If other factors such as differences in 
technical value are held constant, the ability of patents to measure technological 
competitiveness will increase with the propensity to patent in a given industry. For 
instance, patent count data is much more likely to capture technical competitiveness 
in an industry where firms patent 100% of their innovations than in an industry with 
very low patent propensity rates. 
Patent propensity data is available for 16 industries in Europe from the PACE survey 
(Arundel et al, 1995). The mean propensity to patent product innovations is 40.1 %, 
with a range from 16.7% in basic metals (ISIC 27) to 62.7% in pharmaceuticals (ISIC 
2423). For process innovations, the mean is 28.0%, with a range from 14.6% for 
electrical equipment (ISIC 31) to 47.7% for petroleum products (ISIC 23). The patent 
propensity for telecom equipment is 42.5% for product innovations, which is slightly 
higher than the mean, and 17.3% for process innovations, which is considerably 
below the mean. These generally low patent propensity rates in the telecom sector 
suggest that caution must be used when using patent count data to measure of 
technological competitiveness. 
Figure 4 presents the number of patent applications at the EPO for telecom 
equipment for the three main EU economies, all other EU-15 countries combined, the .. 
7 Trajenberg (1990), in a study of computer tomography equipment, establishes that the value of 
patents varies considerably. 
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US, and Japan8• 
Figure 4 
Telecommunications Patent Applications at the EPO 
1980- 1991 Source: OECD, 1995 
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Overall, there has been~ 319°/o increase in patent applications for telecom equipment 
between 1980 and 1991. However, patent applications by German and French firms 
increased by only 97.8°/o and 99.3°/o respectively, compared to an increase of 323°/o for 
the UK, 500°/o for other EU 15 countries, 346°/o for the US, and 990°/o for Japan. The 
rapid increase in patents for American and Japanese firms is probably due to both 
an increase in inventive activity and expansion into the European market and the 
consequent need to apply for patents to protect their innovations within Europe. This 
latter interpretation is supported by the fact that patent applications by American 
firms in the US increased by only 78°/o over the same time period9• Conversely, the 
rapid increase in patent applications by other EU 15 countries is likely to reflect a 
much faster increase in innovation. Much of this increase is due to patent applications 
from Finland, whose share of patents in this group increased from less than 2°/o up 
until 1984 to 26°/o in 1991. Finland's share of total telecom equipment production 
8 The main international patent classification (IPC class) group for telecom equipment is H04 
(electric communication technique), with the exception of H04S (Stereophonic systems). 
9 Data for the US patent office also includes electronic components. This will bias the true change 
in patent applications for telecom equipment by the difference between the patent application rate for 
components versus telecom equipment. 
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within the EU 15 also increased faster, between 1989 and 1990, than any other 
country (see Appendix B, Table B-2). In this case there appears to be a clear link 
between patent activity and future market success, but this is also because the patent 
data and production data for Finland measure the growth of a new industry. 
It is more difficult to interpret the available patent data in terms of market success 
for the established telecom industries, particularly in Germany and France. French 
patent applications grew more rapidly than for Germany, while production grew 
more slowly. Any relationship between patents and production could be distorted by 
several factors, such as changes in the types of products produced by the telecom 
industry, differing patent propensity rates, the proportion of production conducted 
outside the home country, or semi-closed domestic markets, which can permit 
production to increase rapidly in response to new infrastructural investments without 
a large increase in technical inventiveness. Lacking more complete data at the firm 
level, it is difficult to conclude, for example, that the patent data suggest that French 
and German firms are falling behind in technological competitiveness. However, the 
patent data, combined with production data for specific areas of telecommunications, 
indicates that the rapid growth in both patents and production by other EU 15 
countries is due to increasing technological strength by existing firms in Italy, the 
Netherlands, and Sweden in mobile communications and by new entrants in this 
technology by firms such as Nokia in Finland. 
3 TECHNICAL TRENDS FOR TELECOM EQUIPMENT 
3.1 Introduction 
Innovation in the telecom equipment sector is subject to an arguably more complex 
set of influences than in many other industries. R&D provides an enormous number 
and variety of new technologies, albeit often at a very high research cost, but their 
successful implementation depends on a range of factors, including market demand, 
standards, legacy systems, and the need to combine several technologies. 
Unlike other markets which are largely limited to individual consumer demand, the 
telecom market is influenced by individual consumers, public network demand, and 
the peculiarities of networks whereby their attractiveness to potential users increase 
with the number of other users. Standards interact with market forces by their crucial 
influence on the size of the potential market, thereby influencing the attractiveness 
of a technology to new users. The result is that it is impossible to disentangle 
technological trends in telecom equipment from the influence of market demand and 
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standards. To complicate matters, telecommunications systems are based on 
substantial existing or legacy investments in switching, line and other equipment. The 
introduction of new technologies often faces strong operator and user commitment 
to these systems. This attracts investment in R&D to upgrade legacy systems to 
provide similar types of services, at lower cost, as those promised by new 
technologies . 
In the following sections we look at the main technological trends in the telecom 
sector and the role of European firms in these developments. It is a complicated story 
where standards, markets, legacy systems, the need to combine technologies, and 
uncertainty continually influence the future direction of telecom systems. Telecom 
service firms face a range of new technologies that potentially offer extensive new 
services and capabilities. The problem is often one of migration paths, or how and 
what route will be chosen to move from existing legacy systems to the promised 
"Information Society", based on high bandwidth ·systems capable of transmitting 
voice, data, and video. The result of these movements can be compared to trying to 
negotiate a boat through a narrow passage in which wind direction, the prevailing 
current, and the presence of other boats must all be taken into account. The story is, 
not surprisingly, technically complex. Wherever possible, we have moved technical 
and other details to the footnotes. 
3.2 The Main Emerging Telecom Technologies 
There are five key emerging technologies in telecom systems: 1) switching, 
transmission and network management, 2) the Intelligent Network (IN), 3) mobile 
communications, 4) customer premise equipment and private networks, and 5) the 
integration of fixed and mobile networks. The discussion below outlines the 
technological trends, the factors influencing their success or failure, and the 
implications for European telecom equipment firms. 
3.2.1 Switching, transmission and network management 
Innovation in this field focuses on how to upgrade existing telephone systems to one 
that supports Integrated Broadband Communications (IBC). IBC is necessary for 
advanced services such as high speed data communication, interactive television, and 
video telephony. IBC requires new switching, transmission and network management 
concepts. Several alternative technologies and migratory paths are available. 
The Plesiosynchronous Digital Hierarchy (PDH) environment was introduced in the 
1970s for high speed transmission. Since then, the Synchronous Digital Hierarchy 
(SDH) has become generally available for public networks, although PDH networks 
still predominate. Many operators are moving towards SDH because of its superior 
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capacity, reduced complexity and more advanced network management10• An 
important standard by the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) reconciles 
differences in SDH transmission speeds between European and American systems11, 
broadening the market for SDH equipment and promising to increase its deployment. 
The most significant new technology for public and private digital networks is the 
Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM) which uses short, digital data packets or "cells" 
of uniform length for voice, audiovisual, or data signals12• ATM is a considerable 
improvement over previous packet techniques because it is suitable for both the 
transmission of intermittent data bursts and for uninterrupted or real-time voice and 
image communication. ATM also promises to be suitable for both private computer 
and public networks, and it can interface with older microwave and coaxial cable 
systems as well as with newer optical systems. 
Although many markets will continue to use PDH systems or migrate to SDH, the 
future shape of the public network, and hence the strategic planning of 
telecommunication suppliers and users, will be strongly influenced by the networking 
philosophy first embodied in ATM. ATM essentially reverses the long established 
approach in public networks to concentrate the switching and routing of network 
traffic at central nodes13• At full capacity, ATM can use the 'intelligence' available 
in advanced user terminals to perform most of the functions that are now performed 
by central switching facilities in public networks and by processors in private 
networks. This change offers significant advantages that have attracted the 
commercial interest of virtually every segment of the computer and 
telecommunication industries. 
10 PDH uses multiplexing of digital telecommunication messages (the combination of voice and 
data traffic into high speed, high capacity channels). SDH is also closely linked to the development 
of optical technologies and is designed to accommodate virtually all of the requirements of B-ISDN 
in an optical transmission environment. 
11 The ITU officially makes "recommendations", but we adopt the common usage of referring to 
these as standards. 
12 The cells include a header that routes the packet and an information field of 48 bytes. Although 
A TM is frequently promoted as a technology that developed after SDH and which will eventually 
replace SDH, A TM and SDH are closely linked. A TM principles evolved from Asynchronous Time 
Division Multiplexing (A TDM) a technique with antecedents extending back to the cell relay 
experiments carried out in the 1960s at AT&T's Bell Laboratories. Cell relay was ahead of its time 
because it required powerful computers that did not become available until the late 1970s. 
13 ATM goes beyond the Intelligent Network (IN) concept whereby some of this control is 
distributed to various decentralised network nodes. 
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However, five problems are currently inhibiting the diffusion of ATM. These are due 
to basic tensions in the telecommunication industry that have important implications 
for the strategies of suppliers and users of network-based services. 
The first problem is how to implement A TM, which is largely linked to the 
availability of SDH networks14 because of a decision by telecom operators to avoid 
a 'standards war' by agreeing to a standard to allow A TM to be used on SDH 
networks15• However, ATM does not require SDH and some experts argue th_at other 
systems, such as fibre-optic PDH networks, could be an acceptable vehicle for ATM. 
Second, ATM is by no means a stable or thoroughly tested technology for all 
potential uses, with technical problems with data loss for some uses16• Third, the 
A TM strategies of public operators have usually assumed that A TM would appear 
first in the public network and then diffuse to private networks. This assumption has 
meant that established European suppliers of network equipment have been slow to 
respond to the demand for consumer premise applications for A TM, thus leaving this 
market open to American competitors from the computer and software industries. 
The belated response has been a flurry of alliances between the major telecom 
equipment manufacturers and these American firms17• Fourth, some public networks 
in Europe charge high prices for broadband connections, reducing the potential 
market18• Finally, the established switch manufacturers and public network operators 
14 SDH is only beginning to appear as operators work out different technical options for migrating 
from PDH to SDH. Many PDH systems, first deployed in the mid-1970s, have reached or are 
approaching full depreciation and are ready for replacement. Most existing operators will likely adopt 
a mixture of migration strategies, but new operators in markets with some degree of infrastructure 
competition could base their services on SDH. Energis, for example, the UK electricity company, has 
recently received a license to offer telecom services and plans to build its entire network on SDH. 
15 The conflict was due to the commitment of Alcatel, AT&T, Fujitsu, and NorTel to ATM and 
other companies to SDH. A standards war would have caused both systems to suffer from divided 
markets and uncertainty. 
16 Many of the first A TM trials, mostly in private networks, experienced data loss problems because 
of switch software, specifically in buffer-management systems, that could not cope with high traffic 
volume or with the chaotic nature of ATM transmissions. Opinion is divided as to whether the 
solution lies in better buffer management, more buffer capacity, or increased circuit capacity. It is clear, 
however, that some marketed ATM products lack the technical capability to meet expectations. 
17 For example, Siemens is reselling A TM products developed by Cascade Communications, a US 
company. Siemens is also allied with Sun Microsystems and Scientific Atlanta over LAN and multi-
media oriented ATM. Ericsson is engaged in similar joint ventures with Texas Instruments and 
Hewlett-Packard. AT&T, the large American telecom equipment firm, is also engaged in joint ventures 
with General DataComm to supply ATM products in China and the Netherlands. 
18 Although higher transmission rates are only marginally more expensive to provide, they 
normally incur substantially higher charges. Basic connection costs in France, for example, start at 
about US$ 8,000, as opposed to only US$ 650 in Germany. Depend~g upon the connection time per 
17 
have relied heavily upon the development of A TM standards by the ITU for public 
network use. However, the ATM Forum, an association of over 300 users and 
manufacturers of private network systems, moved more quickly and developed A TM 
standards for private networks firstl9• This has created problems in the development 
of compatible, industry-wide standards20• 
3.2.1.1 The importance of Legacy systems 
The market potential of SDH and A TM is limited by substantial operator and user 
commitments to existing methods. For example, the customer base for some long-
established but less advanced alternatives, such as X.2521 and Frame Relaf2, 
continues to grow. This suggests that demand for broadband services may not be as 
great as suggested by their promoters. One possibility, that users are simply taking 
up older technologies because newer ones are not yet widely available, is doubtful. 
It appears that the primary consideration in the adoption of a technology, whether 
old or new, is the trade-off between its capabilities and the price of network services 
day, however, prices in Germany for a 155 Mbps network cost up to 50 times that' of an equivalent 
network in Finland. Discrepancies such as these are typical throughout Europe. 
19 Established telecom firms initially downplayed the importance of the A 1M Forum, which is 
dominated by computer equipment and software vendors, though participation by established firms 
has since been increasing. The A 1M Forum has been able to quickly incorporate technical changes into 
its standards and to operationalise standards developed by the ITU. In comparison, the ITU has been 
slower to adapt to technical advances. The market opportunity for vendors of private network 
equipment and software, and, hence, for the A1M Forum, was provided initially by the lack of ITU 
standards for customer premise equipment, except for defining the interface to public B-ISDN, since 
the ITU is not responsible for standards for customer equipment. This meant that the customer 
equipment manufacturers were able to develop and exploit A 1M products for customers while public 
network operators and their equipment suppliers were still trying to secure further levels of 
standardisation through the ITU. 
20 There are actually three problems: how to develop industry-wide standards that resist the 
pressure of individual A 1M suppliers to impose their products as de facto standards; how to control, 
assimilate, and coordinate standards developed by the A 1M Forum and the ITU; and how to balance 
the A 1M standards requirements of public and private networks. 
21 X.25, despite its low speed and unsuitability for anything but intermittent data transmission, is 
the only packet switching protocol that is supported by practically every public network operator. The 
European market for X.25 is still growing because of its record of reliability, relative stability, and user 
familiarity (PNE, 1995). X.25 is projected to' rise from the current level of about 59% of the European 
market for packet switched services, to about 69% by 1997 (CN, 1994). Furthermore, X.25 has been 
upgraded from 64 Kbps to higher speeds. France Telecom, is now providing X.25 services at 2 Mbps. 
22 Frame Relay, one of the first approaches to fast packet switching, retains a substantial following, 
though in some cases, European Frame Relay applications are driven by the necessity to interface with 
US firms where the technique is well established. The main European market for Frame Relay 
supplements rather than replaces X.25. Despite the growth of Fame Relay, opinion is currently divided 
as to whether X.25 or Frame Relay will provide the best route to A 1M. 
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and peripherals. This is partly illustrated through the case of narrowband ISDN. 
Narrowband ISDN is a legacy system that is far from the leading edge of network 
technology, but which has grown rapidly after a period of dormancf3. The basic 
reason for this upsurge is that ISDN lines, depending on use and national tariff 
levels, are cheaper than alternatives24• This new confidence in ISDN is also a result 
of improvements in the stability of European ISDN standards and new commitments 
on the part of American suppliers outside of the telecommunication sector to provide 
ISDN products that flexibly meet user requirements25• 
The future of European ISDN, however, is far from certain. ISDN has resurged 
because of comparably higher prices for competing systems, continued commitments 
by suppliers, and favourable standards. These conditions could change rapidly. 
Furthermore, the cost of ISDN terminals that meet European standards is typically 
eight to ten times more than the cost of non-standard equipment. These equipment 
costs could significantly reduce the growth potential of ISDN in Europe. Conversely, 
a rapid decline in prices, as in the US for line charges and peripheral costs26, could 
extend the lifespan of ISDN. 
3.2.1.2 Trends in transmission technologies 
There is now little question that the major European public network operators plan 
to upgrade their trunk line networks to optical fibre because it offers an enormous 
expansion of capacity. The timing and degree to which these new capabilities will be 
provided to medium and smaller users will be influenced by the rate of technical 
progress, cost reduction in fibre cabling methods, prospective demand, and the extent 
23 By the end of 1993, only about 345,000 basic rate ISDN lines, and 38,000 primary rate ISDN lines 
had been sold in Europe. However, connection commitments to the end of 1994 in the UK, France, and 
Germany alone were for 623,000 basic rate ISDN lines, and 51,000 primary rate lines (CWI, 1994a). 
24 Whereas a typical 64 Kbps leased line between two European countries involves a flat charge 
of approximately US$ 6,000 per month, an ISDN line can cost about US$ 50 per month in rental, and 
US$ 1 per minute in usage charges. 
25 INTEL has made a substantial commitment to ISDN video-conferencing through its ProShare 
Personal Conferencing Video System 2000, and has made agreements with US and European public 
network operators to offer an ISDN interface. LAN interconnection is another market segment that is 
opening up for ISDN, with US firms like Cisco committed to ISDN for its router products. 
26 A large US ISDN market has grown for Internet and teleworking remote access, driven by rapid 
price falls. Such remote access now holds about 60% of the US ISDN Market (CWI, 1995a). 
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of competition27• These factors will influence the answer to the question 'How close 
to the service delivery point should the optical fibre terminate28? 
As debate continues on the viability of various strategies for fibre cable systems, a 
possible interim solution is to use advanced electronics to enhance the capacity of 
existing legacy systems, based on 'twisted pair' copper wiring, at a lower cost than 
optical fibre29• These technologies are most likely to be used by established public 
network operators as an interim means of exploiting their extensive installed base of 
copper wiring. It is a less attractive option for new market entrants that deploy their 
own transmission infrastructure, such as new cable television systems. 
3.2.2 The Intelligent Network 
Originally defined by Bellcore in the mid-1980s, the Intelligent Network (IN) 
represented the first major re-think of telecommunication networks since the advent 
of automatic switching (Mansell, 1993), and was designed to enable incumbent public 
network operators to meet some of the commercial challenges raised by rapid 
changes in technology and markets. Essentially, the IN decentralises some of the 
network control tasks from centralised switching facilities to computer-operated 
nodes. This increases the flexibility of the technology investment plans of public 
operators by reducing their dependence on large switching facilities. 
All of the technical developments discussed so far can be implemented using IN 
architecture. The questions concern the extent to which the IN is actually necessary or 
desirable. The 'distributed intelligence' aspect of the IN, for example, is similar to the 
distributed switching philosophy of ATM. The difference is that ATM does not require 
27 In the UK, the regulatory decision to support infrastructure-based competition has encouraged 
operators like City of London Telecommunications (COLT} to chose fibre connections for business 
sites. However, cable television franchises, who also provide telecommunication services to their dom-
estic customers, remain mostly committed to coaxial cable, even for curb-side cabling. Some, like 
Southwestern Bell, the cable television franchisee in the Birmingham area in the UK, have opted for 
a mix, with 'fibre to the curb' and coaxial cabling to the home. Elsewhere in Europe, a variety of 
plans have been announced, including ambitious fibre to the home plans in parts of Italy, Belgium, 
and The Netherlands. 
28 The issue is not the cost of fibre cable which has become comparable to other types of cable, but 
rather the costs of the electronics employed in optical transmission. The costs of these electronic 
systems is subject to substantial reduction through economies of scale and learning effects created by 
high volume production. 
29 Equipment costs for Asymmetrical Digital Subscriber Line (ADSL}, the best established 
technology for upgrading the existing copper-wire networks, are between US$ 2,000 and US$ 3,000 
per line as compared with the estimated US$ 3,000 to US$ 5,000 per line for fibre, but both sets of costs 
are projected to fall. 
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the IN. In fact, there is a growing body of opm10n that the IN is the most 
cumbersome way of implementing A TM and similar technol~gies - i.e. •Why bother 
nesting one distributed system within another distributed system?'. Another problem 
is that high-speed switched LAN and WAN systems that handle voice telephony can 
meet the need for computer-controlled service nodes in the public network. 
Most importantly in the short to medium term, public network standards for the IN 
are not emerging quickly enough, with the standards programme several years 
behind schedule. Most IN systems either use proprietary standards, or standards 
drawn from the private consortia that are proliferating in the computer networking 
industry. At this time, international IN capabilities are dependent upon bilateral 
arrangements between national operators. 
In spite of these difficulties, European network operators and equipment suppliers 
remain committed to the IN30• Furthermore, the market prospects are still uncertain 
for alternatives such as SDH and A TM, both of which are still'horizon' technologies. 
There are also many possibilities for minor reconfigurations of the IN to improve its 
attractiveness for public networks. For example, several major European public 
networks are considering moving some of the •intelligence' to customer premises. 
In terms of future capabilities, the IN remains the principal technical framework for 
the further development of advanced forms of •virtual networks', and •personal' 
communications. If A TM represents a potential revolution in the philosophies of 
switching and transmission, the provision of •virtual' and •personal' communicatl.ons 
represents a corresponding revolution in the means of providing services over public 
networks. This will involve integrating mobile and private network technologies, the 
subjects of the next two sections. 
3.2.3 Mobile Public Network Technology 
The development in Europe of various types of wireless communication technologies 
has been affected by a number of significant policy initiatives, both in the EU and in 
its member states, particularly the UK. Mobile telephony, in fact, was singled out by 
policy makers as a vehicle for liberalising segments of the European 
telecommunication market, to redu.ce the technology dominance of incumbent public 
monopolies, and to create a new pan-European infrastructure. 
30 Ericsson is developing IN applications for digital cellular telephohy based upon its already 
dominant AXE mobile switching technology, and the IN capability developed at GPT was a major 
factor in the decision by Siemens to acquire a 40% share of GPT stock. 
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The original EC strategy was to support the development of two basic approaches to 
digital wireless telephony. The first, digital cellular telephony, improved on earlier 
analogue systems by adding a roaming capacity which allows the same cellular 
telephone to be used in any national network. The second, digital cordless telephony, 
requires the user to be close to a fixed terminal that provides the radio interface. This 
system does not always allow a user to receive calls. The EU strategy has since been 
extended to include Personal Communication Networks (PCN), which forms the 
'third leg' of its mobile communication strategy, though market response outside of 
the UK is limited31• 
The first approach was embodied in the Global System for Mobile Communications 
(GSM) standard, and the second in Digital European Cordless Telephony (DECT). 
Both received substantial political backing from the EU, and, in the case of DECT, 
financial backing as well. The original EU strategy has partly been overtaken, 
although unevenly throughout the EU countries, by changing market and 
technological conditions. Nevertheless, the EU remains strongly committed to GSM 
and DECT as ·the two core standards for a pan-European mobile services network. 
In contrast, the major European telecom firms have a strong commitment to the 
further development of GSM, but an uncertain commitment to DECT. 
GSM is a very successful European standard and a strong contender to become the 
internationally accepted standard for digital cellular telephonf2• The future of GSM, 
however, may depend on how well it is accepted in the US. In addition, a key 
strategic problem for European manufacturers of GSM products is to maintain a 
single GSM standard. Ironically, one of the most attractive features of GSM to users -
its roaming capability - is also one of the chief impediments to its international 
success. Ensuring roaming capacity requires complex international administrative 
agreements that are very difficult to negotiate in a way that meets the criteria of the 
31 PCN employs low power terminals and micro-cellular technologies. PCN has undergone a 
number of revisions in different national markets, most significantly in the US where the idea of 
providing world-wide PCN networks through satellites gained prominence. Initially, this system was 
promoted by the Iridium project fronted by Motorola, but other consortia have since formed, with 
Globalstar attracting major commitments from European public network operators. 
32 There are currently about five million GSM subscribers world-wide, and this is expected to 
exceed eight million by the end of 1995 (PNE, 1995a). GSM is rapidly replacing analogue cellular 
services in most major European markets, and is achieving significant penetration in Asian markets. 
GSM is estimated to have captured more than 80% of the existing subscriber base for digital cellular 
telephony (CI, 1995b ). Planning is also underway to upgrade the GSM standard to increase the number 
of user channels. This major evolution to a Phase 2 GSM standard would support data, fax and 
supplementary services. While GSM is presently limited to voice grade services, the mobile data 
capability is particularly significant in the light of recent forecasts that this market may approach US$ 
lbn by the tum of the century (PNE, 1995b). 
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European Telecommunication Standards Institute (ETSI). 
Although heavily promoted by the EU as the second leg of its strategy for wireless 
telephony, DECT is still seeking a market role to supplement that of GSM33• DECT-
J. based systems originally suffered from an inability to receive calls. Ericsson has 
invested heavily in a two-way version that could both send and receive calls (CT3). 
! • 
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The capabilities of DECT go substantially beyond simple cordless telephony, since it 
can be configured to offer many of the same services as emerging GSM and PCN 
standards. The two most promising markets for DECT products are cordless PBXs, 
discussed below, and wireless local loop applications. The latter was first introduced 
in Europe by Deutsche Telekom, using its NMT technology, to increase telecom 
services in former East Germanf4. However, the future of DECT is unclear, partly 
because other technologies such as GSM offer better and more flexible services. 
3.2.4 Customer Premises Equipment and Private Networking 
Distinctions between the capabilities of public and private networks are disappearing 
quickly. It is often argued that only regulatory definitions continue to distinguish the 
two, but such arguments understate the commercial significance of historical 
differences between these networks and the market structures of the computing and 
telecommunication sectors. The technology options for a private network are still 
determined by these historical differences and by their effects on the R&D alliances 
among equipment manufacturers in both sectors. Three main customer premise 
technologies are discussed below: private branch exc-!'tanges (PBX), Computer 
Telephony Integration (CTI) systems, and Local Area Networks (LAN). 
Private branch exchanges (PBX): PBX equipment was first introduced to reduce the cost 
of internal calls within a company by avoiding the need to purchase new lines from 
the public network. Currently, PBX is gradually being combined with other 
33 The original goal of the DECT programme was to stop the proliferation of cordless telephones 
in Europe that did not conform to any recognised standard. However, the potential to use the same 
handset at multiple base stations was soon recognised. In the late 1980s, a UK-developed technology, 
Cordless Telephony 2 (CT2), was promoted as an alternative to pay-phones. CT2 was later taken up 
again in North America by Nortel and Motorola, where a duplex version (CT2-plus) was introduced 
into several US and Canadian markets. 
34 Since then, several systems have been installed or planned, using different technologies. lonica 
is lkensed to provide competitive local loop access to the British Telecom network and is using its 
own technology, developed with Nortel. Telef6nica d'Espaii.a, is employing Motorola's 'WiLL' 
products to provide some 500,000 fixed cellular customer drops in rural areas. Likewise, in Hungary, 
HTC is employing Ericsson's 'RAS 1000' products in the local loop, although a Hungarian cellular 
operator, Pannon, is planning to use a GSM interface. 
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technologies that allow the transmission of both voice and data and by Computer 
Telephony Integration {CTI), which allows desk-top PCs to perform telephony 
functions. The commitment of all of the major European telecom equipment suppliers 
to the development of PBX and other private network technologies, usually referred 
to as business networks, are growing substantially35. 
The first response of public network operators to growing PBX use was Centrex, a 
system for emulating PBX functions using the public network. Centrex was essentially 
a pricing strategy to reduce the cost of using the public network for internal calls. 
Although Centrex was widely accepted in the US by the 1970s, Centrex was not 
offered in Europe until the 1980s. Acceptance in Europe has been slow because of a 
lack of pricing incentive,s, since both PBX equipment and Centrex were only available 
from the same public monopoly. Centrex has since achieved a modest market share 
in the UK, but most of Europe is still slow to adopt Centrex. 
Where competitive equipment provision is allowed, Centrex, and later VPN, exploit 
two potential weaknesses in the structure of the PBX market. First, the capital cost 
of PBX equipment can be high relative to its capabilities over its life span. Second, the 
PBX customer is dependent upon the PBX supplier for any changes to its system 
because of a lack of non-proprietary PBX standards. In contrast, Centrex users require 
no investment in on-site technology and the cost of reconfiguring their internal 
networks is usually less than reconfiguring a PBX. 
VPN originally extended Centrex services by using the public network to link 
individual Centrex or PBX installations for both local and long-distance calls. Its 
commercial possibilities therefore depended on its technical ability to link different 
PBX systems. This has encouraged the major equipment firms to develop non-
proprietary inter-PBX signalling protocols, though most VPNs use proprietary 
signalling protocols36• In the past ten years, a move has been underway to develop 
a non-proprietary standard interface. One result would be the provision of more open 
35 As of mid-1994, Alcatel claimed to be the third largest supplier of business systems world-wide. 
By 1993, some 30% of Ericsson's revenues were generated by the business network market as opposed 
to only about 20% from public network equipment. The purchase by Siemens of a stake in GPT was 
in large part inspired by the desire to increase the 'intelligent' business systems profile of Siemens. 
Alcatel, Siemens, Ericsson, and GPT are engaged in a number of R&D projects, mostly with US-based 
computer equipment and software suppliers, to develop 'intelligent' business networks that combine 
PBX, B-ISDN and CTI capabilities (MDIS, 1994). 
36 The ISDN-based Digital Private Network Signalling System (DPNSS), proprietary to British 
Telecom, is currently among the most widely used inter-PBX interfaces, with a world-wide base of 
about 2 million users but it is only one of four major proprietary standards. Other standards have been 
developed in the US, Japan, and Australia. 
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and flexible conditions for VPN37• Q.sig, a new ,standard developed out of an Alcatel 
initiative38, allows mor~ intelligent signalling between PBXs in an ISDN framework, 
and is a migratory route to inter-PBX broadband services. 
Q.sig is an attractive alternative to proprietary standards in the UK, France and 
Germany. However, Q.sig is not completely compatible with the US, Japanese and 
Australian systems and there are problems with the certification procedure and in 
aligning different versions of the standard. The primary problem with Q.sig, 
however, is that public operators and equipment firms are not equally committed to 
its adoption. The equipment suppliers would like Q.sig to be immediately 
implemented as the primary VPN access, while public operators largely favour 
retaining proprietary protocols over the short to medium term39 • 
Computer-Telephony Integration: CTI systems link desktop computers to voice switches 
and advanced telephone handsets. CTI's first commercial use was to handle customer 
inquiries. Using the 'call line identification' and related capabilities of modern 
electronic switches, company employees can automatically retrieve customer data files 
in response to the customer's incoming telephone number, or to previously assigned 
registration numbers that customers can key in to their telephone. CTI has developed 
in three directions; call centres, voice cards, and PC-based voice processing40• Voice 
37 Another variation on VPN is Switched Mulit-megabit Data Services. Like VPN, SMDS is less a 
new technology than a new approach to configuring and marketing existing network capabilities. 
SMDS is a is a 'fast packet' approach with built-in security mechanisn;tS, capable of delivering high 
'on-demand' bandwidth for data services using public network facilities. Although still at the trial 
stage in most markets, SMDS is emerging as a serious option in the US and a possible option in the 
UK. An SMDS Interest Group has been fon:n,ed, led by AT&T and Bellcore, that includes the European 
telecom equipment firms Alcatel, Siemens, Ericsson and GPT, public network operators in the 
Netherlands, Sweden and Italy, and US-based computer firms Digital Equipment and Hewlett-Packard. 
38 An Alcatel initiative to provide an alternative to British Telecom's proprietary standard DPNSS 
grew into IPNS, an international standard for an inter-PBX interface. The IPNS Forum is a consortia 
of European and North American telecom equipment firms committed to this goal. The members are 
Alcatel, AT&T, Ericsson, GPT, Italtel, Matra, Nortel, Philips, Siemens, and Bosch-Telenorma. The basic 
IPNS product is 'Q.sig', a standard first defined by the European Computer Manufacturers 
Association (ECMA). Q-sig was subsequently adopted by the European Telecommunications Standards 
Institute (ETSI) and the International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO). Q.sig takes its name from 
the designation of the mid-point between PBX configurations as point 'Q'. It is ISDN compatible and 
nearly 100% compatible with DPNSS. 
39 To date, the only significant application of Q.sig is between British Rail and SNCF, the French 
railway company, where it links the private networks, based on different proprietary protocols, of both 
railways. The need for a link was created by the Channel tunnel. 
40 The market for call centres has evolved considerably from a centralised to a distributed 
computing environment. ffiM's CallPath, for example, originally a mini and mainframe application, 
has moved into a PC-based client/server environment. The market for PC voice cards is also growing, 
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applications in the latter two directions are becoming more closely related because 
of standards and the difficulties in establishing stable CTI markets41 • 
Both the applications software firm Microsoft and the network software firm Novell 
are developing CTI, but using different technical approaches42• European PBX 
vendors are developing CTI capabilities largely in collaboration with US computer 
vendors and software firms. Siemens is allied with IBM, and Ericsson is allied with 
IBM, Intel, and Novell. 
Switched Local Area Networks ~LAN): As LAN applications require higher transmission 
speeds, LANs are increasingly moving to switched hub architectures. The market for 
switched hubs, which was worth US$ 90 million in 1993, is estimated to approach 
US$ 600 million in 1996 and 1.2 billion in 19~8 (CI, 1995b). Given the integration 
between LAN and PBX environments, and the increasing profile of A TM in LAN 
technology planning, this migration from hub-and-router to switched hub 
technologies is potentially significant for the manufacturers of public network and 
PBX switching equipment. 
3.2.4.1 The future of PBX 
Digital PBXs are commonly referred to as a •fourth generation' technology for 
customer premises, but it has not changed substantially since it was first introduced 
in the early 1980s. Even though most of the PBX equipment purchased in the early 
to mid 1980s is now coming to the end of its useful life, •fifth generation' PBX is not 
likely. Instead, equipment firms are trying to integrate PBX, LAN, and PC 
environments by adding computer processing power to their newer PBX lines. Thus, 
some new PBXs may become •intelligent' by being able to perform some of the 
but the European presence in this segment is modest, with most of the larger switch manufacturers 
concentrating instead on multi-media interfaces incorporating video images. Active players in the voice 
card market are typically specialised, US-based firms like Dialogic and Rhetorix. PC-based voice 
processing involves interactive voice response and messaging. 
41 The first CTI standard, the Multi-Vendor Integration Protocol (MVIP), emerged in 1990, the 
product of a collaboration among a small group of CTI vendors. In 1993, however, Dialogic brought 
out its Signal Computing System Architecture (SCSA), a proprietary system. An SCSA advisory 
council has subsequently been set up and currently has over 100 members, with about 260 additional 
firms supporting the standard (CI, 1995a). Although originating in the stand-alone PC environment, 
SCSA has migrated into distributed computing environments, and is now claimed to support virtually 
the whole range of telephony service scenarios. Whereas MVIP currently has the larger share of the 
market, SCSA promises more in the way of broadband applications. 
42 Microsoft 'is stressing desktop-mounted CTI where the PC controls th~ telephone handset. 
Conversely, Novell, is stressing the network server approach and is co-ordinating its products with 
PBX developments through the co-development of a standard application programming interface. 
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control, management, and enhancement functions that are now being done outside 
the PBX, for example by PCs43• 
The pressing question is how PBX will migrate to a broadband environment. To date, 
even the move to ISDN-PBX has not been made by all PBX manufacturers, thus 
raising questions about their possible strategies for incorporating new systems 
concepts like ATM. The ISDN strategies of the major European manufacturers vary, 
with Alcatel supporting one strategy and Ericsson keeping its options open44• 
A potential new market for PBX and a possible way to leapfrog to ISDN and 
broadband interfaces is wireless customer premises equipment. The advantage of 
wireless technologies is that they eliminate much of the need to reconfigure PBX 
systems to accommodate the movement of employees and departments from one 
location to another. GPT was an early entrant into this market, but the results have 
been uncertain. A major problem is the conflict between standards. Although DECT 
is ~uitable for PBX applications, it is relatively complex and costly to implement. CT2 
is simpler and cheaper but offers less technical scope than DECT. The situation is 
further complicated by EU support of DECT over CT2 for all European cordless 
services. Moreover, although Ericsson is committed to using DECT in Europe, its 
proprietary CT3 technology is at the core of much of its export strategy. 
3.2.5. Integrating Fixed and Mobile Networks 
A potentially important new market is 'personal communication' systems that allow 
users to transfer their own personal telecommunications account among networks 
and terminals (Cl, 1995c). The success of this system depends on providing the high 
level of network intelligence required to locate the user's position, authenticate the 
agreed service profile, and deliver the service. This could emerge as the most 
important medium-term market opportunity for the IN, but the eventual form of this 
network intelligence is open to speculation. Three competing approaches, largely 
based on public networks, are described below. None have been implemented to any 
substantial degree, but th~ir progress has potentially important implications for the 
commercial strategies of European equipment firms. 
43 GPT, for example, is developing an interface to ffiM's CallPath CTI systems. The most important 
developments in this area, however, are occurring in the US, particularly between AT&T and Novell. 
44 Alcatel helped secure a Memorandum of Understanding in 1994 with AT&T, Ericsson, GPT, 
Matra, Ndrtel, Philips, Siemens, Telenorma, Italtel, Ascom, and SAT to test multi-vendor ISDN PBX 
interconnection based on ETSI/ECMA Q.sig standards. Ericsson, however, remains committed to both 
Q.sig and DPNSS. 
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Universal Personal Telecommunications (UPT) defines the building blocks for personal 
access systems. The basic idea of UPT is to separate the number from the terminal. 
The UPT number is thus a •personal' number that can be linked to any available 
terminal, fixed or mobile, in both public and private networks. UPT standards have 
been developed for voice telephone and are being upgraded for other services45• 
The major problems with UPT concern third-party protection and supplementary 
services. UPT users must •register' their location on the nearest available terminal. 
In many cases, the procedure involves •borrowing' a terminal from another party. 
Devising a way to protect the •lending' party from paying for the costs of the UPT 
user is one of the chief obstacles to the further development of UP~6• Due to these 
problems, full UPT implementation involving the integration of all types of networks 
may be a distant goal. UPT is more likely to be useful for limited environments that 
integrate the current proliferation of radio-based systems. 
Personal Communication Systems (PCS) combine terminal-based mobile communication 
techniques with intelligent •personal mobility' capabilities - essentially a mixture of 
UPT and terminal-based mobile telephony. PCS has become an influential model for 
the future development of mobile services in the US, where the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) has already auctioned radio spectrum to 
prospective PCS providers. 
For European telecom equipment firms, the most important aspect of American 
support for PCS is that PCS could harm the acceptance GSM in the US, depending 
on whether or not GSM is taken up by US PCS operators. DCS 1800, the micro-
cellular variant of GSM that was originally developed for the European PCN market, 
has been implemented in the US market using a different frequency47• A major part 
45 Early attempts at UPT were little more than highly automated call forwarding services, and were 
confined to national markets (the only extensive service offering is in Australia). UPT is now being 
defined in the ITU Standardisation Bureau (ITU-T), ETSI, and the US 'T1' Committee. At present it 
consists basically of the UPT Service Set 1 as defined in ITU-T Draft· Recommendation F.851, and in 
the ITU-T Recommendation E.168 on UPT numbering (based upon the E.164 Recommendation- ISDN 
Numbering Plan). Service Set 1 supports basic PS'IN, ISDN and land-based mobile network services. 
Service Set 2 is under development, and is intended to support the whole range of ISDN 
supplementary services. 
46 The problem is compounded for UPT Service Set 2 in that no mechanism is yet clear to enable 
interaction between the 'host' user's supplementary service profile, and that of the 'visiting' user. 
47 The European 1.8 Ghz PCN band allocation is set at 1.9 Ghz in the US. There are concerns that 
DCS 1900 will gain only the support of a small number of new US PCS licensees. A version of DECT 
at 1.9 Ghz is also a contender in the US for applications based on smaller cell sizes for mobile systems 
that permit the addition of more users or higher capacity connections necessary for advanced 
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of the problem is the strategic decision of AT&T to link PCS to a change in the 
technical standard for digital transmissions to permit higher capacities48• The new 
standard will be incompatible with the current GSM standard. As yet, Europe has not 
respondep to this new, upgraded, standard, making it possible that GSM will be 
bypassed in the US market. 
Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service (UMTS) prov~des an alternative to the 
myriad of separate technology and service domains for current land-based mobile 
communications systems. For several years, plans have been discussed in the ITU to 
migrate from these systems to a single service environment49 • 
The aim of UMTS is to offer global coverage for voice and low to medium bit rate 
services that are ISDN compatible, along with more localised coverage for higher 
bandwidth services. The provision of UMTS, however, depends upon successful R&D 
to solve several problems with battery technology, integrated circuitry, end-to-end 
encryption, and multi-mode, multi-cellular interfaces to enable the dynamic use of 
cells of different sizes and power levels. Perhaps the most critical need is to develop 
the required network intelligence, using either the IN or some other method. 
3.3 Conclusion: Technological Trends and European Competitiveness 
' ' 
This review identifies the main technological trends for telecom equipment and 
illustrates the important role of non-technical factors on these trends. Among the 
most important of these factors are standards and the role of legacy systems and 
market demand on migration routes. 
Conflicts over standards, for example between ATM and SDH, delays in introducing 
standards, as in the slow response of the ITU to develop A TM standards for public 
networks, and a lack of international agreement over standards, can fragment 
communication services. 
48 AT&T plans to migrate from FDMA and TDMA (the core multiplexing technologies of G$M and 
OECT) to Code Division Multiple Access (COMA) multiplexing. Some estimates are that COMA offers 
as much as 20 times TDMA capacity for mobile communications, but its reliability is still considered 
by some of AT&T's competitors to be unproven. The choices are (1) commit to COMA now in the 
expectation that COMA will be sufficiently developed by the time PCS services actually roll out (the 
AT&T strategy), or (2) split the commitment by implementing TDMA now and migrating to COMA. 
Although the use of CDMA is being discussed in GSM circles, no co-ordinated strategy has emerged. 
49 This ITU programme is referred to as the Future Public Land Mobile Telecommunication System 
(FPLMTS). The European version of FPLMTS is the Universal Mobile Telecommunications Service 
(UMTS), a project that received its initial impetus in the RACE programme, and is now largely 
administered by the ETSI Special Mobile Group 5 (SMG-5). The spectrum allocation for UMTS is 230 
Mhz in the 1.8 - 2.2 Ghz band -roughly the same band allocation as for PCN and PCS. 
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markets, create uncertainty, and promote market turbulence. Yet harmonised 
international standards are a two-edged sword. They allow European producers to 
gain markets outside of Europe but they also open European markets to foreign 
competition. This is the case for a variety of equipment used in A TM and in virtual 
private networks. The interaction between standards and innovation is also complex. 
Innovation that offers greater technological capabilities can force changes to existing 
standards, but this can create problems for technologies based on the earlier standard. 
The potential conflict between PCS and GSM in the US is an example. As in Europe, 
decisions in North America on standards are viewed strategically as a means to create 
critical market sizes and to support the technological capabilities of American firms. 
Uncertainty over migration routes to new technologies is increasing risk and market 
turbulence. The current enthusiasm for multi-media and the "Information Society", 
dependent on high bandwidth technologies, hides the fact that most of the current 
European market for public and private voice and data services still relies upon fairly 
old technology. Even in cases where migration to newer technologies occurs, it is 
often for the purpose of providing existing services more reliably or cheaply, and not 
because higher bandwidths are desired. In this respect the continual technical 
improvement of legacy systems remains an important market segment in Europe and 
elsewhere. Public operators are unlikely, for some time to come, to abandon their 
commitments to 'intermediate' systems such as the Intelligent Network in the face of 
even newer technologies such as ATM. 
Yet, the general trend in the evolution of network technology is to provide more 
bandwidth, either through adapting legacy systems or by introducing new 
technologies to respond to the growing information content of modern business and 
the increasing opportunities for delivering advanced consumer services. This trend 
can be divided into two components; to provide greater bandwidth flexibly according 
to demand, and to decentralise control over the network functions that use this 
bandwidth. However, since there is often a large gap between the development rate 
of new technology and the growth of new markets to use these technologies, the 
dominant factor influencing the future shape of telecom services is not technological, 
but the migratory paths that will most likely be followed to get from one technology 
to another: PDH to SDH, SDH to ATivi, GSM to PCS and so forth. In Europe, the 
choice of a migratory route is not only affected by legacy systems and demand 
factors, but also by the discrepancies between EU countries in technology, regulation, 
service pricing, market structure, and peripheral hardware and software costs. 
In response to market demand, telecom equipment firms are shifting their focus from 
public network technologies to business networks and various forms of hybrid 
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personal access systems. Furthermore, as the A TM example showed, the role of 
public networks as a driving force behind innovation is declining as the technology 
lead shifts decisively to the private networking sector. New entrants, particularly 
American firms, are leapfrogging over the public network technologies, configuring 
their networks instead around the integrated voice and data requirements of private 
networks where equipment standards and supply are broadly internationalised. 
3.3.2 Can the GSM Experience be Replicated? 
The European experience with GSM is an outstanding success story and a major 
factor behind the rapid growth in the European market share for radio-based telecom 
equipment, the sole sector where European market share has increased in recent 
years, following the decisive early lead taken by European firms in this technology. 
Does our review of technological developments suggest the possibility for replicating 
this experience with other technologies? Our conclusions on this point are mixed. 
European capabilities are dangerously concentrated in the telecommunication side of 
network-based markets, with major weaknesses in software and computers. This is 
a serious problem because a common feature of many new telecommunication 
technologies is the importance of both increasing and decentralising system 
intelligence, which requires greater processing capabilities and software. Today, 
digital electronic components and design principles dominate the design of new 
telecom equipment. Therefore, expertise in computer and software technologies is 
vital and telecom firms must be able to combine telecommunications, computer, and 
software technologies. With this change, the specialised advantages (or core 
capabilities) of telecom equipment firms have become less unique and the possibilities 
for competitive entry by non-telecom firms has grown. Partly as a result, European 
firms have only been able to successfully market new products in a small number of 
the key technological areas outlined above. This erosion of the :unique capabilities of 
telecom manufacturers is accelerated by standards to permit the connection of 
different types of equipment and the increasing availability of generic solutions for 
switching and transmission systems. 
Furthermore, the European lead in telecommunic~tion technology, though supported 
by EU programmes such as RACE and ESPRIT, is narrowing, while the European lag 
with its American and Asian competitors in the complementary computing 
technologies is not narrowing. European firms have not been competitive in computer 
hardware and software since the 1970s (STOA, 1995)50• And, while RACE and ESPRIT 
50 Only a third of European computer needs could be supplied by European-owned firms in 1990 
(EC, 1991), while the US and Japan dominate the world-wide market for semi-conductors (ET, 1995). 
31 
have developed and tested many new technologies, these technologies are only 
slowly reaching the market. A well-documented response to these problems by 
European telecom equipment firms is to seek alliances with US computer firms, as 
has occurred for the development of CTI, PBX, and the Intelligent Network. It 
appears likely that reliance upon non-European firms for network intelligence and 
new service concepts will remain a feature of the European telecom industry for some 
time to come. This raises concerns that European firms could miss future 
technological developments in products or services that are vital to competitive 
advantage. 
The future development of European technologies for network-based services will 
depend upon creating conditions that support the evolution of new technologies, as 
embedded in products, in accordance with changing technological and market 
conditions world-wide. In this respect, the traditionally high profile of European 
standards making organisations are on trial. The ability of European telecom 
equipment firms to control the content and pace of development of standards has 
historically been a major support mechanism for their product development 
strategies. This is breaking down. The standards structure is decentralising and much 
of it is moving out of the telecommunication sector altogether, as shown by the 
history of the A TM Forum. New standards are frequently ambivalent as to their 
public or private network orientations. Moreover, the attitude of European firms to 
European standards is often ambiguous. 
In addition, "made-in-Europe" standards will not always lead to long-term 
competitive advantages for European firms. The current European lead in mobile 
communications, for example, also depends upon the decisions that will be taken in 
the US concerning PCS standards, as well as PCS markets, over the next 5-10 years. 
The European Commission has played an active role in attempting to strengthen the 
competitive capabilities of European telecom equipment firms. These policies have 
been guided by three main goals. The first is to support R&D, for example through 
the Framework Programme, in order to improve the technological capabilities of 
European firms (Barry, 1990). The second is to introduce common standards to form 
a critical mass for new technologies in the EU. The third is to support the single 
market. Some EC policies have promoted market integration in general, but other 
policies are specific to telecommunications, such as programmes to encourage the 
construction of trans-European telecommunication networks as a means of 
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accelerating the construction of a single markefH. Policies to support the single 
market also permit the use of the economic power of a large European market as a 
base for the effective exploitation of foreign markets for European technologies. 
The experience with GSM indicates how future developments can be harnessed to 
achieve more positive outcomes. The environment in which GSM appeared and 
prospered was a high point in the expectations of the creation of a single market and 
the willingness to take policy actions on behalf of this developmef\t. Yet some of the 
force of these developments and some of the confidence that the single market would 
provide the critical mass for European telecom equipment technologies have waned. 
Implementing the telecommunication features of the Trans-European Network (TEN) 
vision is one means of harnessing European service demands to maintain demand for 
telecommunication equipment. In this respect the TEN vision reproduces the 
conditions that led to the success of GSM. What has changed in the interim, however, 
is that other regions of the world, and especially the US, share a common vision for 
the development of advanced, communication services and are actively attempting to 
accelerate movement toward their own versions of the Information Society. In 
Europe, this requires a decline in the importance attached to public switched telecom 
networks in favour of private networks and a much more internationally competitive 
structure of telecommunication equipment supply52• Failure to keep pace with new 
telecom technologies is likely to lead to inadequate service levels, with its negative 
consequences for the competitiveness of European industry and services. For 
European telecom equipment firms the only way to sail the boat appears to be 
forward, and at an increasing speed. 
51 The White Paper on Growth Competitiveness and Employment (EC, 1993) provides a more extensive 
rationale for this policy direction. 
52 While private networks are an increasing market, the strength of the European telecom equipment 
sector over the medium term is likely to be influenced by procurement by European network 
operators, with their large share of world telecom service markets. Of the top ten international telecom 
carriers (as ranked in 1993}, five are European: Deutsche Telekom, Cable & Wireless, France Telecom, 
British Telecom, and PTT Netherlands (CWI, 1994b). 
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PART TWO 
RESULTS OF THE CIS SURVEY 
5 INTRODUCTION 
The analyses of the CIS data are limited to six topics of interest to policy that were 
identified through the evaluation of the European telecom sector in Part One1: 
1. Innovative status and innovative success. The design of good policies to support 
innovation requires basic information on the factors that determine whether or not 
a firm innovates and the factors that determine innovative success. 
2. Types of innovation activities: Information on the relationship between firm size and 
the type of innovative activity can improve our understanding of the specific needs 
of smaller firms, while the amount of effort that firms expend on product versus 
process innovation can help to identify cost-reduction from new product market 
strategies. 
3. Sources of technical information and new technologies. EC funding support for 
electronics and informatics research encourages research links between firms, which 
could be particularly important in telecom in order to integrate telecom equipment, 
electronic components, and software. The CIS survey permits an evaluation of the 
types of external information sources and alliances that are of value in this sector. 
Innovation goals. Long-term competitiveness in telecom equipment partly depends on 
an aggressive innovation strategy to develop new products and seek out new 
markets, particularly in Asia and North America. At the same time, the Maastricht 
Treaty identifies a cleaner environment as an important social objective of European 
policy. The CIS results are used to examine both issues. 
1 One topic of interest that is not examined in this report, other than in several footnotes, is the 
effectiveness of appropriation methods to protect innovations from copying. The relevant CIS 
questions are of great interest to policy because of the assumption that strong appropriation conditions 
encourage firms to innovate. Patents have attracted the most attention because they are amenable to 
policy actions, such as programmes to assist SMEs to use the patent system to their advantage. The 
recent Green Paper on Innovation (EC, 1995), for example, notes .that 'effective legal protection is a vital 
incentive for innovation' and supports policies to ~prove the ability of firms, particularly SMEs, to 
use patent and other intellectual property rights. Unfortunately, the results for the CIS questions on 
appropriation are available for only 52 component and 44 telecom firms, which is too few to be able 
to adequately investigate appropriation conditions in the telecom sector. 
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Regulations and other factors hampering innovation. Standardization is an important 
influence on the direction of research in the telecom sector because of its effect on 
reducing uncertainty in the face of a wide range of technical options. Innovation can 
also be hampered by a lack of skilled personnel, information on technologies, or 
opportunities to cooperate with other firms. 
Export rate. The telecom sector is one of the few high-technology sectors in Europe 
where the EU runs an export surplus (see Figure 3, Part One), while most European 
countries run a large deficit in components (YWED, 1996). The policy goals are to 
maintain or improve the performance of the telecom sector while improving 
conditions for components. The CIS data is analyzed to discover what factors are 
associated with the export success for telecom and the export failure for components. 
Each of these six topics is evaluated below, after a brief overview of the methodology. 
6 METHODOLOGY 
6.1 Available CIS Data for the Telecom Sector and for Comparison Groups 
Data for the telecom sector is only available for Norway and six EU countries: 
Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, and Ireland. This is not a serious 
limitation, since these six EU countries account for 80% of total EU telecom 
production in 1992. The most important limitation is the lack of data for the UK and 
Spain, which accounted for 13.7% and 5.7% respectively of EU production in 19922• 
The number of cases available for analysis is further limited by a lack of data in 
several countries for several questions of interest, such as on R&D expenditures or 
a change in sales, and by missing responses to some questions for many of the cases. 
The maximum number of cases available for analysis for all NACE 32 firms, for 
components and telecom separately, and for a comparison group of other Hitech 
firms, are given in Table 6.1 for both innovating and non-innovating firms. An 
innovator is defined as a firm that introduced a technologically changed product or 
process between 1990 and 19923• 
2 Further details on the CIS coverage of telecom firms are given in section A2.1 of Appendix A. 
3 Firms that did not introduce a product or process innovation between 1990 and 1992 but which 
stated that they planned to introduce one between 1993 and 1995 are not classified as innovators. This 
exclusion is unlikely to influence the results since only 5.8% of telecom firms fit this category. 
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Many of the analyses 
use the components 
sector as a comparison 
group for telecom firms. 
The comparison group 
'Other hitech' consists 
of cases from the office 
equipment (NACE 30), 
electrical equipment 
(NACE 31), and instru-
ments sectors (NACE 
33). All three contain a 
high percentage of R&D 
intensive firms that use 
technologies such as 
computerisation and 
Table 6.1 Number of CIS Cases by Innovation 
Status and Sector 
Non-
Sector Total Innovators innovators 
Other hitech 2465 1368 1097 
NACE 321 569 402 167 
32.1 Components 202 134 68 
32.2 Telecom 210 148 62 
other NACE 32 60 40 20 
1
: The sub-totals do not add up to the total number of NACE 32 cases 
because of missing data and because a breakdown of NACE 32 to the 3-
digit level is not available for 97 cases. See Table B-3, Appendix B, for 
a full description of the available weighted and unweighted data by 
country for NACE 32. 
electronics that are also of importance to telecom equipment. 
6.2 Statistical Methods 
The CIS survey provides cross-sectional data on the state of innovation over a three 
year period. A major problem for statistical techniques such as regression analyses 
that make cause-and-effect assumptions is that it is often impossible to determine if 
a specific faCtor is the outcome or the cause of an innovative strategy. The problem is 
complex because Kline and Rosenberg's chain-link model of innovation, which 
provides the theoretical foundation of the CIS questionnaire, a~sumes that innovation 
includes many feedback loops where a cause can become an outcome, and vice-versa. 
For example, sales can grow because of past innovation or the profits earned from 
high sales growth can be spent on current innovative activities. Our approach to this 
problem is to first present simple, descriptive results that make no assumptions about 
cause and effect. Where relevant, these are followed by logit, probit, or tobit 
regressions that make cause and effect assumptions and which should therefore be 
interpreted cautiously. 
6.2.1 Weightings 
Unless stated otherwise, all results are based on analyses that use the EUROSTAT 
weights to account for the varying response rates by country and sector4• Statistical 
4 The use of weightings introduces other problems such as overestimating the size of the European 
telecom industry (see discussion in Appendix A, section A2.2) or magnifying the importance of a few 
firms with high weightings. RE!sults are similar between unweighted and weighted regressions that 
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significance is calculated using rescaled weights based on the actual number of cases. 
6.2.2 Descriptive results 
Two methods are used to present summary descriptive results for the CIS questions 
that use a five-point subjective scale, varying from 'not important' to 'crucial'. The 
first measure is the extreme score, which is the percentage of firms that give a score 
of 4 or 5 (very significant or crucial) to a question. For example the extreme score is 
20% if 20 out of 200 firms give a score of 4 or 5 to a subjective question. 
The second measure is the most important score, or the percentage of respondents who 
give their highest score to a specific question in a group of questions. Both a 
respondent that gives a score of '5' to a question on the importance of· universities 
and 4 or less to other information sources, and a respondent that gives a score of '3' 
to universities and 2 or less to other sources, are indicating that universities are more 
important to their firm than other sources of information5• 
6.2.3 Regression analyses6 
The most commonly used regression method employed here is the logit model, which 
is an appropriate technique for dichotomous (two-valued) dependent variables. All 
regressions indude variables for country and firm size, measured by the log of the 
number of employees. Country is always included to control for response biases7, but 
the results for country are not given to avoid the temptation to make possibly 
meaningless comparisons between countries. Given the exploratory nature of this 
research, forward stepwise selection, based on Likelihood Ratios, is then used to 
select from a list of optional variables that could plausibly influence the results and 
which are unlikely to strongly violate the cause and effect assumption8• All optional 
control for country and firm size, though weighted regression results are always given here. 
5 Tie scores are assigned equally, for example three maximum scores of 5 are counted as '0.333 
each. The total sum of the most important scores always adds to 100%. 
6 The relatively short observation period of the CIS limits the possibility for simultaneous equation 
modelling methods that could accommodate the dual role of variables. The regressions are estimates 
of reduced form behavioural relationships where the structural equations remain unspecified and 
unestimated. 
7 The proportion of all firms that completed the CIS questionnaire varies by country, from a low 
of 21% and 22% respectively for Germany and France to a high of 76% for Norway. These differences 
in sampling appear to have biased the results, with the proportion of innovating firms increasing in 
inverse proportion to the response rate. 
8 Results are only given for optional variables where p is less than 10%. The value p may be 
thought of as the probability that a meaningful effect is occurring in the regression for that parameter. 
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variables are described in Table B-7 of Appendix B. 
In order to maximise the size of the data set used in the analyses, some of the 
analyses are repeated with and without firms with missing data for important 
variables such as R&D intensity. The comparison groups are always limited to an 
equivalent set of firms, using identical inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
6.2.4 Bias from values estimated by EUROSTAT 
EUROSTAT used regression methods to estimate missing values for some variables. 
Replicating these regressions could produce spuriously high R2 values. This problem 
is avoided, where relevant, by excluding cases where the dependent variable was 
estimated by EUROSTAT. (See Appendix B2 for further details). 
7 INNOVATIVE STATUS AND SUCCESS 
7.1 Introduction 
A basic question of interest is what influences whether or not a .firm innovates, and 
if it does innovate, the factors that influence the amount of effort that it expends on 
innovation. A second research question concerns the identification of the factors that 
are associated with innovative "success", as reflected in sales growth, an increase in 
profitability, and a higher percentage of sales from innovative products. 
The CIS questionnaire does not contain data on profitability, but it is possible to 
determine the change in sales between 1990 and 19~2 for all countries except 
Germany and Norway and to determine the percentage of product sales in 1992 that 
are unchanged, incrementally changed, or significantly changed. Using this data, we 
develop two measures of innovative success and determine the influence of a range 
of variables on these two measures of success. 
7.2 Descriptive Results for Innovative Status 
Table 7.1 gives the proportion of innovating and non-innovating firms for the telecom 
. and comparison sectors. Telecom has the highest proportion of innovators, at 71.3%, 
followed by Other hitech at 67.0% and components at 66.0%. The proportion of 
innovators increases with firm siz~, as is clearly shown in Table 7.2. The proportion 
of innovators also varies by country (results not shown), but it is not significantly 
different between countries in comparisons limited to firms with more than 100 
employees. Only 10% of telecom and 4.9% of component firms innovate but do not 
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Table 7.1 Weighted Proportion of lllifovating and Non-innovating Firms in the Telecom 
Sector and in Comparison Industries 
Non-Innovators Innovators 
All Industries (NACE 15-36)1 47.1% 52.9% 
Other hitech sectors1 33.0% 67.0% 
All NACE 32 Firms1 34.0% 66.0% 
32.1 Components2 40.1% 59.9% 
32.2 Telecom2 28.7% 71.3% 
32.3 HEE2 34.1% 65.9% 
. 
1
' Excludes the UK, Portugal and Greece where weightings are not available. 
2
: Excludes the UK, Portugal, Greece, Luxembourg, Denmark, and Spain where either weightings or three-digit 
level NACE data are not available. 
conduct formal R&D9• Firm size is also a factor. For all NACE 32 respondents, 3.3% 
of innovating firms with over 500 
employees do not conduct R&D, com-
pared to 5.9% with less than 100 
employees and 12.8% with between 100 
and 499 employees .. 
7.2.1 Innovation Intensities 
Table 7.3 gives the results for four 
measures of innovation intensity: R&D 
expenditures per employee, total inno-
vation expenditures per employee, R&D 
expenditures as a percentage of sales, 
and total innovation expenditures as a 
percentage of sales. Total innovation 
includes R&D plus the cost of patents 
and licenses, product design, trial pro-
duction, and market analysis. Each 
Table 7.2 Weighted Percentage of 
Innovating Firms by Size 
Class for Telecom and 
Components 
Employees Telecom Components 
1-19 10.0 47.6 
20-99 72.5 64.0 
100-249 91.6 67.3 
250-499 93.9 100.0 
500-999 100.0 100.0 
> 1000 100.0 100.0 
Trends statistically significant (p < 0.001) 
intensity measure is provided for 1) R&D performing firms only (RDP) and 2) for all 
firms (AF), including both non-innovators and innovators that do not conduct R&D. 
Expenditures per employee on R&D by telecom firms are much higher than the 
equivalent expenditures for all industries (NACE 15 - 36) and among similar hitech 
sectors, but expenditures per employee on R&D are highest in the component sector, 
followed by telecom, though expenditures on all innovation activities is slightly 
9 This excludes French firms for which there is no data on R&D. There are no NACE 32 firms that 
conduct R&D but which have not introduced an innovation in the preceding three years. 
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higher in telecom than in components. However, R&D intensity is considerably lower 
for telecom firms compared to components and total innovation intensity (ill) is 
lower for telecom firms than for all comparisons groups with the exception of HEE. 
Table 7.3 1992 R&D and Total Innovation Intensities (Til) by R&D Performance Status 
(RDP = R&D Performing Firms Only, AF = All Firms) 
Expenditures ('000 ECUs) per employee Expenditures as a percent of sales 
On R&D Til On R&D Til 
RDP AF RDP AF RDP AF RDP AF 
All Industries 2.60 0.66 6.70 3.53 3.5% 0.9% 13.8% 7.3% 
Hitech sectors 3.70 1.67 12.99 5.9 5.1% 2.3% 20.2% 9.1% 
32.1 Components 8.86 5.17 11.84 7.29 17.9% 10.5% 24.5% 15.1% 
32.2 Telecom 6.64 3.48 12.80 7.91 6.0% 3.1% 10.0% 6.2% 
32.3 HEE 2.29 1.11 7.28 4.21 2.6% 1.3% 7.6% 4.4% 
All calculations limited to countries with data on weights, R&D expenditures, and NACE codes at the three-
digit level: Germany, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Ireland, and Norway. 
Excludes firms where R&D expenditures exceed total innovation expenditures and French firms (no data 
on R&D), outlier firms with R&D intensities above 100% are also excluded. 
Note: Estimates are by firm. Sales-weighted R&D intensities are considerably higher (see Table 1.7). 
The results show that sectors with high R&D intensities spend comparatively less on 
non-R&D innovation costs than sectors with low R&D intensities. 
Figure 5 gives the weighted frequency distribution for sales-based intensities for R&D 
expenditures and total innovation costs, using class ranges of 2%10• For example, 
14.2% of the firms have an R&D intensity between 0% and 2%,. for a midpoint of '1'. 
The midpoint of '0' refers to a few firms that reported R&D expenditures of zero, 
while the midpoint of -1 consists of non-innovating firms with no expenditures on 
R&D or other innovation costs, as relevant. As expected, the distribution of total 
innovation intensity is shifted to the right in comparison with R&D intensity and the 
distribution of both intensities is strongly skewed to the left, with most firms having 
low R&D intensities. The frequency peak at the midpoint of 33% for R&D intensity 
and at 39% for total innovation intensity is due to high weightings on a few cases. 
10 Excludes firms with higher expenditures on R&D than on total innovation costs and French 
firms, for which there are no data on R&D 6r total innovation expenditures. 
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7.2.2 Firm Size 
and R&D share, 
export share, and 
sales growth 
Table 7.4 gives 
correlation coeffi-
cients between 
firm size and the 
proportion of total 
innovation expen-
ditures due to 
R&D, the share of 
exports in total 
sales, and the 
change in sales 
between 1990 and 
1992. For all ind-
Figure 5 
I 
~ 
Distribution of R&D and Total Innovation Intensity for NACE 32 
Based on 1907 weighted and 490 original cases 
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ustries, the export share increases with firm size, but there is no correlation between 
size and the change in sales between 1990 and 1992. The results for R&D expendi-
tures as a share of total innovation costs differ by industry. The R&D share increases, 
with size for Other Hitech, there is no significant relationship for components, while 
the R&D share declines with firm size for telecom. 
The proportion of 
firms with sales 
growth was calcu-
lated for innova-
tors and non-inno-
vators. Overall, 
there is very little 
difference either 
by sector or by 
innovation status. 
For example, 
59.5% of innovat-
ing and 60.6% of 
non-innovating 
telecom firms 
reported some 
growth in sales. 
Table 7.4 Correlation Coefficients between Firm Size 
(log of employee number) and Share of R&D 
in Total Innovation Expenditures, Export 
share, and Change in Sales (Statistically 
significant coefficients in bold) 
Sector R&D share1 Export share2 Sales Change3 
Other Hitech 0.16 0.29 0.00 
Components 0.11 0.29 -0.01 
Telecom -0.43 0.49 0.00 
1
: Based on questions lOdi and 13a and limited to R&D performers. 
Excludes firms where R&D expenditures > total innovation expendi-
tures, firms where the R&D intensity is > 100%, and firms from France. 
2
: Data available for all countries (except the UK, Portugal and Greece). 
3
: Excludes Germany and Spain where sales data for 1990 is not 
available. 
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The equivalent rates for Other Hitech firms are 56.5% for innovators and 53.3% for 
non-innovators, and for components the rates are 50.9% for innovators and 43.8% for . 
non-innovators11• 
7.3 Regression Results for Innovative Status 
A maximum of six variables are available for both non-innovating and innovating 
firms: nationality, size (number of employees), export share, sales growth, industry 
sector, and foreign versus domestic ownership. 
Both firm size and export share could influence the probability of innovating: larger 
firms are more likely to have the financial resources to invest in innovation, while 
export oriented firms could be forced by exposure to international competition to 
innovate more rapidly than firms that produce for a more protected domestic market. 
Firms with rapid sales growth could be more likely to innovate because of an 
increase in income. Finally, the probability of innovating could be influenced by the 
ownership status of a firm, with foreign-owned subsidiaries based on assembly 
operations less likely to innovate than domestic firms. 
7.3.1 Results of Regression Analyses 
Table 7.5 provides the results of a probit model for the probability that a firm 
innovates (Prob1 and Prob2) and a Tobit model to determine the effect of these Two 
probit model results are given to maximise the amount of available data. Prob1 uses 
the full data set for all NACE 32 firms. However, no data on R&D intensity or other 
related variables is available for France. Therefore, the Prob2 results exclude French 
respondents and use the identical set of cases as used in the Tobit models. 
A robust and consistent result is that the probability of innovating increases with firm 
size (LEMPLOY), which is significant in all regressions. Sales growth, between 1990 
and 1992, has no effect on the probability of innovating, even though European 
telecom sales increased rapidly between these two years. Furthermore, there is no 
difference in the probability of innovating between telecom and other NACE 32 firms, 
after controlling for firm size and country. Export intensive firms are less likely to 
have high R&D intensities in two Tobit regressions (Models 2 and 4). As shown in 
model 5 which includes ownership status, this unexpected result could be caused by 
foreign-owned assembly plants12• 
11 The average sales growth is higher in the telecom and component sectors among the innovators 
compared to the non-innovators, but the variances are so large that the differences are not significant. 
12 Almost a quarter of the firms do not export. A second set of regressions, limited to exporting , 
firms, found that the export rate had no effect on the probability of innovating. 
42 
. Table 7.5 FACTORS INFLUENCING INNOVATION STATUS: Probit and Tobit Model Results (** = p <0.01, * = p< 0.05) 
For Probit: 0 = non-innovator, 1 = innovator. For Tobit: dependent variable is In (1 + R&D intensity) 
1 2 3 4 
Probl Prob2 Tobit Probl Prob2 Tobit Probl Prob2 Tobit Probl Prob2 Tobit Probl 
Constant -2.54** -3.63** -0.14*" -2.98"" -4.83*" -0.15"" -1.45"* -2.46*" -0.21"" -4.13** -4.63** 0.02 -1.48** 
EXPORTS -0.05 -0.12 -0.07 -0.21 -0.44 -0.12" 0.35 0.35 -0.01 -0.42 -0.46 -0.16** 0.16 
LEMPLOY 1.60"* 2.14** 0.06** 1.88** 2.88*" 0.07"* 0.91"* 1.41** 0.08** 2.68** 2.89"* 0.05** 1.17** 
TELECOM 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 
5-GROWTH 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.00 
DOMESTIC -0.11 -0.20 -0.14*" -0.39 
#Cases 545 425 425 475 359 359 428 315 315 398 359 359 323 
Pseudo R2 0.63 0.73 0.63 0.82 0.52 0.61 0.78 0.82 0.57 
-2LL 559.2 398.2 480.1 310.4 478.8 303.0 350.8 311.2 329.0 
%Correct 72.5 72.7 71.2 72.4 68.9 61.0 72.4 71.3 69.7 
EXPORTS: Percentage of total1992 sales from exports. LEMPLOY: Log of the number of employees. TELECOM: '1' if the telecom sector, otherwise '0'. 
5-GROWTH: Percentage increase in sales in 1992 compared to 1990. DOMESTIC: '1' if firm is domestically owned, '0' if foreign owned. 
s 
Prob2 
-2.00** 
0.20 
1.36** 
0.11 
-0.04 
-0.41 
288 
0.75 
285.2 
69.1 
Tobit 
0.09 
-0.08 
0.02 
0.00 
-0.01 
-0.18** 
! 
288 i I 
i 
I 
I 
_j 
All Models exclude the UK, Portugal, and Greece. Respondents from France are only included in the first column of each model. For each model, the following additional 
exclusions are made due to differences in the CIS questionnaire by country: Modell: none; Model2: Excludes respondents from Denmark and Spain; Model3: Excludes 
respondents from Germany, Spain and Norway; Model4: Excludes respondents from Denmark and Spain; ModelS: Excludes respondents from Germany, Denmark, Spain 
and Norway. 
All models include dummy variables for country. 
A combined Probit/Truncated model is often more appropriate than a Tobit model, but attempts to fit the data to the Truncated model failed. The R&D intensity of non-
innovators is set to zero. Some of the variables are not available for all countries. 
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7.4 Innovative Success: Sales and Changed Products 
Successful innovation should lead to 
a higher proportion of innovative 
products and an increase in sales. 
Firms are defined as successful if 
they had an increase in sales (0% and 
above) and if more than 25% of their 
sales were from incrementally or 
significantly changed products. Firms 
are defined as unsuccessful if their 
sales had declined (negative change 
in sales) and if less than 25% of their 
sales were · from incrementally or 
significantly changed produ~ts. Firms 
Table 7.6 
Unsuccessful 
Successful 
Mixed-success 
Total 
Actual count 
Percentage of successful, 
unsuccessful, and mixed-
success component and 
telecom firms 
Components Telecom 
14.6 8.6 
25.1 26.6 
60.3 64.8 
100.0 100.0 
128 119 
which succeed on one variable but fail on the other are defined as mixed-success 
firms. 
The weighted percentage of successful, unsuccessful, and mixed-success firms are 
given in Table 7.613• The majority of firms in each sector are of mixed-success and 
are excluded in a series of analyses to determine if there are differences in the 
strategies used by the two extremes of successful and unsuccessful firms. The results 
of simple comparisons are given in Table 7.7 for several firm characteristics, the 
percent that find public research to be an important source of information, and the 
average index for the importance of external information sources14• 
Few of the differences are statistically significant, though this could be due to the 
small number of cases. Nevertheless, a higher percentage of successful telecom firms 
are domestically-owned, though the reverse is true for components, and they have 
a slightly higher R&D intensity (though the highest R&D intensity is among the 
mixed-success firms). Successful telecom firms are also larger than unsuccessful firms. 
A significantly higher percentage of both successful component and telecom firms 
find universities or government labs to be important than their unsuccessful 
counterparts. 
A logit regression was also used to determine which factors had a significant effect 
on the probability of success or failure in the telecom sector (results not shown). In 
addition to firm size and dummy variables for country, the regression included 
13 The analysis excludes German and Norwegian firms where data on 1990 sales is' not available. 
14 The questions on barriers to innovation were not included since these questions were not asked 
in France. Their inclusion would considerably reduce the number of available cases. 
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variables for the 
importance of uni-
versities and govern-
ment laboratories, 
and whether or not 
the firm participates 
in cooperative R&D. 
The only significant 
factor is firm size. 
Larger telecom firms 
are more likely to be 
successful than 
smaller firms. 
7.4.1 The Proportion 
of Changed Products 
in Total1992 Sales 
The percentage of 
incrementally or 
significantly changed 
products out of total 
1992 sales is used as 
Table 7.7 Characteristics of Unsuccessful (U) and Sue-
cessful (S) Pooled Sample of Component and 
Telecom Firms (Italics = p < 0.10; Bold and 
italics = p < 0.05) 
Components Telecom 
Factor u s u s 
Firm characteristics 
Domestically owned1 81.1% 50.1% 44.0% 62.2% 
Participate in cooperative R&D 47.9% 34.1% 49.6% 49.7% 
Average R&D intensity 5.6% 8.3% 4.3% 6.7% 
Number of employees 239 223 121 600 
Sources of information 
Universities or gov labs 30.9% 55.6% 0.0% 46.8% 
Index of outward orientation 20.5 27.8 22.4 25.7 
1
: Excludes France where this data is not available. For comparison, 
domestic firms account for 61.6% of all component and 73.0% of all 
telecom firms. 
the second measure of innovative success. Three different measures are investigated: 
1) the percent of incrementally changed products, 2) the percent of significantly 
changed products, and 3) the percent of incrementally and significantly changed 
products combined. Models 1 and 2 gave poor results and therefore are not presented 
here, but relatively good results are available for model 3 and presented in Table 
7.815. 
Model 3 was first explored using variables obtained from information sources, 
innovation goals such as the importance of accessing European and foreign markets, 
barriers to innovation, participation in cooperative R&D programmes, domestic 
ownership, and R&D intensity. Only four of the 17 variables are significant factors 
in explaining the proportion of changed products. 
7.5 Concluding Comments 
The results of both measures of innovative success show that the probability of 
success increases with firm size. This could reflect structural conditions in the telecom 
15 The value for the percent of changed products had been estimated by EUROSTAT for almost 
20% of the cases. Including these cases significantly increased the adjusted R2 values, suggesting a bias. 
These cases are therefore excluded from the analyses given in Table 3.2. 
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sector, where innova-
tion is very expens-
ive and only large 
firms can succeed. A 
related explanatory 
factor is the import-
ant role of large 
national champions 
and service providers 
in the European 
telecom equipment 
industry, which 
could have encour-
aged the concentra-
tion of innovative 
expertise into large 
firms. Second, firins 
that use publicly-
funded research are 
more ·successful, 
though this result is 
much more tentative 
than the result for 
firm size. 
Table 7.8 OLS regression coefficients for the natu-
ral log of the percentage of incrementally· 
and significantly changed products in 
1992 sales by Telecom firms. Statistically 
significant variables in at least one 
model. (* = p . < 0.10, ** = p < 0.01) 
Model3.11 Model3.22 
QUALITY -0.56** -0.62** 
COPYEASE 0.35* -
PUB RES 0.29* 0.14 
Lemploy 0.34** 0.41** 
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.34 
Signif F 0.0000 0.0000 
1
: Excludes France and Norway, permitting variables on factors hampering 
innovation (ie COPYEASE). 
2
: Includes firms from ·France, Norway, Germany, Italy, Holland, and 
Belgium. 
QUALITY: dummy for the importance of improving product quality as a 
innovation objective; COPYEASE: dummy for the importance of ease of 
copying as a barrier to innovation; PUBRES: dummy for the importance of 
universities and government laboratories as a source of information. 
Two interesting results in Table 7.8 are the importance of the ease of copying as a 
barrier to innovation, with a positive coefficient, and the negative coefficient for the 
importance of improving product quality as a goal of innovation. In the former case 
the result indicates that -poor appropriation conditions impel firms to maintain a 
higher share of changed products in their product line, suggesting that the overall 
effect of poor appropriation conditions is to encourage rather than discourage 
innovation in the telecom sector16• The negative role of the importance of quality as 
a goal suggests that telecom firms are opting for innovations over quality. Alterna-
tively, this effect could be spurious, with quality getting a relatively lower rating 
among successful firms compared to other goals, such as developing new products, 
while retaining an equivalent importance, in real terms, as firms that rate quality as 
16 Analysis of the questions on appropriation conditions show that telecom firms find strong 
protection methods such as patents and secrecy to be less effective than component firms. The only 
relatively effective methods for telecom are lead time advantages and technical complexity, but even 
these are seen as less effective by telecom than by telecom firms. These results indicate that 
appropriation conditions in the telecom sector are relatively poor compared to components. 
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an important objective of innovation. J 
Some of the results suggest that component firms are less successful or innovative 
than telecom firms. However, a sales-weighted estimate of the proportion of all sales 
in the component and telecom sectors that are incrementally or significantly changed 
shows a higher rate of innovative products in components than in telecom: 34.1% and : 1 , 
32.8% of all component sales are incrementally or significantly changed, compared 
to 23.3% and 25.6% of all telecom sales. These results point to the need for caution, 
since using the firm as the unit of analysis can give different results than those 
produced by looking at the entire sector as a whole17• 
8 TYPES OF INNOVATIVE ACTIVITIES 
8.1 Introduction 
The innovative effort of firms is usually measured through expenditures on R&D or 
by R&D intensity. R&D activity does not, however, take an invention right through 
to ·the market, nor can R&D intensity alone tell us much about the purpose of 
innovation or whether it occurs within the firm or purchased from external sources. 
The CIS survey permits us to look more closely at each of these questions. First, 
respondents are asked to estimate the proportion of their firm's total innovation costs 
that are due to R&D, acquisition of patents and licenses, product design, trial 
production, training and tooling-up, and market analysis, as well as a write-in 'other' 
category. Other than patent purchases, these activities are often necessary to market 
a new product or introduce a new process innovation. Second, a separate question 
provides an estimate of the proportion of R&D related to product and process 
innovation. The choice of whether to focus on product versus process innovation 
could be linked to strategies to reduce costs versus seeking new markets. A third 
question asks for the percent of total innovation costs spent on external services for 
R&D, training, etc, which could be an important source of innovation for some firms. 
8.2 Results 
Figure 6 gives the distribution of innovation costs for component, telecom and other 
Hitech firms, while Figure 7 provides the distribution by firm size for telecom alone. 
Figure 6 shows that R&D costs are a considerably higher fraction of all innovation 
costs for telecom than for component or other hitech firms, largely due to 
17 We have chosen to concentrate on the firm because this perspective provides a better description 
of firm behaviour, with possible policy implications, than taking a sectoral approach. In addition, 
methodological limitations of the CIS data suggest caution in weighting results by sales or the number 
of employees (see Appendix A2.2). 
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proportionately lower costs for trial production. Figure 7 shows that smaller firms 
spend proportionally more than large firms on non-R&D activities. 
Table 8.2 gives the results for components, telecom and other hitech for the percent 
of R&D spent on product innovation, the ratio of product to process innovation, and 
. . the. percentage of total innovation costs spent externally. All three sectors focus 
considerably more on product than process innovation. However, telecom firms 
spend relatively more on process innovation, as shown by their lower prod-
uct/process ratio. Telecom also firms spend a higher fraction of their total innovation 
costs on external 
sources than component 
firms, but less than 
other hitech firms. 
Table 8.2 gives 
regression results for 
the percentage of total 
innovation costs due to 
R&D (R&D share), the 
percentage of total costs 
Table 8.1 Innovative activity by sector 
Components Telecom 
%product 83.6 77.8 
Product/Process ratio 5.1 3.7 
% ext. services 12.9 25.8 
Other 
hi tech 
69.4 
4.1 
30.9 
spent on external services (External share), and the product/process ratio (a measure 
of the relative importance of product versus process innovation). 
The R&D share for all NACE 32 firms declines with firm size (LEMPLOY), though 
there is no effect for telecom firms for firm size, in contrast to the results given in 
Figure 7. This is explained by the increase in R&D share with the absolute amount 
spent on R&D (LRDEXP), which has a more important impact on R&D share than the 
number of employees, but which is correlated with firm size. Similarly, LRDEXP is 
positive for all NACE 32 firms, indicating that the negative coefficient for LEMPLOY 
is capturing large firms with low R&D activities such as assembly operations. 
Unexpectedly, for all NACE 32 firms, R&D share declines for variables that measure 
different successful innovation outcomes or objectives that should require high R&D 
activity to develop new innovatiwe products: the proportion of new innovative 
products (IPRODSH), exports as a share of total sales (EXPORTS), and the importance 
of creating new markets in Europe (EURMARK). One possibility is that these 
measures of success or goals require significant investment in trial production and 
product design to sqcceed. 
The share of all innovation costs spent on external services should be related to 
outside sources of information such as cooperative R&D or consultants (CONSULT). 
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Table 8.2 TYPE OF INNOVATIVE EFFORT: OLS regre-ssion results for R&D 
share and external share of total innovation costs, and product/process 
ratio. For All NACE 32 firms and Telecom firms only (* = p < 0.10, ** = 
p < 0.01) 
R&D Share1 External share2 Product/process ratio3 
All32 Tel All32 Tel All32 Tel 
Constant 0.27* 0.15 0.44** 0.82** 4.55** -6.06* 
Telecom 0.03 -0.08 0.14 
Optional variables 
DOMESTIC 3.64* 
LEMPLOY -0.21 ** 
LRDEXP 0.26** 0.13** 2.43** 
IPRODSH -0.14* -0.49** -0.52** 
EXPORTS -0.15* -0.33* 
R&D INTENSITY 12.60** 9.21** 
EURMARK -0.18** -0.34** 
NEWPROD 0.11* 
MAINPROD -2.14* 
LOW CoST 0.20** 
CONSULT 0.08* 0.21** 
COMPET 0.11* 
PUB RES -0.44** 
Cases 180 84 123 44 234 107 
Adjusted R2 0.51 0.35 0.25 0.64 0.17 0.41 
1
: Exclusions: firms with less than 50 employees (no data for these firms from Germany), French and non-R&D 
performing firms who were not asked the question, firms with R&D intensities above 100%. 
2
: Exclusions: Italian, French, non-R&D performing firms (not asked question), firms with R&D intensities> 100%. 
3
: Exclusions: French and non-R&D performing firms (not asked question), firms with R&D intensities> 100%. 
See Appendix Table B-7 for a description of the variables. Optional variables are only shown in the Table if they 
were selected through stepwise forward selection in at least one regression. FORMARK and COOPRD were included 
in option list but never selected. 
There is no effect for cooperative R&D (therefore this variable is not included in 
Table 8.2), but there is a positive effect for the importance of consultants for telecom 
firms. Neither firm size or R&D intensity influence the external share. An interesting 
result is that the external share declines with IPRODSH for both all NACE 32 and 
telecom firms, and the external share also declines with exports and the importance 
of creating new European markets for Telecom firms only. 
The ratio of product to process innovation for both all NACE 32 and telecom firms 
increases with R&D intensity, as well as total expenditures on R&D for telecom firms. 
Domestically-owned telecom firms (DOMESTIC) spend a higher proportion on · 
product development than foreign-owned firms. However, a high export or 
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innovative product share has no effect on the product/process mix. 
8.3 Concluding Comments 
A higher proportion of the total innovation expenses of telecom firms is spent on 
R&D than for component and other hitech firms, but relatively more of this R&D 
component is focused on process instead of product innovation. This could be due 
to technical factors, for example if reducing component production costs_ occurs 
during prod~ct design and trial production, whereas these could remain part of R&D 
in telecom. The regression results show that both the R&D share and the focus of 
product innovation increase "'!ith the absolute level of R&D expenditures in the 
telecom sector, indicating that new product development is more common among 
larger telecom firms. The results for external share suggest that the more successfully 
innovative firms are less likely to acquire innovations from external sources, 
indicating that success depends on the ability of firms to develop their own 
innovative strengths. 
9 SOURCES OF INFORMATION AND NEW TECHNOLOGIES 
9.1 Introduction 
There are two main research questions that concern the importance of external 
sources of information to the innovative activities of the telecom sector. 
First, the policies of the European Commission to support research and innovation, 
for example via the Framework Programme, encourage firms to cooperate with other 
firms and with the public research infrastructure. The promotion of cooperative 
research is justified by the belief that alliances and research collaboration are essential 
to maintain competitiveness in sectors, such as telecom, with rapid technological 
progress. This need results from the growing complexity and cost of research. 
Especially for large firms, a broad portfolio of technological capabilities is necessary 
to avoid being "nibbled to death" by smaller specialised producers. 
Second, collaboration could be particularly important to the telecom sector, where 
success depends on integrating innovation in telecom equipment, electronic 
components, and software. Given the poor technical competitiveness of the European 
components sector, and the fact that the single European market is not supposed to 
substitute for global participation, we would expect European telecom firms to form 
alliances with Japanese and American firms for components and with American firms 
for software. This should create a general tendency for telecom firms to acquire new 
technologies from sources outside of Europe. 
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The first research question largely concerns the importance of the public research 
infrastructure and participation in cooperative R&D. The second research question 
concerns both the importance of commercially-mediated information sources, such 
as information obtained from suppliers, clients, and consultants, and the different 
means firms use to acquire and transfer technologies. The types of cooperative R&D 
agreements that firms enter into are also of interest to the second research question . 
9.2 The Value of Public Research 
The CIS respondents evaluated the importance of 13 information sources to the 
innovation activities of their firm, including questions on three types of publicly-
funded research institutions: universities, government laboratories, and technical 
institutes. Descriptive results for many of these sources are given in Figures 8 and 9. 
The results for public research are amalgamated because of the generally low ratings 
given to them. Both figures show that the telecom respondents give public research 
a very low rating, both relative to other information sources and in comparison with 
the component and other hitech sectors18• 
Logit regression results for the telecom sector and for all NACE 32 firms, given in 
Table 9.1, show that the most important factor influencing the importance of public 
research in the telecom sector is firm size. 
Among the optional variables, ECONCOST, a composite measure of the importance 
of four economic cost factors as barriers to the ability to innovate, is negative for 
universities and positive for government laboratories, suggesting that firms that are 
worried about the cost of innovation are even less likely to use university research, 
perhaps because of its expense or because it tends to be far from the market, and 
more likely to use government laboratories, perhaps because their work is more 
practical, with immediate application. 
Though there is no difference in the importance of any public research between 
telecom and other NACE 32 firms (mostly components firms), this aggregation 
disguises a significant differt;!nce for universities, which telecom firms value less as 
sources of information than· components firms, and for government laboratories, 
which is a more important source of information for telecom firms. This suggests that 
government laboratories are more likely than universities to be conducting the type 
of research that telecom firms find useful. The percentage of product sales from 
18 This result confirms the findings of the PACE report of Europe's largest firms, which asked 
about the importance of public research and five other external information sources. The telecom 
respondents gave the lowest rating to public research of six high technology sectors. Out of a total of 
16 sectors, including high, medium and low technology industries, only rubber and plastics and 
fabricated metals gave lower ratings to public research. 
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Figure 8 
Importance of Information Sources: 
Percent Very Significant or Crucial Responses 
Other Hitech (1368) 
Figure 9 
Importance of Information Sources: 
Most Important Source of Information 
Other Hi tech ( 1368) 
Intemal Patents Public Res 
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Table 9.1 IMPORTANCE OF PUBLIC RESEARCH: Logit Results for 321 NACE 
32 cases and 148 Telecom cases. The dependent variable is coded as 1 
= moderately, very, or crucially important, 0 = not important or 
slightly important. (* = p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.01) 
Universities/ Government Technical Any public 
higher educat laboratories institutes research 
All32 Tel All32 Tel All32 Tel All32 Tel 
Constant -0.95 -2.6** -7.50** -7.40** -4.83** -4.80** -3.43** -3.30** 
LEMPLOY -0.32 0.88* 1.07** 1.17** 1.03** 0.94* 0.15 1.03** 
TELECOM -0.63* 0.63* -0.48 0.07 
Optional variables 
EXPORTS -1.64* 1.64* 
COOPRD 1.34** 0.95** 
DOMESTIC 1.60* 1.40* 
LACKPERS 1.43** 
LACI<INFO 1.22* 2.27** 
ECONCOST -1.76** 2.17** 0.59* 
IPRODSH 2.08** 1.40* 2.52* -2.20* 1.64** 
R2L 0.33 0.30 0.21 0.38 0.30 0.34 0.23 0.23 
R2L options 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.09 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00 
-2LL 294.6 118.2 241.4 90.5 174.3 72.0 339.0 157.5 
%Correct 75.7 81.8 85.1 91.2 88.5 90.5 76.0 75.2 
See Appendix Table B-7 for a description of the variables. 
incrementally or significantly changed products (IPRODSH), is also positive and 
significant for the importance of government laboratories. This suggests that 
successfully innovative telecom firms, with a higher proportion of innovative 
products, are more likely to find governm~nt laboratories useful than less innovative 
telecom firms. This result recapitulates and supports the hypothesis that the historical 
concentration of technological activities in generally large national champions is an 
important element in the system of innovation in this sector. 
9.3 Alliances and Cooperation for Innovation 
Ideally, given the structure of the European telecom sector, questions on alliances and 
cooperation would ask specifically about the sources of technical information on 
components and software. Unfortunately, the CIS questionnaire is designed for the 
, · entire industrial spectrum and does not ask questions at this level 0f detail. 
Another area of interest to an evaluation of the telecom sector, given the need fot 
telecom firms to combine innovation ~ components and software with telecom 
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equipment, is the importance of cooperative R&D. Participation in cooperative R&D 
programmes is addressed in two CIS questions. The first is a simple question that 
asks the respondent if their firm had any cooperative arrangements on R&D with 
other enterprises or institutions in 1992. Results are available for 148 telecom and 134 
components firms19• The second question asks the respondent to check specific types 
of cooperative R&D that they are active in, by region. Unfortunately, the number of 
available responses to this question is too low for these questions to be of any use in 
an analysis of the telecom sector0• 
Given these limitations, the evaluation of alliances and cooperation is restricted to the 
general importance of market-mediated information sources, whether or not the firm 
participated in any form of cooperative R&D programmes, and the percentage of 
firms that used one of seven methods to either acquire or transfer new technologies 
by six geographic regions. Three of these regions are in Europe (national, other EC, 
and non-EC) and three are outside of Europe (US, Japan, and other). Though separate 
questions on software and components are not available, we assume, given the 
superior technical competitiveness of American and Japanese component and 
software firms, that telecom firms should find foreign sources of new technology to 
be relatively important, with 'new technology' possibly referring to software and 
components as well as other inputs. 
9.3.1 Market-mediated sources 
As shown in Figure 8, clients are less important to telecom firms than to components 
and other hitech firms, while competitors and consultants are considerably more 
important to telecom than to component firms21 • There is little difference in the 
importance of material and equipment suppliers. Other analyses show that the 
importance of clients, competitors and consultants is not due to their involvement in 
cooperative R&D programmes. 
9.3.2 Participation in cooperative R&D 
The participation rate of innovating firms in cooperative R&D programmes is 38.0% 
for telecom firms, 35.8% for other hitech firms, and 63.6% for component firms. The 
higher participation rate for component compared to telecom firms is statistically 
19 The question is available for all co\mtries where data at the three-digit NACE level is available 
(Germany, France, Italy, Holland, Belgium, Ireland, and Norway). 
20 The low number of useable responses is due to a large number of missing values, no data for 
Italy, and no data for many of the questions for France. Depending on the question, the number of 
available responses ranges from 95 to 49 for telecom and component firms combined. 
21 These differences between telecom and component firms are statistically significant after 
controlling for country and size effects in Logit regressions. 
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significant after controlling for firm size and country. 
The results of separate Logit regressions of the factors that influence the probability 
of participation in cooperative R&D are given in Table 9.2. The factors that influence 
participation by telecom firms in 
cooperative R&D programmes are 
similar to that of other Hitech 
firms, except that telecom firms 
with a high proportion of innova-
tive products in total sales 
(IPRODSH) are less likely to par-
ticipate, whereas the reverse is 
true for the Hitech sector. In con-
trast, the only similarity between 
the telecom and component sectors 
is that both are more likely to 
participate in cooperative R&D if 
they find public research (PUBRE-
S) to be important. The negative 
coefficient for IPRODSH combined 
with the positive coefficient for 
firm size indicates that cooperative 
R&D in the telecom sector is most 
likely to be used by large firms 
with low innovative success. 
9.4 Acquisition and Transfer of 
Technology 
Table 9.2 PARTICIPATION IN COOPERATIVE 
R&D PROGRAMMES: Logit model 
results for the Telecom, Component 
and Hitech sectors 
(* = p < 0.10, .... = p < 0.01) 
Telecom Component" Hi tech 
Constant -9.94** -3.33* -5.46** 
LEMPLOY 3.51** 0.08 0.41** 
EXPORTS 1.11 -0.64 1.35** 
IPRODSH -2.50* 2.82* 0.92** 
PUB RES 0.49 2.66** 1.18** 
EURMARK 0.99 -2.01** 1.05** 
Number of cases 148 132 1,360 
R\ 0.54 0.47 0.22 
2LL 90.3 92.5 1380.4 
%correct 88.6 81.8 81.8 
Results for the Hitech sector based on forced entry for country 
and LEMPLOY while other variables selected through forward 
stepwise selection, using the Likelihood Ratio. The results for 
components and telecom are based on forced entry for the 
identical variable set as selected for the hitech sector. 
For simplicity, the results for the acquisition and transfer of technology are 
aggregated into two main geographic areas, Europe and outside of Europe, though 
where relevant, the discussion refers to the results by sub-region. The percentage of 
telecom and component firms that have used each of the seven methods to acquire 
or transfer a new technology from or to each of the two main regions is given in 
Table 9.3. 
9.4.1 Acquisition of new technologies 
The ,most common method for telecom firms to acquire new technologies from within 
Europe is through communication with specialist services from other enterprises22, 
equipment purchases, and the hiring of skilled staff. For all methods the dominant 
22 We assume that this obscure phrasing refers to the R&D or other specialised divisions of other 
firms, and not to specialist firms per se, such as consultants. 
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source within Europe is the home country. The use of legal rights, such as licenses, 
copyrights, and patents to acquire new technology is relatively infrequent. 
Non-European sources are used much less frequently than European sources, with 
only equipment purchases and communication used by over 25% of the telecom firms 
Table 9.3 ACQUISITION AND TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY: Percentage of 
component and telecom firms that have acquired or transferred a 
technology within Europe (Europe) or outside of Europe (Other) 
(Statistically significant differences in bold (p < 0.05)23 
ACQUISITION TRANSFER 
Europe Other Europe Other 
Method Comp Tel Comp Tel Comp Tel Comp Tel 
Legal rights 10.3 12.9 4.8 6.8 14.8 25.2 4.6 8.3 
Contract R&D 25.8 30.5 3.1 1.5 66.6 40.3 3.5 2.9 
Consultancy 23.7 34.5 1.7 1.9 72.1 34.3 3.3 3.2 
Firm purchase/sale 9.0 8.3 2.6 2.4 6.0 3.0 0.8 1.5 
Equip purchase/sale 78.8 62.2 9.5 32.4 28.5 34.9 9.4 19.2 
Communication 69.1 63.1 7.4 25.3 71.0 60.8 6.0 5.8 
Hiring/ mobility 69.4 43.8 3.1 2.0 51.5 29.4 3.0 4.4 
to acquire new technologies from outside of Europe. The use of legal rights, thpugh 
very low, is in third place compared to seventh place for within Europe. The use of 
legal rights to acquire new technologies is dominated by American sources. This 
pattern reflects the role of intellectual property rights in these sectors. Participation 
in networks of cross-licenses is necessary to prevent lawsuits and therefore a steady 
"background level" of licensing activity may be expected to occur, even if little 
revenue or significance is attached to this activity by the firms involved. 
The only significant differences between telecom and component firms for sources 
within Europe are for equipment purchases and hiring, both of which are used more 
frequently by component firms than by telecom firms. This result complements the 
finding that component firms valued university research more highly than did 
telecom firms. It suggests a significant gap between the technological needs of 
telecom firms and university activities in· both teaching and research. Conversely, 
telecom firms are more likely to obtain new technologies through the purchase of 
equipment and by communication with firms from outside of Europe. Again, this 
suggests that telecom firms are obtaining needed technologies from foreign firms. 
23 Controlled for country and firm size. Many of the results for Other countries are unsatisfactory 
because of the very low number of cases that acquire or transfer a technology outside of Europe. 
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Table 9.4 gives the results of logit regressions for the telecom sector alone. Firm size 
has the most important effect on the use of a specific method to obtain new 
technologies. Participation in cooperative R&D programmes increases the probability 
of using contract R&D to acquire new technologies, while decreasing the probability 
Table 9.4 TELECOM AND TECHNOLOGY ACQUISITION: Logit Model Results 
for Methods to Acquire Technology from within Europe (EUR) and 
from other regions (OTH)1• (** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.10) 
Legal Contract Consul- Equipment Communi- Hiring 
rights R&D tancy purchases cation staff 
EUR OTH EUR EUR EUR OTH EUR OTH EUR 
Constant -5.88** -9.3000* -4.40** -5.70** -0.31 -7.48** -2.71** -11.9** -1.57* 
LEMPLOY 1.88** 2.57*• 0.87•• 0.99* 0.58 2.1000* 1.25• 2.27*• 1.1800* 
Optional variables 
EXPORTS 1.77* 3.69* 
IPRODSH 2.32•• -2.48** 
COOPRD 1.43* -1.92** -2.31*• -2.08•* -3.07** 
PUB RES 2.13•* 3.08 .... 
EURMARK 3.11* 1.49• 3.93*• 
LOW COST 1.74•* 
R2 L 0.29 0.53 0.36 0.42 0.26 0.33 0.33 0.55 0.16 
R\ options 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.18 0.11 0.14 0.06 0.36 0.05 
-2LL 80.4 34.5 116.9 110.4 145.8 124.5 109.4 50.1 169.3 
%Correct 90.5 95.3 83.8 83.1 81.9 85.8 74.2 91.9 73.7 
1
: No results for Firm purchases (Question 6.4) and for Other regions for several methods because of an 
unacceptable fit to the model. 
of equipment purchases and communication with other firms. The former could be 
due to a tendency for firms to view contract and cooperative R&D as a similar 
activity. The latter, however, suggests that equipment purchases and communication 
are alternative means of obtaining new technologies that displace cooperative R&D24• 
9.4.2 Transfer of new technologies 
The most common method for telecom firms to transfer technology within Europe, 
as shown in Table 9.3, is through communication with other firms, contract R&D 
24 An alternative explanation is that equipment purchases and communication are used by less 
R&D intensive firms, since the probability of participating in cooperative R&D is higher for R&D 
intensive firms. R&D intensity was not added as an independent variable, however, because it would 
considerably decrease the number of cases available for analysis. In addition, R&D intensity in the 
telecom sector increases with firm size, so controlling for the effect of size in the logit regressions 
should partially adjust for the effect of R&D intensity, 
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done for other organisations, equipment sales, and consultancy. Transfers within the 
home nation dominate, except for legal rights, which are slightly more frequently 
transferred to organisations in other EC countries (15.7% versus 12.1%). The most 
important transfer method to regions outside of Europe is equipment sales, mostly 
to regions outside of the US and Japan. The only statistically significant difference 
between the component and telecom sector is for consultancy within Europe, which 
is used more frequently by component firms, and for equipment sales outside of 
Europe, which are more frequent among telecom firms. This could reflect the better 
export performance of the European telecom versus components sector in non-
European markets. Transfer through sales to foreign markets is also dominated by 
sales to countries other than the US and Japan, possibly because these markets are 
more open to non-domestic firms. 
Table 9.5 TELECOM AND TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: Logit Model Results 
for Methods to Transfer Technology (** = p < 0.01, * = p < 0.10)1 
Contract Con- Equipment Communi Hiring 
Legal rights R&D sui- sales -cation staff 
tancy 
Europe Other Europe Europe Europe Other Europe Europe 
Constant -5.50** -7.72** 0.79 1.84* -0.25 -8.47** -0.90 -0.95 
LEMPLOY 1.90** 2.01** -0.61* -1.86** 0.19 0.86* 0.41 0.70* 
Optional variables 
EXPORTS 1.85* 
IPRODSH -3.00** 3.81** -2.10++ 
COOPRD 2.41** 2.23** -1.74* 
PUB RES -1.60* 1.00* -1.10 -1.33** 
EURMARK -0.91* 1.06* 2.20** 
LOWRCOST -1.12* -1.82* 1.03* 
R\ 0.34 0.36 0.20 0.26 0.20 0.35 0.34 0.23 
R\ options 0.00 0.04 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.20 0.00 0.12 
-2LL 110.7 54.7 159.1 140.3 153.6 94.3 146.3 154.6 
%Correct 84.5 92.6 77.2 85.2 75.7 92.0 77.4 78.7 
1
: No results for Firm sales (Question 7.4) and for several methods for outside of Europe because of an 
unacceptable fit to the model. 
Logit model results for technology transfer for telecom firms are given in Table 9.5. 
The effect of firm size on technology transfer is not consistently positive as it is with 
technology acquisition. Instead, the probability of transferring technology through 
contract R&D and consultancy is higher for smaller firms, perhaps due to the effect 
of small, specialised firms that conduct R&D for other firms, and there is no 
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relationship for equipment sales or communication within Europe. The proportion of 
I 
innovative products (IPRODSH) appears to assist equipment sales abroad, but has a 
negative effect within Europe. This result could reflect alternative routes for 
technology transfer, with transfer within Europe occurring through more direct 
methods such as cooperative R&D, contract R&D or direct communication, while 
, .. · transfer outside of Europe is largely perceived as occurring through sales. This 
interpretation is also supported by the positive coefficient for export share and for the 
importance of creating new European markets (EURMARK) as an objective of 
innovation25• 
The pattern for cooperative R&D (COOPRD) is identical to that for acqmrmg 
technologies, with a positive effect for contract R&D and consultancy and a negative 
effect for equipment purchases. 
9.5 Concluding Comments 
The ability of telecom firms to acquire knowledge from outside of their firm, and the 
importance of this knowledge, is strongly linked with the size of the firm. Compared 
to smaller telecom firms, large firms find public research more important, are more 
likely to participate in cooperative R&D programmes, and are more likely to acquire 
new technologies from sources within and outside of Europe. This is in contrast to 
the results for components, where firm size is a less important factor in the 
importance of both public research and the probability of participation in cooperative 
R&D. 
, The importance of government laboratories and acquiring technologies from other 
firms in Europe and other countries is greater for successful telecom firms, when 
success is defined either by export share or the percentage of innovative products. In 
contrast, participation in cooperative R&D programmes, though more likely among 
firms with a high export share, is less likely among firms with a high percentage of 
innovative products. Again, the results for the component sector, particularly for 
participation in cooperative R&D, are the opposite. The participation rate in 
cooperative R&D is also much higher for component firms, at 63.6% compared to 38% 
for telecom firms.· 
Though European subsidies for public research have had relatively little impact on 
the telecom sector, with telecom respondents giving public research a very low rating 
compared to other sources of information, the importance of public research varies 
by the type of public research, with government laboratories appearing to be more 
important than universities or technical institutes. In particular, telecom firms with 
25 The importance of creating new foreign markets is not included as a variable because it would 
require excluding Norwegian firms. 
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a high proportion of sales due to innovative products are more likely to find 
government laboratories to be an important source of information than telecom firms 
with a low proportion of innovative products. 
The results for technology acquisition indicate that telecom firms use some foreign 
sources more frequently than component firms. This could reflect the need to acquire 
components and software from outside Europe, but unfortunately there is no 
information on the types of technologies that are acquired through each of the seven 
methods evaluated in the CIS questionnaire. Equipment purchases and communica-
tion with foreign firms are the most important means by which telecom firms acquire 
new technologies from outside of Europe. Both are linked to success, with a positive 
relationship between exports and communication with non-European firms and 
between innovative product share and equipment purchases from outside of Europe. 
10 GOALS OF INNOVATION 
10.1 Introduction 
Results on the importance of eighteen main goals of innovation are available for 
innovating firms. Several of these goals measure an "aggressive" versus "defensive" 
innovative strategy. An aggressive strategy is defined as first, seeking new markets 
outside of Europe and second, by moving into new products rather than replacing 
existing products that are being phased out. A defensive strategy is characterised by 
maintaining existing market share and replacing existing products. Other goals, such 
as improving quality or reducing costs, can be part of both strategies. It is difficult 
to completely define a defensive strategy using the CIS results since the question on 
market share also includes increasing market share, which can be part of an aggressive 
strategy. Though a defensive strategy is of value, the long-term success of the 
European telecom equipment industry depends on an aggressive strategy of 
developing new products and actively seeking growing markets outside of Europe. 
The first section of this chapter briefly examines the importance of aggressive and 
defensive strategies. Further discussion of these goals can be found in Chapter 7 on 
innovative success and Chapter 12 on exports. 
In addition, four objectives that are of relevant to EU environmental policies are also 
examined. Two are of primary concern; to reduce energy consumption and 
environmental damage, and two are of secondary importance to environmental 
issues; to reduce materials consumption and improve safety and working conditions. 
10.2 Aggressive Innovation Strategies 
The percentages of telecom, component, and similar hi tech firms that stated that each 
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objective was very important or crucial are given in Figure 10 and the most important 
objectives are given in Figure 11. Both are listed in descending order of importance 
based on the results for the telecom sector. Over 80% of respondents from all three 
sectors rate increasing market share as an important objective, followed closely by 
product quality for the telecom and other hitech sectors. Objectives that are part of 
an aggressive strategy are rated as important by considerably fewer firms. Develop-
ing new products (NPnf) is important,to fewer than 40% of telecom firms while less 
than 20% find creating new markets in North America (NMna) or Japan (NMj) to be 
important. In Figure 11, the two questions on extending the product range within and 
outside the main product field are combined into 'New prods'. This is the fourth 
most important goal for telecom firms, though it lags considerably behind improving 
product quality. Creating new markets' outside of Europe are combined into 'For 
marks'. This is the least important objective for telecom firms, and relatively less 
important than in components and other high tech. 
Table 10.1 gives the results for telecom firms of logit regressions for several objectives 
that are related to aggressive versus defensive innovation strategies. 
Table 10.1 INNOVATION OBJECTIVES: Logit results for 148 telecom firms(*= 
p < 0.10, ** = p < 0.01) 
Lower Market Improve Main New- Foreign 
costs share quality products products markets 
Constant 0.87 -0.73 -1.17* -1.82** -0.22 
LEMPLOY 1.20** 0.50 0.18 0.84** 0.67** 0.12 
Optional variables 
EXPORTS 1.35* 4.00** 2.76** 
COOPRD -1.92** 
DOMESTIC 
PUB RES -1.00* -0.95* -2.12** 
SPRODSH -1.30* 
R2l 0.36 0.38 0.11 0.22 0.07 0.19 
-2LL 183.1 129.4 273.7 208.7 262.0 241.8 
%Correct 76.6 83.9 68.8 81.7 67.0 74.1 
Optional variables limited to avoid erroneous cause and effect relationships. Only optional variable~ wi.th at least 
one significant result are included. See Appendix Table B-7 for a description of the variables. The objectives are 
arranged approximately in order from the most defensive position (lower costs of 
wages, materials and energy) to the most aggressive strategy (create foreign markets 
in North America, Japan, or other locations outside Europe). The importance of lower 
costs and extending the product range, either in the main product field (Main 
products) or in a new field (New products), increases with firm size (LEMPLOY), but 
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Figure 10 
Importance of Innovation Objectives: 
Percent Very Significant or Crucial Responses 
Mshare =Increase or maintain market share, Quality= improve product quality, Rprod =Replace products being phased out, 
NPmf = develop new products within main product field, NPnf = develop new products outside main field, NMnat = create 
new national markets, NMeur =create new markets in Europe, NMna =create new markets in North America, NMj =create 
new markets in Japan, NMoth =create new markets in other countries, LCwage =lower share of wage costs, LCmat =lower 
material costs, LCegy =lower energy consumption, LCpd =lower product design costs, LClt =lower costs from production 
lead times, Enviro = reduce environmental damage, Pflex =production flexibility, Quality= improve product quality, Safty = 
improve working conditions I safety. 
Figure 11 
Importance of Innovation Objectives: 
Most Important Objective 
Other Hi tech ( 1368) 
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there is no effect for creating foreign markets. Other than the variables for country 
(not shown), none of the variables influences the importance of increasing market 
share, probably because this goal is important to all types of firms. A high export 
share (EXPORTS) and finding public research to be an importan~ source of 
information (PUBRES) have the most frequent influences on these six goals, though 
in opposite directions. 
High export shares increase the probability that lower costs, developing products, and 
creating foreign markets will be important goals. This is not surprising, since low cost 
products are needed to compete in foreign markets and export intensive firms should 
also be more likely to want to develop new export markets. Conversely, finding 
public research to be important (and participation in cooperative R&D (COOPRD) in 
one case), decreases the probability that each of these three objectives are important 
to the respondent's firm. Unfortunately, there is no indication here as to where public 
research is important. Finally, the proportion of significantly changed products out 
of total sales (SPRODSH) is negatively associated with improving quality. This is a 
perfectly reasonable result since quality improvements are not significant innovations, 
but it does suggest that firms make a choice between strategies. Otherwise, we would 
expect no relationship between SPRODSH and quality improvements. 
10.3 Environmental Goals 
Figure 10 shows that 19.9% of telecom firms find reducing energy use and 27.3% find 
reducing environmental damage to be important goals for innovation. After 
controlling for firm size and country effects, the higher importance of safety and the 
lower importance of environmental goals for telecom compared to component firms 
are statistically significant (p < 0.1), while the differences for energy and material use 
are not significant. Reducing environmental damage is more important to telecom 
firms than to component firms, while the reverse is true for reducing energy costs. 
The two secondary environmental goals are important to a higher percentage of 
telecom firms, 45.7% for reducing energy costs and 37.6% for improving safety. 
Since very few firms rate any of these goals as the most important, the results in 
Figure 11 combine reducing energy and material input costs (L inputs) and 
environmental damage and safety goals (Env & safty). Both are rated as most 
important by less than 5% of the telecom respondents, compared to slightly over 10% 
of other hitech firms and under 3% by component firms. 
Attempts to fit a logit model to the data in order to determine the factors that 
influence whether or not a firm finds each of the four environmental goals to be of 
importance were generally unsatisfactory. The best results, given in Table 10.2, were 
achieved using a limited range of optional variables and by including R&D intensity. 
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The latter required 
excluding French firms. 
Firm size has little 
effect on the importance 
of environmental goals, 
except for improving 
work and safety condi-
tions. 
In contrast, the import-
ance of all environ-
mental goals declines 
with R&D intensity, 
though this is perhaps 
because the firms find 
other goals relatively 
more important. The 
importance of three of 
the environmental 
objectives increases 
with export share. The 
results suggest that 
cooperative R&D could 
Table 10.2 ENVIRONMENTAL GOALS FOR 
INNOVATION: Logit Regressions for 
124 Telecom firms ( * = p < 0.1, ** = p 
< 0.01) 
Reduce Reduce Reduce Improve work 
material energy enviro conditions & 
use1 use1 damage2 safetf 
Constant -1.34 -0.45 -0.50 -1.36 
LEMPLOY 0.47 -0.65 0.03 0.85" 
RDINTENS -5.89" -11.86" -2.52 -6.36" 
Optional variables 
Exports 1.73" 1.95" 3.61"" 
Cooprd 2.29"" -1.31" 
Pub res 1.70" 
R2 L 0.20 026 0.16 0.23 
R\ optional 0.02 0.07 0.05 0.07 
2LL 130.7 112.5 144.8 114.5 
%correct 82.1 83.1 69.1 81.5 
1
: 1 =a very significant or crucial response. 
2: 1 = a moderately significant, very significant, or crucial response. 
be used in innovative projects to reduce energy consumption, while public research 
could be a source of information for reducing environmental damage. 
10.4 Concluding Comments 
Telecom firms are less likely than component and other high tech firms to find 
aggressive innovative strategies such as developing new pro~ucts or creating new 
markets outside of Europe to be important. However, the probability that firms will 
find several goals that are related to future export success - lowering costs, 
developing new products in the main product field, and creating foreign markets, 
increases with the share of the firm's sales from exports. In contrast, firms that find 
public research of !mportance are less likely to find these three goals of importance, 
with the implication that publicly funded research in telecommunications is not of 
much relevance to firms pursuing an aggressive strategy. 
These results, though admittedly sparse and exploratory, suggest that the European 
telecom sector is relying too much on defensive innovation strategies. There may also 
be policy options to improve the relevance of publicly funded research to the 
aggressive innovation goals. 
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Environmental goals are relatively unimportant to telecom firms compared to other 
innovation objectives such as improving product quality and market share. Though 
firm size has no effect on the importance of most environmental goals, R&D intensity 
is an importance factor, with more R&D intensive firms considerably less interested 
in environmental goals. We suspect that this is probably not true in absolute terms, 
but could largely reflect a relative increase 'in the importance of other goals. 
Alternatively, the greater importance of environmental goals to firms with low R&D 
intensities could be due to a greater emphasis on the production of standardised 
products, where improved economic performance would also depend on reducing 
input costs26• 
11. STANDARDS, REGULATIONS AND INNOVATION BARRIERS 
11.1 Introduction 
Data on the importance of 18 possible barriers to innovation is available for both 
innovating and non-innovating firms. Six of these questions are of particular interest 
to policies for the telecom sector: a lack of skilled personnel, lack of· information on 
technologies, lack of market information, lack of opportunities for cooperation with 
other firms and technological institutions, uncertainty in the timing of innovation, and 
one question that unfortunately combines legislation, norms, regulations, standards 
and taxation. This is unfortunate because of the importance of standards to the 
telecom sector as a means of reducing uncertainty and to reduce entry barriers for 
smaller and more specialized firms. Combining standards, which could be interpreted 
positively by some telecom firms, with taxation, with a likely negative interpretation, 
could confuse the meaning of the responses to this question. 
11.2 Basic results 
Table 11.1 gives the percent of innovating and non-innovating telecom and 
component firms that find each of these six barriers to innovation to be either 
moderately, very, or extremely importanf7• 
26 The low importance of environmental goals for telecom firms is probably due to the low cost 
of inputs relative to total costs in this sector and to a reputation for clean manufacturing operations. 
In a comparison of the importance of environmental and safety goals for all NACE two-digit 
industries, NACE 32 firms ranked last. These goals are most important to firms in bulk product 
sectors, reaching a high of 17% in petroleum products. Similarly, reducing input costs is most 
important in bulk product sectors such as food, wood products, chemicals and rubber, and among the . 
least important in NACE 32 and similar Hitech industries. 
27 The percentage of respondents that find each of the six factors examined here to be 'very 
significant' or 'crucial' is usually below 10%. In order to increase the variation in responses, the 
'important' category has been altered to 'moderately significant', very significant', or 'crucial'. 
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Table 11.1 BARRIERS TO INNOVATION: Percent 'Moderately', 'Very 
Important' or 'Crucial' Responses for Telecom and Component Firms. 
Statistically significant differences1 (p< 0.05) between telecom and 
component firms in bold type. 
Innovators Non-Innovators 
Telecom Comp Hi tech Telecom Comp Hi tech 
Lack skilled personnel 31.6 40.6 46.5 49.1 15.2 38.0 
Lack info on technologies 18.7 27.6 25.7 23.2 2.1 13.7 
Lack market information 30.6 70.6 35.9 22.8 4.3 24.7 
Lack external cooperation 19.4 72.5 35.3 26.9 11.9 25.2 
Innovation too easy to copy 39.4 40.7 57.9 13.8 6.8 26.4 
Legislation, standards taxes 24.7 73.2 40.5 37.1 12.5 30.8 
Uncertainty in timing 27.8 75.1 38.0 23.8 9.8 27.9 
1
: Controlled for country and firm size. 
Two patterns immediately stand out. First, innovating telecom firms consistently find 
all of these six barriers to innovation to be less important than both component and 
other hitech firms. The pattern is partly reversed for non-innovators, where the 
Telecom firms find all barriers to be more important than component firms, though 
the results are mixed in comparison with other high tech firms. Second, innovating 
component and other hitech firms find all six barriers to be more important than non-
innovators in the same sector. Again, the pattern is mixed for telecom firms, where 
innovators are more concerned than non-innovators about a lack of market 
information, the ease of copying innovations, and uncertainty in timing28• 
A plausible explanation for the first pattern, particularly in the comparison between 
telecom and component firms, is that the telecom firms are more confident innovators 
that generally experience fewer difficulties with obtaining adequate information and 
skills or in dealing with external factors since these are essential survival skills for 
telecom firms. 
The second pattern is unexpected, since one would expect non-innovators to find 
many of the factors to be greater barriers to innovation than the innovators, but this 
is definitely not the case. An explanation for the higher importance attributed by the 
innovators to most of the barriers could be due to one or both of two basic reasons. 
First, the innovators should have greater experience with each barrier, and could 
therefore be more cognizant of their importance and, also, of ways to deal with it. 
28 The results are similar for the four questions on economic factors as barriers to innovation: 
excessive perceived risk, lack of appropriate sources of finance, innovation costs too high, and pay-off 
periods too long. The exception is that innovating telecom firms are more concerned ab.out high 
innovation costs and long pay-off periods than component firms. 
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Second, the questions could mean different things to the innovating and non-
innovating groups, with the former evaluating each question for its significance in 
influencing ongoing innovation, while the non-innovators interpret the question as 
referring to the reasons why their firm does not innovate at all. 
, . 11.3 Logit Results for Telecom Firms 
Factors that influence whether or not a telecom firm finds a specific barrier to be 
important were investigated for both innovating and non-innovating firms. The 
results for the non-innovators were unsatisfactory, largely because of a small number 
of cases, which made it impossible to control for country effects29• The results 
presented here are therefore limited to innovators. 
Several factors investigated in the CIS questionnaire could possibly be related to the 
importance of barriers to innovation. In addition to firm size, export intensity, and 
innovative success, these include information sources, which can be used to overcome 
barriers, and innovation goals, which could be directly hampered by barriers30• 
Preliminary analysis showed that many of the information sources were significant 
for at least one of the seven barriers, but there were no consistent results. 
Consequently, we limited the available optional source variables to a few of particular 
interest; public research (PUBRES), consultants (CONSULT), and competitors 
(COMPET). Preliminary analysis of the goals of innovation showed that the only 
important influence was the importance of foreign markets (FORMARKT). 
The final Logit model results are given in Table 11.2. In contrast to other Logit 
models for the importance of information sources, innovation objectives etc, firm size 
is not an important factor, with a significant effect only for the importance of a lack 
of technical information (where larger firms have fewer problems) and for 
uncertainty, where larger firms find this a more important problem than smaller 
firms. This suggests a structural difference between large and small firms in the 
timing of innovations. The prospect for a large firm of a highly complex systems 
with enormous development costs being "dead on arrival" in the market is a larger 
risk than the fisk facing smaller firms producing more specialised systems with 
29 This was a serious problem because almost all firms that found each barrier to be important 
were Italian, raising serious problems of bias. ' 
30 Another possible factor is interactions with other barriers to innovation. Preliminary investigation 
of the effect of other barriers to innovation on the seven barriers used an index of the importance of 
the four economic factors and drawbacks within the enterprise. Both were highly significant for almost 
all of the seven barriers, and contributed much more to the reduction in variance than all other 
independent variables combined. However, these results are impossible to interpret because of bias 
due to high correlations between adjacent barrier questions and similar ratings to all sub-questions 
in a question set. Consequently, the true contribution of other barriers, such as estimated by the 
indexes for economic and enterprise factors, cannot be separated from these two types of internal bias. 
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shorter and less expensive development cycles. In addition, the results are relatively 
poor, with R\ values ranging between 0.11 and 0.23. 
The most important influences on these barriers are the export share, the percentage 
of incrementally or significantly changed products out of total1992 sales (IPRODSH), 
and the importance of foreign markets as a goal of innovation. The negative 
coefficients for IPRODSH suggests that successful innovators are less concerned about 
barriers, including legislation and uncertainty. In contrast, the coefficients for both 
exports and FORMARKT are positive, indicating that both successful exporters, and 
firms with the goal of exporting to foreign markets, are very concerned about these 
barriers. This could reflect greater international competition, and a need to 
continually innovate to keep up, putting pressure on personnel resources and a 
greater need for technical information31• 
Table 11.2 BARRIERS TO INNOVATION: Logit results for Innovating 
Telecom Firms1 (* = p < 0.1, .... = p < 0.01) 
Lack Lack Lack Lack Innovation Legislation, Uncertainty 
skilled technical market external too easy to standards, in timing 
personnel info info coop. copy taxes 
Constant -1.85* -1.19 -1.48* -1.41 -2.88** -0.98 -2.25" 
LEMPLOY 0.01 -0.91" 0.47 0.40 0.51 0.31 1.01** 
EXPORTS 2.18" 2.67* 4.34"" 2.66" 
IPRODSH -1.66* -2.05* -2.27* -3.08"" 
PUB RES 1.38* 
CONSULT 2.39** 
COMPET -1.90" 
FORMARKT 1.75*" 2.00"" 129"" 1.18* 1.35*" 1.02* 
R\ 0.16 023 0.11 0.13 0.22 0.13 0.18 
2LL 125.8 90.5 134.5 91.6 106.4 110.8 106.3 
%Correct 75.8 86.3 69.4 82.3 83.9 73.4 72.0 
1
: All barriers are coded 1 = moderately significant, very significant, or crucial. Dummy variables for country 
consist of Germany and all small countries combined, with Italy as the reference group. The smaller countries had 
to be combined because of a lack of variation in the dependent variable. 
The effect of information sources is highly specific. Public research is more important 
to firms that find a lack of external cooperation to be a barrier to innovation. Since 
31 There is no correlation between export share and either IPRODSH or R&D intensity, indicating 
that a high export share is not dependent on good innovative performance. This explains why 
successful innovators (IPRODSH) are less likely to find each barrier to be a problem, while export 
oriented firms are more likely to find them a problem. 
69 
I 
1. 
I 
! ' 
.. : 
' ' 
' 
I 
t> ' I 
' 
' \ 
' i 
I 
I l 
' I 
i 
public research is often used through cooperative R&D programmes, this raises the 
possibility that the responses to the barrier questions are biased by the cross-sectional 
design of the questionnaire. A lack of opportunities for external cooperation can be 
rated as highly important both by firms which do not cooperate (but would like to) 
and by firms which find this barrier important, and have therefore already taken 
. ~ steps to overcome it, for example by entering into cooperative R&D programmes with 
public research institutes32 • 
... 
Similar problems affect the interpretation of the question on legal barriers. Standards 
and regulations,. in so far as they reduce uncertainty, could be considered as a 
positive factor. However, since the question is in a group of barriers to innovation, 
we assume that the telecom respondents interpret these legal factors as negative 
effects on innovation. The lack of any relation with exports suggests that these legal 
barriers are interpreted as within Europe, though this is contradicted by the positive 
coefficient for the importance of foreign markets. 
11.4 Concluding Comments 
Innovating telecom firms find each of th.e seven barriers to innovation evaluated here 
to be less important than· both component and hitech firms, while for most barriers 
non-innovating telecom firms find them to be more important barriers than non-
innovating component and hitech firms. The former paints a picture of a successful, 
innovative sector with few limitation due to a lack of capabilities, uncertainty, 
legislation, or poor appropriation conditions. The situation for non-innovating firms 
suggests that either the non-innovating telecom firms are more aware of the need to 
innovate, or that a crucial reason for not-innovating among component firms is 
missin~3• Poor appropriation conditions is given the highest importance rating by 
telecom firms, but this factor does not appear to translate into real difficulties, since 
firms that find the ease of copying to be important are more successful innovators, 
as shown in Section 2. 
The importance of most of these six barriers is not related to the size of telecom 
firms, but firms with a high export share and a goal to create new foreign markets 
are more concerned about their internal capabilities to innovate and uncertainty. This 
could reflect intense technological competition in export markets. This suggests that 
telecom firms that are export oriented and seeking to move into foreign markets, 
_ perhaps the most important section of this sector to European competitiveness, could 
32 Preliminary analyses showed that participation in cooperative R&D was not related to any of 
the barriers examined here. 
33 A main reason not to innovate could be that it is not part of the firm's strategy, particularly if 
it is a subsidiary or a supplier to a larger firm. 
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be confronting barriers in their ability to acquire skilled personnel, and technical and 
market information. 
The question on legislation and standards is not formulated in a. way that is 
particularly useful for this sector. It is not possible to determine if the low importance 
attached to this factor by telecom compared to component and other hitech firms is 
due to the respondents perceiving legislation as basically advantageous, or if they are 
simply less likely to view legislation as a negative factor. 
12 EXPORT PERFORMANCE 
12.1 Introduction 
Successful innovation should lead to more competitive products. Therefore highly 
innovative firms should have a higher export rate than their competitors. However, 
several factors could confuse the relationship between innovative activity and the 
export rate. One factor is firm ownership. Foreign subsidiaries operating as export 
platforms within Europe could export a substantial proportion of their output to 
other European countries while conducting very little R&D in Europe. This appears 
to be occurring among the component firms, where foreign-owned firms have an 
R&D intensity of 7.2% and an export rate of 74.7%, while the R&D intensity of 
domestic component firms is higher at 19.1%, while their export rate is much lower 
at 8.8%. There is little difference between domestic and foreign-owned telecom firms 
in average R&D intensity, 8.1% for foreign compared to 9.3% for domestic, but there 
is a larger difference in export rates, with foreign firms exporting 42.7% of their 
output compared to 21.5% for domestic firms. 
A second factor, that is also related to firm ownership, is that firms based in small 
countries will normally export a higher proportion of their output than firms based 
in large countries. For example, the average export rate for telecom firms in the three 
large countries of Germany, Italy and France is 15.3% compared to an export rate of 
46.7% for the four small countries of Belgium, the Netherlands, Ireland and Norway. 
These first two factors can be controlled for in the analyses by including variables for 
ownership and country. However, there is no information in the CIS survey on two 
other factors that could influence export rates. One is that the CIS data does not diffe-
rentiate between exports to other countries within the EU and exports to countries 
outside of Europe. This distinction would be of interest, both because of the 
importance of foreign exports to European trade, and because of the assumption that 
competitiveness should be reflected in high foreign export rates. The second factor 
is that small, relatively young firms could be very innovative but export little, either 
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because their current strategy is to supply other domestic firms, or because they have 
not yet had the time to build up the abilities needed to move into export markets. 
This effect can be partly captured by including a variable for firm size, but this is not 
completely satisfactory. 
12.2 Basic Results and Export Status 
Table 12.2 gives the percent of firms that export and the average export rate for 
telecom, component, and other hitech firms. A lower percentage of non-innovating 
telecom firms export compared to component firms, but the opposite is true for 
innovating firms. Among exporters, the difference in the export rate between telecom 
and component firms is not significanf-4. 
The factors that influence whether or not a firm exports were further investigated in 
Table 6.2 EXPORT RATES: Percent of Export-
ing Fiqns (export rate > 0.0%) and 
Mean export rates for Innovating and 
Non-Innovating Component, Tele-
com, and Other Hitech Firms 
(Statistically significant differences 
between Telecom and Components 
(p < 0.01) in bold1) 
Telecom Components Other Hitech 
Percent exporters 
Non-innovators 26.4% 79.0% 51.5% 
( 
Innovators 85.1% 56.9% 74.6% 
Average export rate 
Non-innovators 4.5% 10.8% 11.6% 
Innovators 20.1% 16.0% 24.0% 
a logit model including both 
innovating and non-
innovating firms. The results 
(not shown) confirm the 
differences between 
innovating and non-
innovating firms shown in 
Table 6.2. Furthermore, for 
all three sectors, the 
probability of exporting 
increases with firm size. 
Domestic telecom and 
component firms are less 
likely to export than foreign-
owned firms, but these 
differences are not 
significant. However, the 
difference is significant for 
1
: Controlled for country effects and firm size. 
other Hitech firms. 
12.3 Export Share among Innovating Firms 
For innovating firms only, the percentage of exporters ranges from a low of 14.9% in 
telecom to 43.1% in components. To avoid biased results, a Tobit model that accounts 
for firms with no exports is used to investigate the factors that influence the export 
34 From a sectoral perspective; 51% of the total output of the components sector is exported, 
compared to 20% for the telecom sector. This difference probably reflects the importance of sales to 
national service providers and the close links between national telecom service providers and 
equipment manufacturers. 
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rate. The results are given in Table 12.335• 
Table 12.3 Tobit Results for Export Share for Innovating Telecom, Component, 
and other Hitech Firms (* = p < 0.1, ** = p < 0.01) 
France Included France Excluded1 
Variable Telecom Components Other Hitech Telecom Components 
Constant -0.24** -0.69** 0.25** -0.087 -0.283 
0' 0.19** 0.24** 0.27** 0.189** 0.199** 
LEMPLOY -0.007 0.327** -0.0004** -0.059 0.25** 
RDINTENS -0.022 -0.085 
DOMESTIC -0.082 -0.385** 
IPRODSH 0.268** 0.147 -0.009 0.183* 0.023 
COSTGOAL 0.014* 0.008 -0.011** 0.018* 0.022* 
COOPRD 0.047 -0.059 0.052** 0.132* -0.031 
FORMARK 0.111** 0.176-r.. 0.13** 0.146** 0.161* 
PATENT 0.113* -0.035 0.091"" 0.088* -0.069 
MAINPROD 0.091* 0.165" 0.024 -0.128 0.145" 
NEWPROD -0.051 -0.178" -0.159"" -0.100" -0.162" 
Cases 148 132 1287 124 113 
1
: No data on R&D or ownership status for French firms. 
R&D intensity has no effect on the export share for either telecom or component 
firms. Unfortunately, the model including R&D intensity and ownership status for 
other Hitech firms did not fit the data. 
For all three sectors, firms that find creating new foreign markets to be an important 
goal of innovation have a higher export share, while firms that attach greater 
importance to developing new products outside of their main product field have a 
lower export share. The first result is as expected, but the second suggests that firms 
with a higher export share have less ambitious R&D plans. This is not necessarily 
true, however, since the results could be confounded by firms that are failing in their 
main product area placing greater importance on new product fields. 
Overall, telecom firms are more similar to other hitech firms than to component 
35 Preliminary analyses explored the effect of excluding cases where the export rate was based on 
values estimated by EUROSTAT. Including these cases had a minor effect on the telecom firms, but 
no effect on the component firms. Therefore, cases with estimated values are included in the 
regressions presented in Table 12.3. 
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firms. Export share for components increases with firm size, foreign ownership, and 
I 
the importance of innovation to reduce costs (COSTGOAL). In contrast, there is no 
relationship between firm size and export share among telecom firms, nor .with 
foreign ownership. Of perhaps greater interest are the positive results for patents as 
a source of information (PATENT), innovative product share (IPRODSH), and 
. , , participation in cooperative R&D programmes (COOPRD). IPRODSH is a measure 
of innovative success based on a high percentage of new or changed products, while 
both PATENT and COOPRD can indicate advanced innovative activities. Firms that 
find patent searches, for example, to be a valuable source of information could either 
be searching for information on their competitors, keeping current with the latest 
developments, or determining if their innovations are patentable36• All of these 
reason are likely to be related to the closeness of a. firm to the technological frontier. 
The same could be true for firms that participate in cooperative R&D. 
12.4 Concluding Comments 
The investigation of export share between telecom and component firms highlight 
several differences between the European telecom sector, where Europe exports more 
high technology products than it imports, and the components sector, where the 
reverse is true. The component sector has a higher export share by non-innovating 
than by innovating firms, and among innovators there are no positive effects for 
measures of innovative success or advanced innovative capabilities. Instead, the 
general picture is of high export rates by non-innovating firms and by large 
innovative firms, without any positive effects for measures of innovative success. In 
contrast, the telecom sector has a much higher export rate among innovating firms, 
a low rate among non-innovators, no relationship with firm size (perhaps indicating 
a healthy level of competitiveness among SMEs in this sector), and higher export 
rates among firms with a high percentage of innovative products in total sales. 
36 A better indicator of the latter would be to use the question on the importance of patents as a 
means of appropriation. This was not done because the appropriation questions were not asked in 
several key countries. 
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APPENDIX A 
METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES OF THE CIS SURVEY 
Al. INTRODUCTION 
The CIS survey is designed to obtain data on innovation from a wide range of 
industrial sectors, across the full spectrum of firm size, and in all of the EU countries. 
It also introduced several questions on innovative activities that have not been widely 
tested in earlier surveys. Both of these characteristics can cause the CIS survey results 
for the telecom equipment sector to fail to meet expectations. Questions designed for 
all industrial sectors can miss important factors that are unique to telecom equipment 
and untested questions can give unexpected results. The purpose of this Appendix 
is to evaluate the ability of the CIS survey to adequately measure innovation in the 
telecom equipment sector and to make recommendations for future innovation 
surveys of this industry. 
Three main methodological issues are explored below. The first section uses public 
data to validate the CIS estimates for several quantitative variables. This analysis 
concerns survey and sampling methods. The second section looks specifically at 
problems and shortcomings with the design of the questionnaire, while the third 
section looks at the issue of aggregation across industrial sectors. 
A2. VERIFICATION OF CIS ESTIMATES 
The CIS survey obtains data for a total of 210 EU firms producing telecom equipment 
in Norway and in up to six EU countries: Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, and Ireland. The results for these firms, which form an unknown percentage 
of all telecom firms in each country, are used to estimate the innovative strategies of 
telecom firms in these countries, and by implication for the telecom equipment sector 
in general in the EU. 
The CIS results given in Part Two are almost always based on weighted estimates, 
where the results for a few respondents are taken as representative for a much larger 
number of firms. The accuracy with which these CIS estimates approach the true, 
unknown values depends on three main factors. The first factor is the survey 
methodology, including the reliability of the sample frames, and the weighting 
factors. The second factor consists of any distortion of the original survey results 
introduced by the micro-aggregation process used by EUROSTAT to protect 
confidentiality (Eurostat, 1994). The third factor is the reliability of the values, for 
example for total sales and number of employees, provided by the respondents to the 
75 
survey. 
It is not possible here to untangle the contribution of each of these three factors to 
any errors in the CIS estimates, but it is possible to estimate the percentage of the EU 
telecom equipment sector that is covered by the CIS survey and the approximate size 
of the error for several quantitative variables by comparing the CIS estimates against 
publicly-available data. Relatively complete and presumably accurate public data is 
available for the telecom sector for production, exports, and employment. Most of 
this data, derived from the series Yearbook of World Electronic's Data (YWED), has been 
presented in Part One or in Appendix B. 
A2.1 CIS Coverage of the EU Telecom Equipment Sector 
CIS data for the telecom equipment sector is available for only six of the 12 EU 
countries at the time of the survey. No useable data is available for the UK, Greece 
and Portugal because of low response rates, or the absence of weightings to adjust 
for differences in response rates, and it is not possible to separate telecom from 
component and television manufacturers for Luxembourg, Denmark, and Spain. 
However, based on production data (Table B-2), the six countries with useable data 
accounted for 80.0% of telecom equipment production in the EU in 19921• The major 
drawback is the lack of data for the UK and Spain, which contributed 13.7% and 5.7% 
respectively of total EU telecom production in 1990. The lack of data for Denmark is 
less important since it only contributed to 0.7% of total EU production. 
A related question concerning the coverage of the CIS survey is whether or not it 
includes Europe's largest telecom firms, who are probably responsible for the lion's 
share of production and innovation in this sector. The micro-aggregation process 
makes it impossible to answer with any certainty whether or not any of these nine 
firms are included in the survey. However, the CIS data includes 17 firms with 
micro-aggregated sales over 0.25 billion ECUs and 10 with sales over 0.5 billion. This 
suggests that it is reasonably likely that some of Europe's largest telecom firms are 
included in the CIS results. 
1 Excludes Portugal and Greece, which have minimal telecom equipment industries. 
2 Total telecom equipment sales of the 14 largest European firms listed in Table 3 of Part One is 
48.4 billion US, which in fact exceeds the total EU production of 41.9 billion in the same year. The 
discrepancy is probably due to several factors: the total sales of these 14 firms includes production 
outside of the EU, it includes re-exports, and includes some products that are excluded from the 
production figures, which are limited to line telephony and radio and broadcast equipment. 
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A2.2 Validation of CIS Estimates 
CIS estimates for three quantitative variables, production, exports, and employment, 
are validated against the combined YWED data for line telephony and radio and 
broadcast communication equipment. This combination (equal to the wide definition 
of the telecom equipment sector in Table 1, Part One) is equivalent to NACE sector 
322, used to classify telecom equipment firms in the CIS survey. 
The results are given in Table A-1. The CIS estimates give the sum of production or 
exports across all respondents in a given country. For example, the unweighted CIS 
estimate for telecom equipment production-for Germany is 4527 million ECUs, which 
is obtained by summing the sales of all German telecom equipment firms that 
responded to the survey. For Germany, the YWED estimate of total production is 
8518 million ECUs3• This figure is used to calculate the proportion of actual 
production, in this case 0.53 (4527 /8518), that is produced by CIS respondent firms. 
The sum of the unweighted CIS values for exports and employees should be less than 
the actual values, though the amount by which they differ will depend on the 
percentage of all telecom firms that replied to the survey . and their relative 
importance to the telecom industry. This sum, for example, could be a significant 
fraction of all exports if several ofthe largest exporters replied to the survey, even 
if the total response rate was very low. The sum of unweighted sales should be a 
relatively higher proportion of actual production values, compared to the equivalent 
proportions for exports and employees, because the production figures exclude 
imports and re-exports of finished goods, whereas both of these can be included in 
the sales reported by the firms on the CIS questionnaire. In theory, the weighted CIS 
estimates should roughly approximate the actual values for exports and employees, 
but the weighted sales values should overestimate actual production. 
The results given in Table A-1 confirm several of these expectations. Unweighted 
production estimates are higher than the equivalent for exports and employees, and 
the weighted estimates for total sales considerably exceed the actual production 
values by 1.89 times. In contrast, the total weighted estimate for exports is very close 
to actual estimates, with only a slight overestimate of 3%. 
The results by country, however, point to a few problems with the CIS data. The 
weighted sales values for Germany, Belgium, and Ireland of 2.68, 2.13, and 1.95 times 
higher, respectively, than actual production could exceed what would be expected 
3 The actual telecom production for each EU country is given in Table B-2 in US dollars. These 
values are converted to ECUs using an average US/ECU exchange rate of 0.77 for 1992. 
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after allowingfor the fact that sales can be greater than production. This can be 
explained for Belgium and Ireland by sales of imports and re-exports, since Belgium 
serves as an entrepot centre for Europe while Ireland has substantial assembly 
operations using imported components (YWED, 1996). However, the high ratio of 2.68 
for Germany suggests that the CIS results inaccurately overestimate the true value 
of German sales of telecom equipment. The number of employees for Germany and 
exports for Italy and Belgium are also substantially overestimated, though the CIS 
estimate of exports for Germany is very close to the actual value. 
The cause of the overestimates, from poor sampling or inaccurate weightings, the 
micro-aggregation process, or respondent error, cannot be determined. However, one 
specific cause of error, which should be corrected in future surveys, is caused by the 
sampling unit. CIS data is obtained at the enterprise level, but as shown in Table 3 
of Part One, not all of the sales of Europe's major telecom producers are in telecom 
equipment. For some telecom equipment firms, the majority of sales are in other 
product lines, while even major telecom manufacturers such as Racal or Alcatel have 
a significant proportion of their total sales in other products. This can create two 
types of error. First, firms with only a small relative proportion of total sales in 
telecom could be classified in another product group. This would underestimate total 
activity in telecom. Second, the telecom sector can include firms with sales in other 
product lines. This would overestimate telecom activity and could be the explanation 
for many of the overestimates, particularly of production and employees for German 
firms. The consistent overestimates for Italy for all three variables are also likely to 
be explained by this problem, since the results for Italy are based on a census that 
obtained responses from 70% of all Italian industrial firms. Therefore it is unlikely 
that errors in the sampling frame is the cause of these overestimates. The solution is 
·to sample, wherever possible, at the level of the line of business, for example by 
sampling divisions or subsidiaries that specialise in one sector. 
The practical effects of the tendency for the CIS data to give inaccurate estimates for 
several countries of these three key variables suggests caution in the use and 
interpretation of sales or employee weighted values for main innovation indicators 
such as R&D intensity. This is unfortunate, since for some purposes sales or 
employee weighted values give a better measure of actual conditions in a sector than 
the alternative of firm-based averages. 
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Table A-1 Weighted and unweighted CIS survey estimates of telecom equipment production, exports, and employees and the 
ratio of CIS estimates to actual figures for the telecom equipment sector in 1992 
Production1 Exports2 Employees3 
Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Weighted 
CIS est Ratio CIS est Ratio CIS est Ratio CIS est Ratio CIS est Ratio CIS est Ratio 
Germany 4527.5 0.53 22842.6 2.68 605.8 0.21 3032.0 1.03 32980 0.43 170211 2.20 
France 4946.7 0.75 9127.5 1.39 1179.4 0.35 2120.4 0.63 36006 0.45 69441 0.87 
Italy 6416.1 • 1.17 '8179.3 1.50 863.6 1.40 1108.9 1.80 54341 1.05 67930 1.31 
Holland 681.8 0.59 965.1 0.83 243.8 0.39 338.6 0.55 4784 - 6936 -
Belgium 2291.5 2.00 2435.3 2.13 1707.9 3.04 1737.4 3.19 16609 - 18559 -
Ireland 225.7 0.70 628.3 1.95 111.3 0.49 308.3 1.35 1388 0.13 3821 0.36 
Norway 146.6 0.37 275.7 0.69 115.1 0.50 218.1 0.94 1081 0.21 2002 0.39 
TOTAL 19235.9 0.82 44453.8 1.89 4826.9 0.56 8863.7 1.03 147189 - 338900 -
1
: Actual production data for 1992 from YWED (1994), while the CIS data is for micro-aggregated sales data. Sales data can differ from production data since the later does 
not include imports or re-exports of finished goods. 
2
: Actual export data for 1992 from YWED (1994). Results are similar, though not identical, when ITU trade data is used. The CIS data is estimated from the !espondent's 
estimate of the fraction of total sales that are exported. 
3: Actual employee data based on Table 6, Part One. Data for France, Germany, and Italy includes military applications such as radar and navigational systems, data for Ireland 
includes consumer electronics, and data for Norway includes Radio, TV and communications equipment. All of these employee counts probably overestimate the actual numbers 
employed in NACE 32.2 activities. For example, NACE 32.2 excludes radar and navigational equipment. Results for Ireland, Italy and Germany also based on extrapolating 
employment for 1992 from other years. 
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A3. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR QUESTIONNAIRE DESIGN 
The CIS questionnaire is designed to be applicable to all industrial sectors. Though 
this permits comparisons between industries, it unfortunately means that the CIS 
survey does not obtain information on several topics that are important to an 
assessment of innovation in the telecom equipment sector. These topics are briefly 
outlined below, including recommendations for changes to questionnaire design that 
would improve our knowledge about innovation in the telecom equipment sector4• 
Intra-firm linkages 
The telecom equipment sector is characterised by a few large firms that control a 
substantial proportion of the market, plus a large number of small and mid-sized 
firms, many of which probably act as suppliers to a single or limited number of 
dominant firms. These ownership and supplier links can have a significant impact on 
the innovative activity of the supplier firm, for example if innovation is largely under 
the control of the parent or dominant firm. 
The CIS questionnaire attempts to identify firms that are owned by a larger parent, 
though both an evaluation of the survey by Archibugi et al (1995) and our own 
research indicates that the relevant question groups (enterprise structure and question 
4.1 and 4.2) are not effective in differentiating firms by ownership. Furthermore, it is 
not possible to determine if most of a SME' s sales are intermediate goods that are 
sold to one or a few other firms. Better designed questions are therefore needed both 
to determine a firm's ownership and the proportion of its sales that go to final 
consumers and to other firms as intermediate inputs. It would also be useful to have 
information on the proportion of output that is purchased by national and foreign 
PITs. 
Product lines 
As shown in Part One, the telecom equipment sector contains several main product 
lines with different growth rates and markets. For example, the market for mobile 
telephones and transmission equipment is growing in Europe and in other regions, 
while the major growth market for line telephony, with the exception of broad-band 
systems, is in developing economies. These different markets could influence 
innovation strategies. Therefore, it would be valuable tq collect innovation data for 
sub-sectors of NACE 322 such as mobile communications, line switching and 
4 Some of these omissions in the CIS questionnaire also apply to other industrial sectors. In 
addition, the CIS questionnaire contains other shortcomings that are applicable to all industries, 
including telecom equipment. Most of these problems with the design of the CIS questionnaire are not 
discussed here, since they are addressed in both other studies and in on-going research at MERIT. 
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transmission equipment, and other terminal and peripheral equipment. This would 
require changes to survey design to sample firms at the line of business instead of 
the enterprise level. 
Software development 
Telecom equipment combines communication, computer components, and software 
technologies. The latter is growing particularly important, while at the same time 
European capabilities in this area are thought to lag behind American firms. This 
should be forcing European telecom equipment firms to acquire software, either 
through alliances, R&D cooperative agreements, or direct purchases, from American 
firms. It would be of great value to be able to determine the extent to which this is 
occurring by including separate questions for software in Section IV of the CIS 
questionnaire on the acqu,isition and transfer of technology. Similarly, question 10c 
should be revised to include the percentage of R&D expended on software 
development, and a question on software could be added to Question 12 on factors 
hampering innovation. 
Standards and regulations 
As shown in the section on trends in Part One, both the direction of innovation and 
the likelihood of success are influenced by standards and regulations. In many cases 
these standards are vital to successful innovation because they reduce uncertainty. 
However, the relevant question on barriers (12.16) combines standards with 
'legislation' and 'taxation'. These various categories of government support or 
hindrance to innovation need to be separated. In addition, standards need to be 
defined. 
Exports 
The CIS questions on exports do not differentiate between exports to other EU 
countries and exports to the rest of the world. It would be worthwhile to collect this 
information, since data on exports outside of the EU would aid both in developing 
indexes of competitiveness and, combined with better data on product lines, provide 
insights into the types of telecom equipment products where European firms are most 
successful in export markets. 
A4. AGGREGATION BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR 
Research on innovation has consistently shown that the sector of activity of a firm has 
a large influence on innovation strategies (Pavitt, 1984; Levin et al, 1987; Arundel et 
al, 1995; EC, 1995; Klevorick et al, 1995). All industrial classification systems us~ 
several levels of detail, so that a four-digit industrial class is more narrowly defined 
81 
than a two-digit class. Most research studies on innovation use a two-digit 
classification group, either to protect confidentiality or to increase the number of 
observations in each group. This assumes that innovation strategies are relatively 
homogenous within each two-digit industrial class. A major question of interest is 
whether or not this assumption is valid. 
This issue can be explored here because Eurostat provided, on request, data for the 
NACE sector at the three digit level. It is therefore possible to compare the results for 
telecom equipment (32.2) against components (32.1) and with all NACE 32 
respondents for several key questions of interest. Telecom and components are 
related, since both are based on electronics and computerisation, and often the 
component sector produces intermediate inputs used by telecom firms. Despite this 
proximity, the results show that there are often statistically signijicant differences 
between telecom and component firms. These differences are, as expected, hidden by 
analyses at the two-digit level. 
Figure Al 
» 
R&D Intensity by Size for All NACE 32, Components and Telecom 
fncludes Innovating and Non-Innovatmg Firms 
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14 --------- -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
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Figure Al provides an example of how analyses at the two-digit level can mask very 
different results at a finer level of detail. The Figure graphs the relationship between 
firm size and R&D intensity for telecom, components, and all NACE 32 firms. The 
relationship is linear for telecom, but 'U' shaped for component firms, with the 
highest R&D intensity for the smallest and the larger size classes. Combining all 
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NACE 32 firms misleadingly suggests that the relationship between R&D intensity 
and firm size among telecom firms is also U shaped, when it is actually linear. 
Table A-2 summarizes differences between the component and telecom sectors, 
drawing on many of the results given in Part Two. 
Table A-2 Significant differences between component (NACE 32.1) and telecom 
(NACE 32.2) firms 
Variable or factor Explanation of differences 
Proportion of innovators 40.1% of component versus 28.7% of telecom firms innovate, due to 
a very low percentage of small innovative telecom firms. 
Innovation expenditures Component firms spend much more on R&D but telecom firms 
per employee spend more on all innovation expenditures. This difference is due to 
the low innovation rates by small firms, and disappears once firm 
size is controlled for. 
Importance of public After adjusting for firm size and other effects, there are differences 
research as a source of in the type of public research that is important to telecom and 
information component firms. Universities are very important to the former and 
government laboratories to the latter. 
Participation in Telecom firms that participate in cooperative R&D, compared to 
cooperative R&D telecom firms that do not, have a much lower percentage of 
programmes innovative new products. The opposite is true of component firms. 
Acquisition of A high proportion of component firms acquire new technologies 
technology through equipment purchases within Europe, but very few acquire 
technologies. from outside of Europe through this means. The 
opposite is true of telecom firms. 
Innovation objectives Increasing market share and new markets are considerably more 
important for component compared to telecom firms. 
Innovation barriers In general, a higher proportion of innovating component firms find 
specific barriers to be important than telecom firms. The opposite is 
true for non-innovating firms. 
Appropriation methods Telecom firms find patents and lead time advantages to be less 
effective than component firms, after controlling for the effect of 
firm size and R&D intensity. 
Export rates For innovators, export rates are positively correlated with the 
percentage of innovative products among telecom firms, but the 
relationship is negative for component firms. 
The results show that there is a wide range of differences between components and 
telecom, all of which are hidden by analyses based on the 2-digit NACE 32 class. 
Many of these factors, such as the types of public research that are found to be of 
value, innovation barriers, or the importance of patents, have direct consequences for 
policy, since they are amenable to government intervention. Results based on all 
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NACE 32 firms combined could produce misleading results for policy, for example 
by suggesting that there is no relationship between participation in cooperative R&D 
programmes and the proportion of innovative products among a firm's total sales, 
when in fact the lack of a relationship for all NACE respondents is a result of 
. combining a negative effect for telecom firms with a positive effect for component 
firms. 
Though the results summarized in Table A-2 show that significant differences can 
occur between different industries that are hidden by analyses at the two-digit level, 
in many cases there are no differences between telecom and component firms, 
particularly after controlling for firm size, which is equally if not more important 
than industrial sector as an influence on a firm's innovative activities and strategies. 
the conclusion to be drawn is that whether or not different industries can be 
combined is an empirical question that should be investigated in preliminary 
analyses. In the case of telecom equipment, there are clearly enough differences 
between telecom and component firms to warrant their separation. 
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Table B-1 Definitions of the Telecom Equipment Sector 
Narrow Wide Extended Mixed 
Main characteristic Focus on line telephony Includes telephony plus radio and TV Includes line telephony, radio Includes non-communication 
communication and broadcast and broadcast equipment, plus equipment 
equipment related products 
Product areas Electronic switching Radio communication equipment, coaxial and optical cables Studies based on two- or three-
included equipment including microwave and satellite digit sectoral classifications that 
systems telecom software include other products such as 
Transmission equipment electronic components, electro-
Radio & TV broadcasting equipment medical equipment, home 
Line, cordless, and cellular entertainment equipment, etc. 
telephones Public broadcast TV cameras 
Facsimile and other terminals 
Classification Panorama of European NACE (1990), ISIC (1989), CIS Communications Week NACE (1976 version), European 
systems and major Industry (1994), Yearbook of survey, PACE Report (1995), SITC, International Report on Science and Technology 
data sources that World Electronics Data Yearbook of World Electronics Data, Indicators (1994), Panorama of 
primarily use the OECD, 1991, Communications European Industry (1994) 
definition 1: Outlook, 1995 
- - ~---··-···-·-- --
1
: Each classification system and data source are assigned to the closest definition of the telecom sector, but there is rarely a perfect match. Some data sources use different 
definitions, depending on the purpose. For example, the Panorama report sometimes uses the narrow definition while in other cases it uses a mixed definition that also includes 
electro-medical equipment and meters & measuring devices. The Yearbook of World Electronics Data provides data at a finer level of detail that permits analyses at both the 
narrow and wide definition of the telecom equipment sector. 
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Table B-2 Market for telecom equipment (radio & broadcast equipment plus line telephony) in million US dollars in the EU-
15 countries1 plus Norway between 1989 and 1995 (Market size for 1995 estimated) 
Norway 
Austria 
Belgium 
Denmark 
FinJand 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
TOTAL (EU only) 
Share of big 4 (% )2 
Source: YWED 1992, 1994, 1996. 
1
: Excludes Portugal and Greece. 
2
: France, Germany, Italy and the UK. 
1989 1990 
538 622 
475 576 
1042 1384 
343 340 
478 551 
6041 7427 
5744 7183 
255 326 
5661 7400 
1394 1622 
2882 3871 
1240 1360 
6054 5843 
31609 37883 
74.35 73.52 
1991 1992 1993 
631 643 615 
528 690 659 
1409 1336 1371 
304 288 290 
498 441 328 
6994 7651 6795 
9277 10073 8634 
330 346 314 
7548 7534 5172 
1725 _1736 
' 
1520 
3264 2446 1721 
1536 1534 1121 
5222 5400 4247 
38635 39475 32172 
75.17 77.66 77.23 
------------ ··----
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1994 1995 
680 698 
780 806 
1365 1342 
366 377 
385 388 
7668 7722 
8263 8266 
343 359 
5500 5604 
1572 1580 
1911 1969 
1209 1185 
4721 4841 
34083 34439 
76.73 76.75 . 
Table B-3 Production of telecom equipment (Radio & broadcasting plus line telephony) in the EU 15 countries1 plus Norway 
in million US dollars between 1989 and 1995 (1995 estimated) 
Norway 
Austria 
Finland 
Sweden 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Germany 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Spain 
UK 
TOTAL (EU only) 
Share of big 4 (% )2 
Source: YWED 1992, 1994, 1996. 
1
: Excludes Portugal and Greece. 
2
: France, Germany, Italy and the UK. 
1989 
445 
345 
750 
2381 
1153 
361 
6460 
6649 
318 
5324 
1079 
2399 
5493 
32712 
73.14 
1990 1991 
550 576 
401 384 
934 663 
2660 2899 
1471 1494 
395 280 
7989 7895 
8178 10280 
345 407 
6847 6878 
1375 1372 
3184 2834 
5580 5281 
39359 40667 
72.65 74.59 
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1992 1993 - 1994 1995 
521 466 500 516 
508 496 624 601 
817 1070 1607 1789 
2977 2540 3184 3483 
1486 1610 1866 1953 
255 264 297 315 
8533 7696 8590 8868 
11062 9616 10141 10315 
418 388 503 596 
-
7100 5060 5102 5127 
1507 1420 1395 1391 
2127 1752 1969 2039 
5149 5143 6292 6704 
41939 37055 41570 43181 1 
75.93 74.25 I 72.47 71.82 i 
Table B-4 Employment in electronic goods or a sub-category that includes telecom equipment between 1986 and 1994, for 
selected EU countries, depending on data availability 
Category 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Denmark Radio, TV and communications equip 12,400 11,874 
Finland All electronics 37,000 28,500 28,900 
Radio, TV and communications equip 11,400 11,100 
France All electronics 386,500 189,138 170,601 
Communication (incl military) & telecom equip 79,760 69,600 
Germany Communication (incl military) & telecom equip 102,150 89,540 70,994 
Ireland All electronics 27,000 33,500 37,200 
Communications, telecom and consumer electr 10,000 11,800 
Italy All electronics 196,520 185,384 
Communication (incl military) & telecom equip 47,405 
Netherlands All electronics and electrical 107,000 103,030 
Norway All electronics and electrical 13,000 14,461 
Radio, TV and communications 5,144 
Spain All electronics 58,430 52,680 48,028 41,877 40,442 
Sweden All electronics 64,000 41,043 30,400 
Radio, TV, communications 16,455 
UK All electronics 367,820 364,793 351,866 
Line telephony 41,662 38,091 31,025 
Source: YWED 1992, 1994, 1996 
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Table B-5 Sales-Weighted R&D Intensities (percent) of Major Industrial Sectors 
Sector PACW CIS2 (R&D per- CIS2 (all 
form~rs only) firms) 
Aerospace3 17.88 
- -
Pharmaceuticals3 11.88 - -
Instruments4 7.88 7.90 7.51 
Electrical equipment 7.88 6.43 4.46 
Telecbm .. ~ipment 7.35 'u.27 10~99 
Computers & Office equipment 4.95 7.01 6.71 
Rubber & Plastics 4,18 4.07 2.41 
Automobiles 3.67 4.94 4.86 
Chemicals6 3.06 4.07 3.81 
Machinery 2.60 2.80 2.01 
Non-metallic mineral products 1.35 4.06 3.00 
Fabricated metal products 1.24 1.27 0.96 
Petroleum products 1.03 0.13 0.13 
Basic metals 0.88 0.97 0.87 
Food and beverages 0.44 0.57 0.38 
1
: Limited to sectors with a minimum of 10 firms that reported results for both R&D expenditures and sales. Total 
number of PACE cases covered in this table is 418. Limited to firms that appeared to report R&D expenditures 
and sales only for their telecom equipment operations. Excludes France, Portugal and Greece. 
2
: CIS estimates do not use original data for each firm but are based on micro-aggregated data, estimates, and 
weights to account for differences in sampling and response rates by country. This could create inaccurate 
estimates of average R&D intensities. The estimate includes firms in Norway but excludes France, the UK, 
Portugal and Greece. 
3
: CIS data only available at the 2-digit level and therefore unavailable for these sectors. 
4
: PACE results based on the average per firm. 
5
: PACE data includes firms from Denmark, UK, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and Spain. CIS results limited to 
firms from Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium, Ireland and Norway. 
6
: CIS estimate includes pharmaceutical firms, which will overestimate the average R&D intensity compared to 
PACE, where pharmaceutical firms are analyzed separately. 
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Table B-6 Trade Balance by EU Country for Telecom Equipment (Million US $) 
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 
Belgium & Lux 266.44 24.63 129.87 86.20 80.63 83.96 0.00 
France 790.70 321.06 135.44 238.04 202.52 250.17 484.47 
Germany 1070.06 422.94 158.66 -181.85 -435.32 -184.27 123.19 
Ireland 66.89 94.36 80.77 7.36 95.65 68.01 -348.10 
Italy -7.61 -464.60 -447.42 -676.95 -937.70 -696.80 -260.98 
Netherlands -80.02 -316.21 -441.51 -153.08 -407.63 -424.29 4.82 
Norway -247.34 -167.67 -125.01 -114.87 -109.99 -175.88 -225.26 
Denmark 22.55 69.09 120.54 184.91 42.28 65.66 15.18 
Greece -113.56 -131.66 -175.33 -150.13 -188.55 -219.86 -78.90 
Portugal -120.60 -224.40 -166.18 -235.56 -305.79 -470.17 -52.05 
Spain -587.08 -776.98 -1182.78 -1366.45 -1249.40 -977.54 -1211.47 
Austria -120.32 -193.22 -296.13 -410.25 -351.20 -430.32 -542.26 
Finland 79.98 92.82 198.39 373.62 114.68 372.48 725.34 
Sweden 805.39 1137.23 1205.61 1378.64 1424.15 1572.85 1862.66 
Source: Stars Database, International Telecommunications Union, 1994. 
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Table B-6 National Distribution of CIS NACE 32 Firms (N = number of observations, 
Weightd = number of observations after weighting) 
NACE32 Nace 32.1 
Estimated All Cases Components 
Country 
Sampling 
N Weightd N Weightd Rate 
Germany 21.2% 661 1280 29 738 
France 22.2% 77 513 38 282 
Italy 66.8% 249 397 103 165 
Holland 46.8% 11 34 0 0 
Belgium 50.7% 20 118 10 89 
Lux.2 - 4 6 - -
UK2.3 
- 4 - - -
Ireland 38.5% 39 102 20 53 
Denmark 38.5% 28 93 - -
Greece2.3 
- 16 - - -
Spain2 25.0% 42 194 - -
Portugal2.3 - 2 - - -
Norway 76.1% 11 19 2 2 
TOTAL 47.5% 569 2757 202 1328 
I 
1
: Includes one firm that could not be classified at the three digit level. 
2
: NACE only available at the two-digit level. 
3
: No weighting data available. 
' 
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Nace 32.2 
Telecom 
N Weightd 
15 257 
30 180 
129 204 
11 34 
10 30 
- -
- -
11 29 
- -
- -
- -
- -
4 8 
210 742 
Nace 32.3 
HEE 
N Weightd 
21 280 
9 51 
17 29 
0 0 
0 0 
- -
- -
8 21 
- -
- -
- -
- -
5 9 
60 388 
TABLE B-7 Description of Variables Used in the CIS Analyses 
Interval variables 
EXPORTS 1992 exports I total1992 sales 
LEMPLOY The log of the number of employees 
S-GROWTH Percent increase in sales from 1990 to 1992 
RDINTENS 1992 expenditures on R&D I 1992 total sales 
IPRODSH Percent of incrementally and significantly changed products combined in total1992 
sales 
SPRODSH Percent of significantly changed products combined in total1992 sales 
Dummy variables 
The rating for dummy variables based on subjective five-point scale questions is 1 = insignificant, 2 
= slightly significant, 3 = moperately significant, 4 = very important, 5 = crucial. 
COMPET 
CONSULT 
COOPRD 
COPYEASE 
DOMESTIC 
ECONCOST 
EURMARK 
FORMARK 
LACKINFO 
LACKPERS 
LOWRCOST 
MAINPROD 
MSHARE 
NEWPROD 
PATENT 
PUB RES 
QUALITY 
TELECOM 
Indexes 
1 =importance of competitors as an information source is 4 or 5, 0 =other 
1 =importance of consultants as an information source is 3, 4 or 5, 0 =other 
1 = participate in cooperative R&D programmes, 0 = no participation 
1 =innovation too easy to copy as a barrier to innovation is 4 or 5, 0 =other 
1 = firms with their head office in the country where they are located, 0 = other 
1 =any of the four economic barriers to innovation is 4 or 5, 0 =other 
1 =creating new national or EC markets is a 5, 0 =other 
1 =creating ne'o/ markets in the US, Japan or other countries is 3, 4 or 5, 0= other 
1 =lack of technical information as a barrier to innovation is 4 or 5, 0 =other 
1 =lack of skilled personnel as a barrier to innovation is 4 or 5, 0 =other 
1 =reducing either wage costs, materials consumption, or energy consumption is 5, 
0 = other 
1 =importance of extending the main product field as a goal of innovation is 4 or 5, 
0 = other 
1 = importance of increasing or maintainin market share as a goal of innovation is 4 
or 5, 0 = other 
1 = importance of creating new products outside the main field as a goal of 
innovation is 4 or 5, 0 = other 
1 =importance of patent disclosures as a source of information is 4 or 5, 0 =other 
1 = either government labs or universities as a source of information is 4 or 5, 0 = 
other 
1 =quality as a goal of innovation is 4 or 5, 0 =other 
1 = telecom firms, 0 =other NACE 32 firms 
COSTGOAL Sum of scores for the importance of reducing wage, materials, and energy costs . 
• 
93 
I 
r • 
, I 
' ' 
,-
' 
' . 
B2: PROPORTION OF ESTIMATED VALUES FOR NACE 32 RESPONDENTS 
In addition to the micro-aggregation process, which altered the value of variables 
reported by the respondents to the CIS questions in order to protect confidentiality, 
EUROSTAT also assigned values to questions that the respondent did not answer. 
The method used to estimate missing values varies from assigning a value of '1' to 
ordinal scale questions that were left unanswered to using regression techniques to 
estimate the value of interval data such as the amount spent on R&D. Though the 
forll'l:er estimates are reasonable if at least one other question in a set of ordinal 
questions was answered, the latter technique could lead to spuriously good 
regression results, particularly if the regression largely repeats the estimation method 
used by EUROSTAT. In order to avoid this possibility, it is importa~t to kriow the 
percentage of responses that are original and not estimated by EUROSTAT. A 
variable with a low percentage of original values (and therefore a high estimation rate 
by EUROSTAT) must be used with caution, particularly in certain types of 
regressions. 
The original response rate can be estimated using the 'Q' flag variables in the CIS 
data. A missing value to the Q variable means that the value of the variable with the 
same name was not estimated by EUROSTAT. Results for ordinal scale variables are 
given in Table 1 and results for nominal and interval variables are given in Table 2. 
The results are based on weighted counts to reflect the true impact of estimated 
values in the data analyses. Variables for which less than 80% of the values are 
original are marked in bold type and variables for which over 80% but less than 90% 
of the values are original are in italics. We assume that variables for which less than 
80% of the values are original could create serious problems in some regression 
analyses and caution is warranted for variables where between 80% and 90% of the 
values are original. Conversely, there should be few problems l:lsing variables where 
over 90% of the values are original. 
The results for ordinal variables, given in Table A.1, show that the original value 
percentage for most variables is over 90%. The greatest need for caution is with the 
protection questions for process innovations. The results for nominal and interval 
variables shown in Table A.2, indicate that there are likely to be severe difficulties in 
using the variables for total innovation expenditures, 1992 external R&D 
expenditures, and the percentage of 1992 sales in the introductory to growth stages, 
since only 37% 69.7%, and 73.4% respectively, are original, unestimated values. 
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Table B-8 Percentage of Original Unestimated Values (UV) for Ordinal variables 
among the NACE 32 Respondents: Weighted Results 
Sources1 uv Objectives1 uv Protection1 uv Barriers2 UVNI UVI 
(Question 4) (Question 5) (Question 9) (Question 12) 
4.1 85.2 5.1 90.7 9.1a 86.2 12.1 98.0 97.1 
4.2 95.83 5.2 91.2 9.2a 86.9 12.2 99.6 98.2 
4.3 91.9 5.3 87.1 9.3a - 90.4 12.3 98.4 98.1 
4.4 92.4 5.4 90.5 9.4a 85.8 12.4 97.6 97.0 
4.5 92.6 5.5 92.4 9.5a 87.3 12.5 93.63 94.~ 
4.6 92.5 5.6 89.~ 12.6 97.5 97.5 
4.7 91.8 5.7 90.~ 9.1b 81.6 12.7 97.5 97.8 
4.8 92.3 5.8 90.Ql 9.2b 80.6 12.8 97.5 97.9 
4.9 91.9 5.9 91.43 9.3b 81.0 12.9 98.8 97.6 
4.10 92.1 5.10 91.9 9.4b 80.0 12.10 98.0 97.4 
4.11 92.3 5.11 92.9 9.5b 78.5 12.11 98.0 96.0 
4.12 92.2 5.12 92.8 12.12 97.6 97.6 
4.13 92.1 5.13 92.3 12.13 93.1 88.7 
5.14 97.63 12.14 94.63 94.0l 
5.15 96.33 12.15 98.0 97.0 
5.16 92.0 12.16 96.7 96.5 
5.17 92.~ 12.17 97.1 97.6 
5.18 91.2 12.18 97.1 97.7 
Average 91.9 91.9 83.g4 
1
: Responses for a maximum of 384 innovating {I) firms. 
2
: Responses for a maximum of 163 non-innovating (NI) and 384 innovating {I) firms. 
3
: Some missing values in the original data that were not estimated by EUROSTAT, for example when the 
question was not asked in one or more countries. These cases are excluded from the estimates of the percent 
of original values since they are not used in the data analyses. 
4
: The average is 87.3 for product protection methods (questions with an 'a') and 80.3 for process protection 
methods (questions with a 'b'). 
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Table B-9 Percentage of Original Unestimated Values for Important Nominal and 
Interval Variables for the NACE 32 Respondents: Weighted results for 
Innovators only 
Variables (CIS question number) CIS question Percent 
. . Employee number (F) F 99.7 
1992 sales J 98.4 
t 1992 R&D expenditures v10d.1 88.8 
1992 external R&D expenditures v10d.2 69.7 
1992 R&D Intensity J & v10d.1 87.4 
Engage in R&D V10a 84.7 
1990 sales M 93.9 
1992 export sales L 96.2 
Percent of 1992 sales due to exports J &L 96.2 
Percent change in sales between 1990 and 1992 J&M 93.7 
Total innovation expenditures v13a 37.0 
R&D expenditures as a percentage of total innovation expenditures v10d.2 & v13a 35.1 
Percent R&D for product or process innovation v10C.1 & v10C.2 85.4 
Percentage of 1992 sales in the introductory to growth stage v14.1 to v14.4 73.4 
Percentage of 1992 sales from products that are unchanged to significantly v15a.1 to v15a.3 82.2 
changed 
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